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A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: INFUSING THE LABOR UNION
DUES DISPUTE WITH FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES
Harry G. Hutchison*
ABSTRACT
This article deploys public choice theory and postmodem identity claims to develop
a far-reaching understanding of the union dues dispute, which suggests that the burden
of proof on the existence of and/or the possibility of an enduring union community
should be placed on proponents of this view. While the postmodern project can be seen
as an unsettled approach that is riven by coherency issues, not the least, its insistence
on offering the good without the true, it supplies modest benefits by revealing the
conceivably infinite varieties of human preferences in contemporary America. The
absence of preference convergence, understood from the perspective of both public
choice theory and postmodern identity construal, vitiates prevalent assertions that
unions operate as a paradigm of voluntary cooperation characterized by solidarity.
The conflict between putative solidarity and the actual presence of preference diver-
sity might well be the genesis of this ongoing dispute.
Secondly, I both consider and differ with the Ninth Circuit's recent holding in
United Food and Commercial Workers v. NLRB, which enforced an NLRB order re-
quiring dues objectors to fund union organizing expenses despite a largely contrary
holding by the Supreme Court in Ellis v. Railway Clerks. I expose the Ninth Circuit's
opinion to a wide-ranging perspective on both First Amendment values and free-
rider issues. Conventional analysis suggests that union organizing expenses, on
their face, do not provide evidence of either a political or an ideological purpose, if,
of course, ideologically grounded objections to collective bargaining are overlooked.
Even so, a conventional analyst must concede that the legitimacy of the implication
of First Amendment norms is both contingent and contextual. It is contingent on the
actual purpose that organizing and consequent union revenue augmentation can be
seen to serve. It is contextual in the sense that organizing can be linked to an ongoing
effort to stem the degeneration in union economic power and the fear that the cur-
rently substantial political influence of unions will diminish in the future.
* Visiting Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law; Professor of Law,
Wayne State University Law School. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful
to Elizabeth McKay, Charles Baird, Kingsley Browne, Byron Cooper, Ross Davies, John
Dolan, Leon Lysaght, Morgan Reynolds, James Ross, Ronald Rotunda, Linda Shin, Stephen
Spurr, and Todd Zywicki. The usual disclaimer applies. This article was sharpened by the
opportunity to reconsider my research during my stay at the McLeod Ranch. Many thanks
to the Michael and Rona Pay Trust for this opportunity. © Harry G. Hutchison
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This examination endangers the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that union expen-
ditures aimed at organizing competing firms can be seen as germane within the
meaning of the NLRA. I intend to show that union expenditures, such as organiz-
ing, that do not embrace an explicitly political purpose can nevertheless diminish the
interest of workers in freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a variety of
other interests that allow individual workers and subgroups of workers to define their
own identities in what has become a pluralistic society. Lastly, I supply a number of
proposals for clarifying judicial, NLRB, and scholarly analysis associated with the
intensely fought debate over union dues. These proposals offer a clearing in a dense
forest that has obscured the necessity of establishing a causal connection between
contested union expenses, such as union organizing, and an actual, as opposed to an
attenuated, collective bargaining purpose.
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A CLEARING IN THE FOREST
INTRODUCTION
We find ourselves in a society that is waiting, but does not know what it is
waiting for. "The feeling of being locked in implies the dream of liberation and
implies, too, the suspicion of something hidden beyond the confines of daily life,
however adequate daily life is claimed to be."'
Americans live in a society in which individuals increasingly populate a variety
of groups while waiting, ineffably, for something. Equally likely, people, individu-
ally and collectively, look for some form (among many possible forms) of liberation.
In such a society, human choice (both individually and collectively) may be seen as
a vehicle to find meaning in a life that seems to confront endless possibilities. If
Chantal Delsol's bracing intuition is correct, it is probable that any contemporary
evaluation of labor unions dues and union security agreements 2 as the primary costs
of union membership, raises unavoidable questions about the nature of autonomy,
individual as opposed to group motivation, and uncertainty about the goals that unions,
like other groups, endeavor and ought to pursue. Inevitably, self-interest, preferences,
the boundaries of consent, and the benefits and costs of collective action are arranged
against the possibility that "a broad definition of unions' societal function... require[s]
... limiting individual rights"3 and choices. Such issues unavoidably fuse politics,
economics, and First Amendment norms. These issues become ever more poignant
' CHANTAL DELSOL, ICARuS FALLEN: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD xxvii (2003).
2 Union security agreements are contracts between a union and an employer in which
the employer requires all employees to undertake some specified level of support for the
union as a condition of employment. Union security agreements are not unlawful on their face,
nor does a union breach its duty of fair representation when it negotiates a union-security
provision that tracks the language of section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act of
1935 (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1935) (amended 1947) (2000), without explaining the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the language in Communications Workers of America v.
Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). See, e.g., Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 36
(1998). Pursuant to the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) decisions in California Saw
& Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995), and United Paperworkers Int'l Union (Weyerhauser
Paper Co.), 320 N.L.R.B. 349 (1995),
[a] union violate[s] its duty of fair representation by failing, when seeking
to obligate employees to pay fees and dues under a union-security clause,
to notify bargaining unit employees who were not union members that
they had the right under Beck to limit payment of their union-security
dues and initiation fees to moneys spent on activities germane to their
union's role as a [section] 9(a) bargaining representative.
Teamsters Local 75 (Schreiber Foods), 329 N.L.R.B. 28,29 (1999). The NLRB extended notifi-
cation rights to union members as well as nonmember unit employees. See United Paperworkers
Int'l Union (Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320 N.L.R.B. 349 (1995), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom., Buzenius v. NLRB, 124 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded sub nom.
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Buzenius, 525 U.S. 979 (1998).
3 George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187, 193 (1994).
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against a contemporary backdrop of emerging fissures within the union hierarchy
itself4 as well as persistent declines in union density rates.'
It has been observed that politics and economics have been divided traditionally
"by the types of questions they ask, the assumptions they make about individual moti-
vation, and the methodologies they employ.",6 It is frequently assumed in political
science "that political man pursues the public interest. Economics has assumed that
all men pursue their private interests."7 This dichotomy can no longer be seen as
valid.' Some commentators imply that human self-interest can be explained simply
as avaricious greed or monetary self-interest.9 A fuller description of human rationality
admits a wider array of explanations for the choices humans make than those supplied
by theorists who concentrate on instrumental rationality in some strictly pecuniary
sense.10 Because simple material gain supplies only "one of the many motives pro-
pelling economic [and other] activity,"" a richer appreciation of self-interest helps
to explain human behavior in a contemporary world populated more and more by
humans who see themselves as ever more autonomous individuals.
However self-interest is defined, a "large literature has grown up exploring the
properties of social welfare"' 2 within the context of social choice. These analyses
concentrate on the difficulty "of aggregating individual preferences to maximize a
social welfare function, or to satisfy some set of normative criteria."1 3 These conten-
tions carry with them ominous implications for the possibility of forging an enduring
' See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Two Top Unions Split From AFL-CIO; OthersAre Expected
to Follow Teamsters, WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at Al. ('Two of the nation's largest and
most powerful unions resigned from the AFL-CIO... as the labor movement struggles to
stem decades of decline and lost influence . . ").
5 Id. (discussing the decline in membership over the last decade).
6 DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 1 (rev. ed. 1989).
7 Id.
8 See id.
9 Cf. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 7 (1991) (presenting an invitation to accept a limited version of public choice
theory, suggesting that self-interest simply means avaricious greed in a simple monetary sense
and thus implying that self-interest can be separated from ideological/nonmaterial consider-
ations). That invitation is hereby declined.
"0 See Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction: Economic Approaches to Politics, in THE RATIONAL
CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF POLITICS RECONSIDERED 1, 20-21 (Jeffrey
Friedman ed., 1996) (discussing instrumental rationality and its limits as well as alternative
views on how human choice is formed); see also AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
10-28 (1987) (suggesting rationality can be variously viewed as consistency, as part of some
self-interest determination, and as part of Adam Smith's understanding of the term, which
taken together under Sen's analysis, implies that rationality must include more than narrow
self-interest in some purely pecuniary sense).
H ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 12 (1975).
12 MUELLER, supra note 6, at 3.
13 Id.
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community shaped by shared interests. These implications have consequences for
all individuals and all groups, not the least, labor unions, which operate under the
protection of a compulsory dues collection scheme. Consequences attend whether
or not unions can be seen as a form of majoritarian hegemony operating as statu-
torily privileged "mini-legislatures" '14 or, alternatively, as a group "to which the indi-
vidual has given her uncoerced express or tacit consent."'' 5 If individual assent cannot
be established, then it is unlikely that the group functions consistently with customary
explanations of the First Amendment's freedom of association discourse. 6 It is
possible that "[n]otions about groups, organizations, community and the characteristics
of human association ... are tied directly to our ideas of the meaning of personhood,"' 7
especially if individuals can be seen as existing "prior to any sort of relation with
others."'18 Because "any form of affiliation or association can impinge [on] ...
individual sovereignty,"' 9 human association may be viewed as "essentially artificial,
instrumental and temporary in character," 20 as well as an invasion of one's liberty
interest.
Undeniably, it is possible to maintain widely differing opinions about the indi-
vidual autonomy/liberty assessments21 that infuse these sentiments. Equally probable,
disagreements about First Amendment norms and doctrines simmer contemporane-
ously with the ongoing debate about what groups can legitimately demand of their
membership. Disagreements intensify because it is unlikely that a majority of workers
share the conviction that conventional unions are the best vehicles for the advancement
" Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Postmodern Unions: Identity Politics in the Work-
place, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1339, 1342-44 (1997) ("Under this view, collective bargaining was
conceived as a form of democratic self-government ... complete with general legislative
principles, including the principle of majority rule."). Majoritarian hegemony may no longer
be fully consistent with the NLRA because of the Taft-Hartley Amendments specifying that
individuals have the right to refrain from engaging in concerted activity as part of their interest
in autonomy. See Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditionsfor Self-Rule: Unions, Associations,
Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 149,
149-52.
'5 Kohler, supra note 14, at 183 (opposing this view).
i6 See id. at 182-86 (suggesting that "the language that informs our first amendment [sic]
discourse has taught us to regard freedom" in individualistic terms).
'7 Id. at 183.
18 id.
'9 Id. at 184.
20 Id.
21 For at least one perspective on liberty, see, for example, Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (suggesting "matters[] involving
the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
But see J. BUDZISZEwSKI, WHAT WE CAN'T NOT KNOW: A GUIDE 6-7 (2003) (offering a
cautionary explication on liberty and human autonomy with respect to moral choice).
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22
of their interests. Without such a conviction, the prospect of a collectively rational
outcome becomes difficult to imagine. Public choice and postmodernism have much
to say about groups, members, and their interactions, and they offer two contrasting,
yet complementary, viewpoints that may inform the labor union dues debate.
While public choice has always seen individual interest as distinct from group
interest, a postmodern recognition has more recently emerged that confirms an "ill
fit between the collective bargaining regime and [both] the identities of women and
people of color" and some forms of expressive individualism. 23 This recognition
"ha[s] led some to conclude that unions did not, and perhaps cannot, represent their
interests."'24 The historical record of American unions underscores this conclusion.
The record includes the exclusionary policies 25 of a number of labor unions, coupled
22 See Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12
LAB. LAW. 117, 118 n.2 (1996).
By an overwhelming 86% to 9% margin, workers want an organization
run jointly by employers and management, rather than an independent,
employee-run organization. By a smaller, but still sizable margin of
52% to 34%, workers want an organization to be staffed and funded by
the company, rather than independently through employee contributions.
Id. (quoting PRINCETON SuRv. RESEARCH Assocs. WORKER REPRESENTATION AND PARTICI-
PATION SURVEY: REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 49 (1994)).
23 McUsic & Selmi, supra note 14, at 1351.
24 id.
25 Exclusionary policies have largely been effected towards members of minority ethnic,
racial, and gender minority groups. On racial exclusion, see AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTr
RUDWICK, BLACK DETROrr AND THE RISE OF THE UAW 3 (1979) ("Since the turn of the century
the mainstream of the labor movement - the AFL unions and the Railway Brotherhoods
[have generally] excluded blacks or restricted them to jim crow units."). See also RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 166 (1995) (asserting that the evidence
demonstrates that labor statutes mandating collective bargaining "made it particularly dif-
ficult for black workers to maintain their economic power in the face of white-dominated
unions which represent them against their will"); W.H. HUTr, THE THEORY OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: 1930-1975, at 7 (1980) (relating that in practice, groups of workers can do
little to raise wages "unless they have power to prevent outsiders from entering the trade");
David T. Beito, Review of Only One Place of Redress by David Bernstein, 10 GEo. MASON
L. REV. 293, 295-96 (2001) (book review) (suggesting "that the railway union had barred
blacks from most of the best jobs on the railroad;" that both "Booker T. Washington and
W.E.B. Dubois spoke with almost a single voice in castigating organized labor as an enemy
of the race;" and that "skilled and unionized workers, who happened to be mostly white, [tried]
to shut out unskilled and nonunion workers who were often black."); David E. Bemstein,
Roots of the 'Underclass': The Decline ofLaissez-Faire Jurisprudence and the Rise ofRacist
Labor Legislation, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 85, 93-94, 99 (1993) (suggesting that the AFL deferred
to the prejudice of its southern white membership and acquiesced in discriminatory wage
levels and segregated facilities, and that the Railway Brotherhood regularly organized strikes
aimed at forcing employers to pursue a white-only hiring policy). On gender exclusion, see
Rosalie Nichols, Are Feminist Businesses Capitalistic?, in FREEDOM, FEMINISM, AND THE
STATE: AN OVERVIEW OF INDIWDUALISTIC FEMINISM 157, 161 (Wendy McElroy ed., 2d ed.
1991). See also Suzanne La Follette, The Economic Position of Women, in FREEDOM, FEMINISM,
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with the likelihood that "[t]o the extent that unions are successful, they redistribute
income toward their members, who are predominantly white, male, and well paid,
at the expense of consumers as a whole, taxpayers, nonunion workers, the poor, and the
unemployed." 26 Accordingly, the hopeful claim that unions operate as one "community
comprised of diverse groups is, for many, a concept that appears inherently coercive
and infused with notions of domination. 27 Perforce, arguments that call into question
union claims premised on an alleged uniformity of worker interest seem compatible
with arguments claiming freedom-of-association and freedom-of-speech violations.
These arguments may be against either closed or union shops, and provide a useful
perspective for enforcing Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which states: "No one may be compelled to belong to an association." 28 Collectively,
these observations breathe life into Charles Baird's contention "that forced bargain-
ing is never justified., 29 These observations also imply that compulsory union dues
are, and ought to be, a source of controversy - especially given the size of union
revenues.
According to the United States Department of Labor, labor unions receive up-
wards of $17 billion a year in revenues.3° Public and private sector unions and their
respective revenues cannot be clearly separated because they are often both affiliate
members of and contributors to the same national labor organization and share the
same mission.3" Separating public sector from private sector bargaining units is also
difficult because roughly one-half of a typical union's financial activity tends to occur
at the national level.32 Despite difficulties in coming up with accurate and complete
data, private sector unions have, nonetheless, remained prosperous.33 Since union
AND THE STATE: AN OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUALISTIC FEMINISM, supra, at 163, 169 n.2 (stating
that among the resolutions passed by the International Moulders' Union was a resolution
restricting and then eliminating employment of women in foundries).
26 MORGAN O. REYNOLDS, MAKING AMERICA POORER: THE COST OF LABOR LAw 29 (1987).
27 McUsic & Selmi, supra note 14, at 1351.
28 Conor Cradden, The Free-Rider Problem, http://www.world-psi.org/Content/Content
Groups/English7/Focus2/Focus articles/TheFree-RiderProblem.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2006) (quoting Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Part I, at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948)).
29 Charles W. Baird, Henry Hazlitt on Unions, FREEMAN: IDEAS ON LIBERTY, Nov. 2004,
at 47, 47.
30 See LINDA CHAVEZ & DANIEL GRAY, BETRAYAL: How UNION BossEs SHAKE DOWN
THEIR MEMBERS AND CORRUPT AMERICAN POLITICS 12 (2004).
31 See, e.g., AFL-CIO/NEA Solidarity Partnership, http://www.aflcio.orglaboutus/nea.
cfm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006); Unions of the AFL-CIO, http://www.afl-cio.org/aboutus/
unions (last visited Mar. 18, 2006); see also CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 30, at 15-17.
32 See Marick F. Masters & Robert S. Atkin, Financial and Political Resources of Nine
Major Public Sector Unions in the 1980s, 17 J. LAB. RES. 183, 186 (1996).
31 See id. at 184. See also KENNETH R. WEINSTEIN & THOMAS M. WIELGUS, HERITAGE
FOUND., How UNIONS DENY WORKERS' RIGHTS (1996), available at http://www.heritage.
org/Research/GovernmentReform/bg1087.cfm (stating that from the period from 1991 through
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expenditures for political and related purposes continue to rise on a per member basis
while membership declines, 3' multiple linear regression analysis is unlikely to be
required in order to recognize that unions spend only a fraction - perhaps less than
twenty percent - of their dues revenues "on collective bargaining and related
activities. 35 Compounding that predicament, accountability is compromised because
unions refuse, as a matter of course, to provide even basic information to dues payers
about how member union dues are spent.36 This complements ongoing problems in
negotiating labor contracts because "[o]n the employee side of the negotiations,
[there] are [at least] two [distinct] groups: union leaders and the rank-and-file union
members, who rely on their leaders for [relevant] information."37 Troublingly, given
the racist and exclusionary history of labor unions, disputes persist because of a recur-
rent positive correlation between the expenditure of union funds involuntarily ob-
tained from African American and Hispanic dues payers and union-led discrimination
against African American and Hispanic employment applicants. 38 Moreover, since
labor organizations are comprised of disparate individuals and, given that a large
percentage, if not a majority, of unionists disagree with union leaders' choices about
1995, total receipts by several of the major international unions that make up the AFL-CIO
actually rose while membership fell).
3' Rep. Joe Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard: Republicans Take on Labor and
the Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 347, 350
(1998).
" CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 30, at 12. See also ROBERT P. HUNTER, PAUL S. KERSEY
& SHAWN P. MILLER, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. PoIucY, THE MICHIGAN UNION ACCOUNT-
ABILITY ACT: A STEP TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
4-15 (2001), available at http://www.mackinac.org/archives/200 I/s2001-02.pdf (concluding
that the United States Supreme Court apparently approved a detailed examination of union
financial records that found no basis to disagree with the following: (1) in Communications
Workers ofAmerica v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), 79 percent of union dues were not charge-
able to collective bargaining and related activities; and (2) in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Association, 500 U.S. 507 (1991), the union spent 90 percent of its dues revenue on non-
representational activities).
36 See, e.g., Johnson Introduces Three Bills to Hold Union Leaders Accountable, Improve
Accountability & Transparency on Behalf of Union Members, STATES NEWS SERV., Mar. 3,
2005; see also Carl Horowitz, Union Accountability: Ruling Strengthens Financial Reporting,
But Concerns Remain on Pension Funds, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 6, 2005, at 9A ("In a
3-0 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, upheld a new set of
regulations issued by the Department of Labor that required unions to spell out in greater
detail how they spend their money.").
11 RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMrI, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND PuBLIc POLICY 448 (8th ed. 2003) (emphasis omitted).
38 See, e.g., Aaron Leo, Bridgeport to Repay Dues from Nonunion Firefighters, CONN.
POST, Mar. 30, 2005 (relating that as part of the resolution of a conflict between the union
and dues objectors who are members of a minority group, the union was required to repay
dues used to discriminate against applicants of certain ethnic groups).
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how labor unions should spend their funds, 39 disputes continue to boil as alternative
ideological voices are excluded from the table.
A persistent source of conflict is rooted in the political and social ambitions of
unions and their leaders. "Even staunch union supporters blanche over the autocracy,
entrenchment, and corruption of some union leaders."'  Other evidence suggests
that "union elections provide members with little real control over leaders"' and that
unions are possibly, if not probably, "inherently undemocratic."42 It is unlikely that
the political, social, and policy aspirations of union leaders accurately mirror the
position of all workers within collective bargaining units. Despite that conclusion,
the leaders of one of America's largest union organizations, the AFL-CIO, recently
met with the chairman of the Democratic Party to plan political strategy amid "call[s]
for a major shake-up" in labor union organizations and union organizing. 3 Although
the AFL-CIO has maintained its political power even with a sharp decrease in its
membership, few union or Democratic Party leaders believe that labor unions can
maintain their political relevancy unless change is in the offing. 44 As a response to
both disquiet within the union leadership and the fear of looming political irrel-
evance,45 John Sweeney, president of the AFL-CIO, proclaimed that labor unions
would tie their politics to union organizing.' This intertwining of organizing capacity
" See, e.g., CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 30, at 46 ("[A]fter voters in Washington State
passed a paycheck-protection initiative in 1992, 85 percent of the state's teachers took advan-
tage of their new freedom and refused to have their dues go toward politics.").
40 Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market For Union Control,
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 368 (footnotes omitted).
41 Id. at 369.
42 Id. at 370.
43 Christina Almeida, AFL-CIO Leaders, Howard Dean Plan Political Strategy in Las
Vegas, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 1, 2005, available at http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/
exec/view.cgi/36/9354.
4 Ron Fournier, Unions' Grip on Political Relevance Slips, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 29,
2005, available at http://www.detnews.com/2005/autosinsider/0505/29/e03-196519.htm.
45 See, e.g., id.
46 See Almeida, supra note 43. Persistent reports suggest a possible pattern of under-
reporting direct and indirect union political expenditures. Typically it is difficult to determine
from a union's filings whether and to what extent it engages in prohibited political expendi-
tures. See, e.g., Beck Rights 2001: Are Workers Being Heard?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Workforce Protections of the H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 107th Cong.
29-35 (2002) (statement of Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr., Vice President & Staff Attorney,
National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, Inc.) (stating that "union dues and agency
fees collected from workers under threat of loss of job" have been "used for registration and
get out the vote drives, candidate support. . ., administration of union political action com-
mittees and issue advocacy [and] amount to between 300 [sic] to $500 million in a presidential
election year"); CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 30, at 13 ("[U]nions technically report that they
spend no money on politics ... [b]ecause any political contributions would be taxable."
(emphasis in original)); Larry Margasak, Labor Dept. Probes Teachers Union Reports,
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and political power47 seems to operate consistently with Gary Becker's conclusion
that "[p]olitical influence is not simply fixed by the political process, but can be ex-
panded by expenditures of time and money on campaign contributions, political
advertising, and in other ways that exert political pressure." 48 Groups, like indi-
vidual human beings, are not animated simply by pecuniary gain. They are also
animated by ideological and social objectives that provide both self-interested and
nonexcludable49 benefits. If union organizing expenditures can be fashioned as a
form of politics, then such expenditures, funded by compulsory union dues payments,
may flout Supreme Court precedents, implicate First Amendment values, ° destabi-
lize already debatable free-rider assumptions, and undermine the contestable social
welfare calculus"' that tends to undergird the NLRA regime. Such expenditures may
also marginalize workers' views and interests, in the middle 2 of national debates
about various social issues such as welfare-reform, drug-decriminalization, and the
Boy Scouts that appear to be unrelated to collective bargaining. 3 Although collective
bargaining objectives during the 1930s may have supplied intra-group esteem en-
hancements that diminished certain collective action problems, 4 as discussed below,
the contemporary proliferation of union objectives outside of a collective bargaining
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4, 2004, available at http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A30595-2004Mar4.html.
41 See Jill Lawrence, Five Unions Form Coalition Apart from AFL-CIO, USA TODAY,
June 16, 2005, at 11A.
48 Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groupsfor Political Influence,
98 Q.J. OF ECON. 371, 372 (1983).
49 See infra Part II.A.
'o See, e.g., Jennifer Friesen, The Costs of "Fee Speech" - Restrictions on the Use of
Union Dues to Fund New Organizing, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603,621-23 (1988) (posit-
ing that limitations on the use of union dues paid by dues objectors "begins with a deter-
mination whether government action exists in union security agreements" and that the Beck
Court evidently confirms the reach of the First Amendment to private labor contracts).
"' See RICHARD VEDDER & LOWELL GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT AND
GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 141 (1993) (reading data to show that
government-sponsored "unionization was the more important cause of prolonged high un-
employment" during the period immediately following the passage of the National Industrial
Recovery Act and the NLRA, which includes the downturn in 1937-1938). If an increase in
unemployment fails to constitute an increase in social welfare, then the assumed positive
welfare benefits purportedly attributable to increased unionization are diminished potentially
to zero or possibly less than zero.
52 My debt to Alan Wolfe should be obvious. See generally ALAN WOLFE, MARGINALZED
IN THE MIDDLE (1996).
51 CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 30, at 18 (discussing the various causes that labor unions
support).
' See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1083 (1995) (discussing how
"[i]ntra-group esteem allocation permits groups to overcome certain collective action problems.").
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context coupled with a crumbling of the presumed unity of worker attitudes may
lessen the likelihood of finding a durable union community today. This proliferation
of objectives and crumbling of unity may contribute to the impossibility of cohesive,
representative, and justifiable group action.
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE PROSPECT OF FINDING A
DURABLE UNION COMMUNITY IN THE FOREST
The federal courts, including the Supreme Court, seem captivated with the possi-
bility, even the likelihood, that unions operate cohesively - hence, the courts' focus
on the free-rider presumption that seems to sustain analyses of union dues disputes.
The free-rider presumption implies a form of community that may not exist. If com-
munity fails to exist, in the presence of compelled contributions to unions, First
Amendment values may be adversely affected and therefore give rise to justifiable
constitutional and other litigable claims55 by union dissidents. Concurrently, the ab-
sence of community may be both a cause and an effect of the growth in the diversity
of preferences from which humans can choose.
Supreme Court "[o]pinions often state that, when a law is challenged as uncon-
stitutional, 'this Court first ascertains whether the statute can be reasonably con-
strued to avoid the constitutional difficulty." ,56 If state action can be discovered within
government mandated dues collection schemes,5 7 First Amendment claims can be
" See, e.g., Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,740-42 (1988) (providing
an example of another potential claim- the judicially constructed duty of fair representation).
56 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 110 (7th ed. 2004)
(quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 444 (1984)).
17 This is of course a debatable issue. See David H. Topol, Note, Union Shops, State
Action, and the National Labor Relations Act, 101 YALE L.J. 1135 (1992).
The Supreme Court has yet to articulate a clear standard for deter-
mining whether state action exists in union shop provisions and, there-
fore, whether a constitutional challenge can be brought against such
provisions. Indeed, the Court has reached contradictory results when
interpreting the virtually identical union shop provisions of the two
major labor law statutes.
Id. at 1135. See, e.g., Beck, 487 U.S. at 761 (suggesting no state action exists in NLRA union
shop agreements); Price v. Int'l Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers
of Am., 795 F.2d 1128, 1133 (2d. Cir. 1986) (declining to find state action within the mean-
ing of the NLRA; finding, instead that the union security clause was permissive and, hence,
the result of the negotiations of private parties, and concluding that the federal government
was not the source of authority for a union security clause); Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of
Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1205 (4th Cir. 1985) (concluding "that there is governmental action
sufficient to sustain jurisdiction" within the meaning of a union shop under the NLRA), affd,
487 U.S. 735 (1988); see also Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under
the National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in
Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 51, 70-71 (1990) (suggesting that the Beck Court's dictum
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tied credibly to the notion of coerced association and correlative free speech issues
connected to union security provisions that most collective bargaining agreements
require.58 Both public sector and private sector cases, whether attached formally to
the Constitution or to "a construction of federal collective bargaining law.... rests
upon the theory that use of members' money to promote causes with which they
disagree offends notions of free speech and association. '59 While there is a dispute
as to whether union-organizing expenditures should be analyzed within the First
Amendment or, alternatively, simply within a statutory test,' it seems clear that dues
disputes are derived from contrasting emphases provided by the Wagner Act and the
Taft-Hartley Amendments.6
One interpretation insists that the Wagner Act can be framed in terms that em-
phasize association and self-government and a diminution in freedom of association
rights for workers. By contrast, both "first amendment doctrine... [and] the...
Taft-Hartley provisions are framed in an individualistic language that views associ-
ation," particularly involuntary association, as suspect.62 Consistent with that View,
workers evidently retain "the right to resign [a]s an unenumerated right, presumed to
subside in the right to refrain from engaging in concerted activity pursuant to Section
7 of the Taft-Hartley Act."63 Significantly, "[t]he nature of resignation rights... [is]
not purely economic[]" and presumably may "be influenced by liberty concerns, the
doctrine of unconscionability, and the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibitions against
involuntary servitude."'
"would seem to defeat any arguments that a union's actions in negotiating and observing a
union security agreement are state actions"); John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine
and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L. REV. 569, 578-79 (2005) (discussing Brentwood
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association, 531 U.S. 288 (2001); stating
"the [Supreme] Court found.., state action in a private interscholastic athletic association's
rules governing its members"; and concluding that "[t]he conventional approach to state
action" requires the Court to engage in fictional analysis, including the fiction "that some
admittedly government conduct does not count as state action for purposes of constitutional
law").
58 See generally Friesen, supra note 50, at 621-26.
59 Id. at 608.
60 Cf. id. at 623-26.
61 See Kohler, supra note 14, at 149-52.'The Wagner Act portion of the [NLRA] is framed
in terms that emphasize the value of associations to self-government... [whereas] the Taft-
Hartley portions... are framed in a highly individualistic language.... Id. at 151-52 (footnote
omitted).
62 Id. at 186.
63 See Heidi Marie Werntz, Comment, Waiver of Beck Rights and Resignation Rights:
Infusing the Union-Member Relationship With Individualized Commitment, 43 CATH U. L.
REV. 159, 174 (1993) (discussing the roots of the right to resign from the union).
4 Id. (focusing on the waivability of the right to resign from the union) (footnotes omitted).
1320 [Vol. 14:1309
A CLEARING IN THE FOREST
Generally, "law and economics" has implied "that social organization is contrac-
tarian in nature."65 As such, community emerges from consent, with the social contract
as the "connecting web."' Self-interested and generally rational actors choose auton-
omously to join together based on their assessment "of the comparative advantages
of limited forms of social cooperation. They come together and work together by
choice and consent" to form a community.67 Since unions, outside of right-to-work
jurisdictions, are often made up of individuals with diverse views about the benefits
of unionism who nevertheless are required to engage in some form of compelled
association and expression, it is possible that neither a hypothetical nor an actual
uniformity of worker interests exists. On the other hand, if dues payers could dis-
cover a consensual kinship with their fellow workers, unions might become their
spokesperson, and union dues might become a vehicle to transform society, the work-
place, and human life. In reality, the dearth of kinship may prove fatal to the prospect
of finding a durable community within the framework of compulsory unionism
while concurrently raising First Amendment concerns. Hence, the proper null hypoth-
esis intimates that unions are unlikely to provide a fertile ground for an enduring
community.
As one commentator noted:
The [United States Supreme] Court has consistently held that
an employee can constitutionally be charged, even over her ob-
jection, for the cost of her union's activities that are "germane to
collective bargaining. This is true despite the Court's concession
that collective bargaining may be ideologically offensive to some,
and thus may implicate speech or associational interests. ' '68
Nevertheless, disputes concerning union expenditures continue to intensify because
they involve the freedoms that are rooted in the fundamental values of democracy
and autonomy that presumably underlie American First Amendment rights.69 One
observer illumines: "The great liberal freedoms - freedom of religion, association,
and expression - are all deeply paradoxical because they rest on the notion of 'epi-
stemic abstinence' - the idea that liberal government cannot impose its views of
the Good on dissenters; that qua liberal government, it cannot know the Good."7 °
65 ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY: REINTERPRETING THE VALUES
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 106 (2000).
66 Id. at 107.
67 Id.
68 Friesen, supra note 50, at 634 (citation omitted).
69 See Yochai Benkler, Property, Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a Core
Common Infrastructure 3 (Mar. 2001) (unpublished white paper, Brennan Center for Justice,
New York University School of Law), available at http://www.benler.org/WhitePaper.pdf.
70 LARRY ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 147 (2005)
(footnote omitted).
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While complete government neutrality may be an impossibility,7' this much seems
clear: because the NLRA empowers unions and their entrenched leadership to decide
"the Good" via compulsory dues and compulsory association, there has been an
"ever problematic relationship between the first amendment and the law structured
by the National Labor Relations Act."72 This specifies "[t]hat a fundamental tension
exists between the first amendment and the statute ... [leading to the possibility
that] the Supreme Court's repeated efforts to reconcile the Labor Act to the first
amendment have trailed off into unintelligibility. 73
Because agency shop schemes, like similar union shop arrangements, appear to
constitute "a significant impingement on First Amendment rights, 74 and because
union dissent as a form of intra-group conflict survives in both public and private labor
organizations, the federal courts, in a series of decisions culminating in Communi-
cations Workers of America v. Beck75 have restricted the ability of unions to extract
dues from dues objectors 76 within either a union or agency shop arrangement. 77
While the Court had considered and rejected the argument that collective bargaining
itself constitutes an ideologically objectionable activity that warrants preclusion,78
the Beck Court held that section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA obliges "union dissenters...
to pay for their share of a union's collective bargaining activities. ,79 As generally
71 Id. (noting "that liberalism as governmental nonpartisanship (neutrality) toward religions,
associations, and expression is an impossibility").
72 Kohler, supra 14, at 149 (footnotes omitted).
73 id.
7' Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984).
75 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
76 JuLIus G. GETMAN, BERTRAND B. POGREBIN & DAvID L. GREGORY, LABOR MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS AND THE LAw 361 (2d. ed. 1999) (reporting that union dues are often
collected through union security and dues checkoff provisions contained within the collective
bargaining agreement). The statutory language legalizes any agreement between a labor or-
ganization and an employer that requires membership in the union as a condition of employ-
ment. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
77 See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,
764 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
[E]mployees under a "union shop" arrangement who are required by
contract to become union members, may be subjected to only one mem-
bership requirement - the payment of dues - and employees under an
"agency shop" arrangement who are required by contract only to pay
dues need not become union members even in form.
Id. See also Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33, 46 (1998) ("[T]he statutory
language [of § 8(a)(3)] incorporates an employee's right not to 'join' the union (except by
paying fees and dues) .. "). Given these conclusions, "there is no realistic difference from
a legal standpoint between a union shop and an agency shop, although under a union shop
the union may, if it wishes, place an employee who only pays dues on its 'membership' rolls."
United Food, 307 F.3d at 765.
78 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
'9 DouGLAs E. RAY, CALVIN WILLIAM SHARPE & ROBERT N. STRASSFELD, UNDER-
STANDING LABOR LAW 427 (1999).
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understood, collective bargaining encompasses negotiation, contract administration,
and grievance adjustment.0 The Court's opinion left open the question of what con-
stitutes collective bargaining activity within the meaning of the NLRA.
On one account, this "decision was hardly remarkable because the NLRB balances
the union majority's right to 'full freedom of association' for purposes of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid and protection with the minority's right to refrain
from such association."A' This process operates consistently with the 1947 Taft-Hartley
Amendments82 and Congress's apparent intent to de-emphasize self-organization and
group action." The Beck decision stands at the epicenter of a controversy which,
on one plane, promisingly confirms that: (A) "an individual should be free to believe
as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and
his conscience rather than coerced by the State"; 84 and (B) as a general matter, "[t]he
differences between public- and private-sector collective bargaining simply do not
translate into differences in First Amendment rights. 85 On another level, it is im-
portant to appreciate that, while the Beck decision (in effect, but not unequivocally)
extends the reasoning of public sector and Railway Labor Act (RLA) sector cases
to the NLRA, the decision is neither self-enforcing nor a model of clarity.
One source of haziness is the Supreme Court's inadequate understanding of the
economics and logic of free riding. While the free-rider argument can undermine
the claims of union dissidents, as I have argued elsewhere,86 the Beck Court's un-
refined free-rider computation is flawed because the Court fails to understand com-
prehensibly the nature of forced riding.87 The Court also assumes unreflectively that
80 Beck, 487 U.S. at 738.
81 RogerC. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication ofTaft-HartleyAct Dues
Objector Cases, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 1, 1 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
82 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994) (permitting an employer and a union to enter into an
agreement requiring all employees in the bargaining unit to pay periodic union dues and initi-
ation fees as a condition of continued employment, regardless of whether the employees ac-
tually wish to become union members).
83 Cf James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74TEX.
L. REv. 1563, 1567 & n.20 (1996). In addition to intentionally de-emphasizing group action
within the parameters of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress apparently continued to emphasize
individual rights in the form of workplace statutes that focused on individual interest. See id.
at 1568.
84 Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977).
85 Id. at 232.
86 Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues? A Post-
modern Perspective in the Mirror of Public Choice Theory, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447,
493-94 (2000).
87 See id. at 488. Members of certain postmodern subgroups are first required to resign
to avoid dues payments for ideological expenditures but must, nonetheless, pay core dues for
collective bargaining purposes. See id. This means that they lose union governance rights
while paying core dues. See id. This leads to a consequent dues overpayment, which con-
stitutes a form of forced riding since they are required to pay the same core fees as union
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all dues collected presumably for collective bargaining purposes are essential to combat
the elusive specter of free riding.88 While strategic behavior within a labor union
setting may create plausible opportunities that produce positive externalities wherein
individuals obtain goods without bidding for them,89 free riding produced by interest
convergence may not necessarily exist 9° - since interest convergence itself may not
members who do not resign and, accordingly, enjoy full membership rights including the
right to vote on strike and union contracts. See id. An additional source of forced riding results
from the likelihood that a union may "inflate the amount of dues required to support core
benefits" and underestimate the expenditures required to support noncore benefits. Id. at
488-89. To the extent that is correct, dues objectors become forced riders to the extent that
unions engage in such activities. See id; see also GEORGE C. LEEF, FREE CHOICE FOR
WORKERS: A HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO WORK MOVEMENT 34 (2005).
As I have noted before:
[Plublic choice theory suggests that collective action can give rise
to both forced riders and free riders. A forced rider is a person or group
compelled to subsidize benefits, which accrue primarily to others. A
forced rider is the opposite of a free rider who receives benefits without
fully paying for them.
Hutchison, supra note 86, at 461.
88 See Hutchison, supra note 86, at 493-94. Deficiencies include: (1) the assumption "that
all workers benefit equally from core collective bargaining activities"; (2) the failure "to take
into account the possibility that non-object[ing unionists] may free ride at the expense of both
ideological and core dues objectors" who then become forced riders in the absence of their
ability to escape; and (3) the failure to understand that in light of "intimidating exit barriers"
and union autocracy, union members who fail to object and resign may nonetheless "lack a
commonality of interest with other union members and union officials." Id. at 493. Addition-
ally, workers who value their union governance rights, such as the right to vote on whether
to accept or reject a collective bargaining agreement, but disagree with the union's ideo-
logical expenditures must either resign and give up voting rights or retain membership and
pay for detestable speech. See id. Given the varied diversity of viewpoints that exist in a
pluralistic society, the Supreme Court's deficiencies "reifly] hierarchy and subordination."
Id. at 494. In relying on the legislative history to understand the free-rider issue, the Supreme
Court shares its deficiencies with Congress. See, e.g., Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487
U.S. 735, 748 n.5 (1988) (quoting 93 CONG. REC. 3558 (1947) (statement of Rep. Jenninger)
(supporting mandatory union dues and noting that "because members of the minority 'would
get the benefit of that [collective bargaining] contract made between the majority of their
fellow workmen and the management.., it is not unreasonable that they should go along and
contribute dues like the others."').
89 Cf Avery Wiener Katz, Two Competing Economic Models of Law, in FOUNDATIONS
OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 42 (Avery Weiner Katz ed., 1998).
9 Richard Posner asserts that the representation election, the principle of exclusive repre-
sentation, and the union shop together are a "set of devices.., for overcoming the free-rider
problems that would otherwise plague the union [that operates] as a large-numbers cartel."
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 354 (5th ed. 1998) [hereinafter POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]. But for these devices, Posner asserts that the rational worker would
"hang back from joining the union or devoting any resources to promoting it." Id. In others
words, he would enjoy the benefits without incurring the costs. Posner's assumption that all
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exist. In neoclassical economic and welfare terms, the disutility associated with man-
datory union membership may outweigh the putative utility (if any exists at all) of
such membership.
An additional flaw in the Beck Court's analysis is its refusal (unlike some lower
courts hearing this case91) to tether its decision to the First Amendment 92 - freedom
of speech and freedom not to associate 93 - interest of union dues dissenters. This
refusal is important because authority exists for the proposition that pure "collective
bargaining" expenditures adversely affect the speech and associational interests of
dues objectors. 94 Although Larry Alexander presents an elegant case that no uni-
versal right of freedom of expression and, perhaps, association can be found to exist
at either the level of constitutional theory or the level of human rights,9" the Supreme
rational workers necessarily enjoy benefits from unionization seems incomplete and uncon-
vincing at best. See, e.g., Hutchison, supra note 86, at 483-92 (explaining deficiencies in
both the Supreme Court and Congress's free-rider analyses that apparently accept Posner's
premises and claims).
9' See Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of Am, 776 F.2d 1187, 1205-09 (4th Cir. 1985) (find-
ing sufficient governmental action to sustain jurisdiction of the plaintiffs' First Amendment
claim, but effectively deciding the case on grounds of the union's duty of fair representation,
even though the labor union's practice of using agency fees for purposes unrelated to collec-
tive bargaining, grievance adjustment, or contract administration was unconstitutional); Beck
v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 468 F. Supp. 93, 97 (D. Md. 1979) (issuing a declaratoryjudg-
ment holding that amounts collected beyond allocable "collective bargaining, contract admini-
stration, and grievance adjustment" violate the First Amendment rights of dues objectors).
But see Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 800 F.2d 1280, 1280-82 (4th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(finding that federal jurisdiction rested on the union's duty of fair representation). Three of
the five members of the en banc majority, however, "felt it unnecessary to consider whether
jurisdiction also existed on constitutional grounds." Id. at 1282.
92 For a discussion of these issues, see generally Charles W. Baird, The Permissible Use
of Forced Union Dues: From Hanson to Beck 38 (Cato Inst., Cato Policy Analysis No. 174,
1992) (on file with author) (discussing when sufficient state action exists to implicate the
First Amendment rights of dissenters). A version of the file in html format can be found at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-174.html.
In union dues situations, assuming state action requirements are met (typically in a situation
where a union engages in the mandatory collection of dues from a public sector employee),
the First Amendment applies in two ways. First, there is a free speech right not to be com-
pelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's freedom
of belief. Second, there is a right not to associate with an objectionable organization. See,
e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 56, 1162-63 & nn. 12-13; see also Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
" As part of an individual's freedom not to associate, if state action is found, she "may
constitutionally prevent the union[]" from using her dues "to contribute to political candi-
dates and to express political views unrelated to [the union's] duties as exclusive bargaining
representative." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 56, at 1299-1300 (citing Abood, 431 U.S.
at 209).
" See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at 222; see also Friesen, supra note 50, at 634.
9' ALEXANDER, supra note 70, at 185 (noting that one "searche[s] in vain for an argument
that would support a human right of freedom of expression").
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Court's failure to rely on the Constitution is troubling because the Court has found
sufficient state action in earlier private sector cases to sustain constitutional juris-
diction. 96 While the Abood opinion conceded that the use of a union-security agree-
ment to force a dues objector to pay "for causes and purposes to which the employee
objected to some extent interfered with first amendment rights," 97 its holding is
grounded technically in the union's violation of its duty of fair representation.98 A
pure statutory focus by the courts might run afoul of the rule that the NLRB retains
primary jurisdiction with respect to union security claims, 99 but judicial interpretation
of the parameters of the statute may be collaterally necessary to resolve duty of fair
representation claims that include a "'statutory obligation to serve the interests of all
members without hostility or discrimination.""'  Although a concentration on the
statutory analyses either related to duty of fair representation or alternatively based
on possible union unfair labor practice might lead the courts to defend union security
agreements, it can be argued that there has actually been a dramatic expansion of First
Amendment-related rights within this arena.' On this account, the courts "now
forbid[] the compelled subsidy of almost any union expenditure not closely related
to the rather narrow service categories of workplace contract negotiations, contract
administration, or grievance adjustment. ''""c If true, then dues objectors might have
reason to celebrate. Nevertheless, since statutory construction in the hands of either
the NLRB or the appellate courts may be infinitely malleable, the judicially imposed
96 The Supreme Court found sufficient state action in private employment cases under
the Railway Labor Act. See, e.g., Topol, supra note 57, at 1135. Furthermore, the courts have
determined that section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA that governs union security clauses is similar
to the pertinent Railway Labor Act language for purposes of deciding union dues disputes.
See, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at 226. As part of its string of decisions, the Supreme Court has
suggested an adequate ground for First Amendment litigation by finding that "the actions of
public employers surely constitute 'state action,' [and] the union shop, as authorized by the
Railway Labor Act, also was found to result from governmental action in [the] Hanson" case.
Id. See also Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 776 F.2d at 1205.
97 GETMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 361.
98 Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 740-42.
99 See id. at 742-43.
" Id. at 739 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)). The judicially created duty
of fair representation is grounded in section 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), and reflects
the principle that a union's status as the exclusive representative of the employees' bargaining
"unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without hostility or
discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and
to avoid arbitrary conduct." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177 (citing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335,
342 (1964)).
'o' See Friesen, supra note 50, at 609-10 (arguing that First Amendment doctrine limits
the purposes for which public and private sector union may expend funds and extends in its
statutory version to preclude compulsory funding for activities that are not closely related to
collective bargaining).
'02 Id. at 609.
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duty of fair representation"' and unfair labor practice claims may constitute a fragile
plinth on which to safeguard the growing interest diversity that characterizes unions
and the workplace in the twenty-first century."'0 Statutory analysis, incorporated
largely from the Ellis opinion, for instance, tends to focus on "whether the challenged
expenditures are necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing
the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer
on labor-management issues."' °5 The Beck Court's adoption of this approach failed
to supply a clear enforcement mechanism or clear principles. '°6 Consequently, this
has led to problems in exercising Beck rights."o
Failure to provide clear principles creates a void that both the NLRB and the
appellate courts may strive to occupy. The Ninth Circuit entered the fray recently
by enforcing an NLRB order that requires dues objectors to pay for union organizing
expenditures.' °8 Union dues objectors filed unfair labor practice charges with the
,03 Evidently, "[tihe Supreme Court first announced the principle that a bargaining repre-
sentative must represent fairly all employees within the bargaining unit - regardless of race
and regardless of membership in the union - in Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. (U.S. 1944),
a case arising under the Railway Labor Act." ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 695 (1976).
"30 The evidence on this issue is mixed. The acceptance of postmodern norms, including
identity norms associated with race, gender, and what can be called expressive individualism,
all likely contribute to growing diversity. On the other hand, at least with respect to the em-
ployment of African Americans, this claim remains a matter of contention since African
American labor-force participation and employment declined after the passage of the NLRA
and the nonwhite-white unemployment differential widened. See VEDDER & GALLAWAY, supra
note 51, at 272. Such empirical evidence may be consistent with less, not more, racial diversity.
105 Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984).
"3o See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,752 (1988) (quoting Ellis, 466
U.S. at 447-48).
107 As noted by one of the attorneys from Beck, "the [National Labor Relations] Board
delayed for eight years before issuing its first post-Beck decision, California Saw [& Knife
Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995)].... When the Board finally decides a Beck case, workers
are likely to receive little protection or relief." Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr., McCain-Feingold-
Cochran's So-Called "Codification" of Beck: In Reality, a Trojan Horse 2 (Nat'l Right to
Work Found., Issue Briefing, 2001) (on file with author). See also Tempers Flare at Hearing
on Beck Rights to Not Pay for Nonrepresentational Activities, 69 U.S. L. WK. 2712 (BNA)
(2001) (reporting that at a House subcommittee hearing, "lawmakers and witnesses presented
highly divergent, and sometimes angry, views on whether there is a significant problem" for
workers trying to exercise Beck rights).
Moreover, because the Beck Court snubbed the opportunity to offer comprehensive legal
principles for deciding when and if union dues expenditures can be truly connected to col-
lective bargaining, and because the duty of fair representation nonetheless implicates statutory
analyses, its decision may imply that interference with First Amendment rights of dissenting
employees nonetheless can be found satisfactory so long as such expenditures reputedly main-
tain a frail, but not necessarily causal, link to the economic interest of workers. See infra Part III.
10' United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760 (9th
Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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NLRB (as opposed to bringing a duty-of-fair-representation or First Amendment claim
in federal district court) "contending that it was an unfair labor practice for the unions
to use their dues to pay the costs of organizing.""' On one account, union-organizing
expenditures occupy a space between pure ideological and political expenditures and
pure contract negotiation, ratification, and implementation." " Whether this constitutes
a genuine distinction or not,"' the importance of this distinction will ride on whether
union organizing is truly attached to an actual collective bargaining purpose or
whether it operates in disguised form as a vehicle that has political fundraising as
its objective.
The Ninth Circuit's decision is attached to the claim that workers "share a 'com-
munity of interests.""' 2 After dues objectors challenged the use of their dues, the
court held, consistent with "§ 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, a union serving as a bargaining
unit's exclusive bargaining representative is permitted to charge all employees, mem-
bers and nonmembers [so-called core members] alike, the costs involved in orga-
nizing, at least when organizing employers within the same competitive market as
the bargaining unit employer."'"
3
This conclusion is based on the uncertain observation that the degree of union-
ization in the industry translates into union success in securing wage gains." 4 If a
positive correlation between the wages of represented workers and organizing com-
petitor stores exists, and if that correlation is sufficient to establish a causal connec-
tion, dues objectors who fail to contribute might become free riders. Equally plausible,
(A) newly organized workers, (B) individuals who have no direct connection to the
already or newly organized workplace but who share the union's political objectives
(outsiders), and (C) union leaders and union majorities may free ride (i.e., obtain
uncompensated self-interested benefits) at the expense of dues objectors. Intrigu-
ingly, if the AFL-CIO president's statements linking organizing to politics are credible,
then union organizing efforts are likely to be driven by ideological and political
objectives. Union organizing expenditures, thus, come alive with First Amendment
issues.
109 Id. at 765-66.
HO See Friesen, supra note 50, at 625-26.
1' See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 214-17 (1977) (considering
union dues objectors' claim that an agency shop provision in the collective bargaining agree-
ment implicates ideological and political expenditures); Ry. Employes' Dep't. v. Hanson,
351 U.S. 225, 233-35 (1956) (upholding a union shop provision because Congress was
charged with identifying "[tihe ingredients of industrial peace and stabilized labor manage-
ment relations" and could constitutionally determine that a union shop provision was necessary
for peaceful labor relations).
112 United Food, 307 F.3d at 764 n.3. This claim may be dubious. See infra Part H.
13 ld. at 766.
"' See Terry Ashley & Ethel B. Jones, Unemployment, Union Density, and Wages, 17 J.
LAB. REs. 173, 173 (1996).
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The Ninth Circuit found the complainants' specific First Amendment claims
unconvincing.'15 Instead, the court deferred to the NLRB. 116 When the Board decides
that a correlation exists between the challenged activity (organizing competitor firms)
and the bargaining process,"' union expenditures are not impermissible expendi-
tures. 1 ' Persuaded by that syllogism, the court ignored an arguably contrary ruling
by the United States Supreme Court construing the RLA." 9 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit's United Food decision-making, which draws a sharp distinction between
the NLRA and the RLA, offers another opportunity to reconsider the essential para-
meters of the union dues dispute.
In Part 11, 1 deploy public choice theory and postmodern identity claims, derived
largely from Richard Rorty's analysis, 2 ' to develop a far-reaching understanding of
the dues dispute. This analysis suggests that the burden of proof on the existence
and/or the possibility of an enduring union community should be placed on pro-
ponents of this view. ' Public choice theory has sparked a rich debate about groups
and the possibility of collective action. With its interest-group-oriented literature at
the intersection of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, public choice has been the source
of "a wide variety of normative proposals for statutory interpretation" including, but
not limited to "strictly honoring the terms of legislative bargains."'' 22 It has also been
used as a vehicle for "eschewing the notion of collective intent ... [and] reading a
public-regarding purpose into statutes to minimize the impact of special interest
group influence."' 123 Public choice, as used in this article, is less comprehensive and
less rich in scope than the available literature suggests. This approach is tied largely
to implications drawn from the field of economics with only limited intermediation
by legal scholars. While the postmodem project can be seen justly as an unsettled
approach that is riven by coherency issues, not least its insistence on offering the good
without the true, 24 I believe it supplies modest benefits by revealing the conceivably
115 id.
116 Id.
" United Food, 307 F.3d at 768.
118 Id. at 766.
"' See Ellis v. Bhd. Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,452-53 (1984) (disallowing
the collection of union dues from a dissenting worker when the funds are used for organizing
purposes); see also Baird, supra note 92, at 23 ('The [Ellis] Court ruled that unions cannot
charge dissenting workers for union attempts to organize hitherto unorganized employees of
nonunion firms.").
120 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989).
12l See generally id.
122 Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALEL.J. 1219,
1224-27 (1994).
123 Id. at 1226-27.
124 DELSOL, supra note 1, at 45-63 (discussing both the contemporary indifference to and
the fear of the notion of truth, coupled with the question "where did the idea of the good without
truth come from?"). For a limited discussion of the postmodern approach to truth, see infra
Part II.
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infinite variety of human preferences in contemporary America. The likely absence
of preference convergence understood from the perspective of both public choice
theory and postmodem identity construal inevitably vitiates prevalent assertions that
unions operate as a paradigm of voluntary cooperation characterized by solidarity.
The conflict between putative solidarity and the actual presence of preference diver-
sity might well be the genesis of this ongoing dispute - whether worker prefer-
ences, judged from the perspective of the legislature, the courts, or the NLRB, are
fully rational.' 25 As discussed more fully below, the prospect of finding solidarity
embedded within either a union security agreement or an agency shop agreement is
negligible.
In Part III, I both consider and differ with the United Food holding by exposing
the court's opinion to a wide-ranging perspective on both First Amendment values
and free-rider issues. Undeniably, cautious conventional analysis suggests that union
organizing expenses on their face do not provide evidence of either a political or
ideological purpose, if, of course, ideologically grounded objections to collective
bargaining are overlooked. Even so, a conventional analyst must concede that the
legitimacy of the implication of First Amendment norms is both contingent and con-
textual. It is contingent on the actual purpose that organizing and consequent union
revenue augmentation can be seen to serve. It is contextual in the sense that organiz-
ing can be linked currently to an ongoing effort to stem the degeneration in union
economic power and the fear that the currently substantial political influence of unions
will diminish in the future. Economic decline coupled with a collapse in political
influence may have dire consequences for the political and social agenda of union
leaders.
I provide neither new evidence about the actual composition nor actual proof of
a lack of workers' interest uniformity and consequent absence of solidarity within
the labor federation - the national and various union locals - associated with this
case. Nonetheless, relying on both conventional and unconventional analyses, this
examination of the United Food case: (A) defends the possibility of diverse human
interest and preferences against labor union and labor movement proponents' claims
that unions should act as hierarchs on behalf of the entire workforce; (B) devalues
the court's social welfare determination that sustains union superordination, pre-
served by suppressing the defensible disquiet of dues objectors to group preferences;
and (C) develops uncertainty about the empirical evidence and syllogisms on which
the court relies by suggesting the probability that many self-interested benefits (whether
accounted for or not by conventional analyses) flow to individuals and groups that
operate outside of the bargaining unit frontier.
.25 For a discussion of rationality, see Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual
History of Law and Economics, 64 MD L. REv. 85, 102 (2005) ("Much of our lives are built
around the assumption that people behave rationally .... The difficulty with irrationality is that
there are so many ways in which it can be expressed.").
1330 [Vol. 14:1309
A CLEARING IN THE FOREST
Taken together, this examination endangers the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that
union expenditures aimed at organizing competitor firms can be seen as germane
within the meaning of the NLRA. I intend to show that union expenditures, such as
organizing, that do not embrace an explicitly political purpose can, nevertheless, dimin-
ish the interest of workers in freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a
variety of other interests that allow individual workers and subgroups of workers to
define their own identity in what has become, rightly or wrongly, a pluralistic society.
Lastly, Part IV supplies a number of proposals for clarifying judicial, NLRB,
and scholarly analysis associated with the intensely fought debate over union dues.
These proposals offer a clearing in an increasingly dense forest that has obscured the
necessity of establishing a causal connection between contested union expenses, such
as union organizing, and an actual, as opposed to an attenuated, collective bargaining
purpose.
II. SOLIDARITY CLAIMS AND THE ABSENCE OF
PREFERENCE CONVERGENCE
James Madison determined that "[t]he diversity in the faculties" of humans con-
stitutes an "obstacle to [finding] a uniformity of interests" among citizens - indeed,
"a division of society into different interests and parties" has been predictable for
some time.12 Madison's insights have obvious implications for current disputes
pertaining to labor union dues and the incompatibility in the interest of diverse union
members.127 Madisonian pessimism about the likelihood of interest uniformity has
assumed renewed vitality since "[t]his move toward separation [and fragmentation]
has found a [thunderous] voice in the context of the workforce," which had been en-
visaged traditionally as a venue for solidarity. 28 Madison's perspective finds con-
temporary echoes in postmodern/pragmatist assertions as well as in ongoing public
choice analyses.
A. Solidarity in the Mirror of Postmodernism
"From the beginning or, to be more precise, from the time of Plato to that of
Voltaire, human diversity was judged in the court of fixed values. Then came Herder,
who turned things around. He had universal values condemned in the court of
diversity. 1 29
126 THE FEDERALIST No. 10, 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
127 Viewpoint incompatibility evidently afflicts union leaders as part of an ongoing debate
regarding union organizing expenditures takes center-stage within the labor movement. See,
e.g., Steven Greenhouse, A.F.L.-C.LO. Is Urged to Oust Its Leader, N.Y. TIMES, May 12,
2005, at Al 2 (examining an emerging conflict over the future direction of the labor movement
in which one group recommends a tripling of expenditures deployed for organizing purposes).
121 McUsic & Selmi, supra note 14, at 1340.
129 ALAIN FINKIELKRAUT, THE DEFEAT OF THE MIND 9 (Judith Friedlander trans., 1995).
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The likely dearth of human and more specifically worker solidarity may well con-
tribute to contemporary declines in union density130 and union strength. 131 Some of
the reduction in labor union membership "coincide[s] with the steep drop in all com-
munity and civic activities starting in the 1960s" as Americans have become, by and
large, content to go "bowling alone."'132 The decline in community and solidarity may
be consistent with and contribute to "a loss of legitimacy for unions as the enablers
of group action."' 133 What solidarity consists of, principally at the level of abstraction
offered by one of America's leading postmodern/pragmatist scholars, Richard Rorty,
remains hazy 134 - even, if one concedes as ideal the boundary waters of his liberal
utopia.'35 As a predicate to unveiling his own understanding of human solidarity,
Rorty offers two contrasting viewpoints. On one account, the largely metaphysical
and theological "attempt to fuse the public and the private lies behind both Plato's
attempt to answer the question 'Why is it in one's interest to be just?' and Christianity's
claim that perfect self-realization can be attained through service to others."' 136 This
provisional fusion - what Rorty calls "a striving for perfection with a sense of com-
munity - require[s] us to acknowledge a common human nature... [that implies]
that what is most important to each of us is what we have in common with others.'
137
In essence, this perspective intimates that "the springs of private fulfillment and of
human solidarity are the same."'
138
Rorty also supplies an alternative view. This view brims with skepticism about
the possibility of attaining solidarity. For instance,
[s]keptics like Nietzsche have urged that metaphysics and theol-
ogy are transparent attempts to make altruism look more reason-
able than it is. Yet such skeptics typically have their own theories
of human nature. They, too, claim that there is something common
to all human beings - for example, the will to power, or libidinal
impulses.'39
130 Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future of the
American Labor Movement Depends on Latino Workers, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1089, 1103
(1999) (suggesting that union density has fallen to less than 10 percent within the private sector).
13' Friesen, supra note 50, at 642 (asserting a "dramatic decline in union strength since the
end of World War II").
132 Fournier, supra note 44 (referencing ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE (2000)).
133 Brudney, supra note 83, at 1564.
"3 RORTY, supra note 120, at xvi ("Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created.").
135 Id.
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Properly understood, skeptics insist that human solidarity does not exist in any sense
that matters; hence, when human solidarity is claimed to exist, it is merely an "artifact
of human socialization.' ' 4°
Notwithstanding the Nietzschean possibility that the model definitions of words
like solidarity and truth represent simply a "mobile army of metaphors,"'4 ' and regard-
less of the contention that we should abandon "the whole idea of 'representing reality'
by means of language" because that implies "a single context for all human lives,' 42
Eric Posner argues rightly that the word "' [s]olidarity' denotes the ability of people to
cooperate in the absence of legal sanctions.' 143 Admittedly, "some... groups ... serve
the individual's interest by minimizing the transaction costs she incurs while acting
to satisfy her preference for whatever interest or function the group facilitates."'"
Nevertheless, since humans can be seen as potential "egoistic, rational, utility maxi-
mizer[s,]"1 45 the prospect of finding a defensible and sustainable version of solidarity'"
in the form of voluntary, yet uniform, self-interest of workers 147 becomes unlikely
in our present-day society.
Consider, for instance, George Feldman's argument for solidarity. This approach
emphasizes "solidarity among workers, widely understood, rather than among em-
ployees of a particular employer (or even employees within a particular industry)."'' 48
This argument places emphasis on the contention that unions have both the power
and the right to speak on behalf of the entire workforce as a class-based force for
140 Id.
14' Id. at 27.
142 Id.
143 Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence ofLegal and Nonlegal Sanctions
on Collective Action, 63 U. CI. L. REv. 133, 135 (1996).
'" McAdams, supra note 54, at 1007.
145 MUELLER, supra note 6, at 2.
'" Chantal Delsol describes and critiques a contemporary kind of solidarity that seems
both coercive and incoherent:
Simultaneously with the rejection of any idea of the objective good,
a discourse of the obligatory good has developed. The idea of social
solidarity, for example, will tolerate no opposition. It has become an
objective reference that admits of no controversy. We feel that we must
share. Similarly, we are under an obligation to protect the earth. No one
can defend the destruction of the environment or manifest his indif-
ference to such destruction.... The mandatory discourse about objective
good, ... seeks its justifications in vain, for why must we show solidarity
with our contemporaries, or even, according to the environmentalist dis-
course, with future generations.
DELSOL, supra note 1, at 54 (emphasis in original).
147 See McUsic & Selmi, supra note 14, at 1339 (noting that workers were commonly seen
as united by a common struggle against management).
148 Feldman, supra note 3, at 201.
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societal solidarity and social change. 149 If this observation can somehow be seen as
true, and if all union members/dues payers concur in the ordering of their prefer-
ences, this development leads inevitably to voluntary cooperation in attaining club
goods 5 ' and other goods which might include "social justice" in some class warfare
sense.
While it is doubtful that unions have sufficient legitimacy to speak on behalf of
all workers, Rorty's analysis (particularly its Nietzschean component) signifies an
epistemic challenge to anyone who views solidarity as an indispensable component
of, or even a possibility associated with, a group. Rorty's perspective supplies a par-
ticular challenge to any group that seeks public goods (pure or otherwise), collective
goals, interest group goods (providing generally nonexcludable benefits), 51 special
interest goods (providing concentrated benefits to the few) 5 2 and individual gains
that are funded or partially funded through compulsory union dues.
5 3
149 Id. at 199-202.
150 Club goods are created when and if public goods can be provided, and when those
individuals who fail to contribute can be excluded from the consumption of these goods. The
possibility of creating club goods can give rise to the possibility that individuals may "agree
voluntarily to provide the public good only to themselves .... For a pure public good, the
addition of one more member to the club never detracts from the enjoyment of the benefits
of club membership to the other members." MUELLER, supra note 6, at 150-51. If this analysis
is correct, then unions may fail to genuinely qualify as a club, at least outside of right-to-
work jurisdictions, because the necessary element of voluntariness is missing. It is probable
that many of the goods sought by unions are best described as either quasi-public or col-
lective goods because many of their goals and objectives provide non-excludable benefits
even though unionists may disproportionately incur the costs of supplying these goods.
' Club goods apparently can be distinguished from an interest group's provision of
collective goods in the sense that when the club provides a good, this provision is excludable
and only available to paying members. Examples of club goods include licensing require-
ments (when only available to union members) that may raise wages - non-licensed partici-
pation may be excluded. An interest group's provision may refer to the provision of non-
excludable goods. An example of an interest group good occurs when a union seeks to
decriminalize marijuana; decriminalization is generally available to all - including non-
members or outsiders who do not pay any dues in order to consume this good. See generally
P.A. McNurr, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC CHOICE 178-81 (1996).
152 Special interest goods may provide concentrated (largely private) benefits for the few.
Cf Jane S. Shaw, Public Choice Theory, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS
150-51 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993) (pointing out that because voters are often rationally
ignorant, legislators may be captured by lobbying groups who provide campaign funds in
exchange for support for legislation that may provide largely private benefits for the group).
Examples of special interest goods may include the creation of a small national park with
extremely limited access, which is designed to prevent development in the backyard of a wealthy
neighborhood. This may provide highly concentrated benefits and large individual gains to the
homeowners in this neighborhood.
i' The public goods and collective goals to which labor union dues have been linked include:
"forcing the Boy Scouts to admit homosexuals and atheists[,] promoting abortion[,] ...
opposing welfare reform[,] legalizing marijuana[,] ... advocating statehood for the District
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"[W]orkers increasingly enticed by an 'expressive individualism' which focuses
on subjective self-realization, are less likely to find attractive any collective action
that requires individual interests to yield to group interest and group solidarity."' 54
Such workers, rightly or wrongly, may embrace Isaiah Berlin's claim that "the capacity
for choice, and for a self-chosen form of life ... [is] itself constitutive of human
beings."' 55 They may be captivated by the opportunity "to invent for [themselves]
through the exercise of the powers of choice a diversity of natures, embodied in irre-
ducibly distinct forms of life containing goods (and evils) that are sometimes in-
commensurable and... rationally incomparable."'' 56 Alternatively, some workers
might be captivated by a nonvoluntary characteristic such as ethnicity, race, or gender,
which creates for them a morally laudable interest in the lives of members of their
own ethnic or gender subgroup. Consequently, they are likely to oppose the sub-
version of their dues to support policies that subordinate fellow subgroup members.
Members of this subgroup may find that their preferences are driven by ascription.'57
Being predominately affective-oriented, their self-worth and their understanding of
subgroup worth is enhanced or diminished by what happens to the subgroup and
what happens to individual members of this subgroup. 58 Whether this analysis is
of Columbia[, and] supporting a freeze on nuclear weapons." CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note
30, at 18. Whatever one's view on these issues may be, and even if one believes that these
goods are under or over-produced, it may be difficult "to argue that the unions' support for
these causes improves union workers' pay, benefits, or working conditions. .. ." Id. Some
of these goods fall into separate categories as public goods or club goods depending on whether
or not they are non-excludable in terms of supply and nonrivalrous in terms of consumption. See
Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, in THE FORTUNEENCYCLoPEDIA OFECONOMICS,
supra note 152, at 74, 74-75. When the good at issue provides benefits to individuals who
are, generally speaking, not members of the group, that is, when nonmembers receive what
can be called positive externalities, the good exhibits the quality of being nonexcludable. See
id. at 74. Nonrivalry in consumption means that nonpayers (those who pay no fee) can enjoy
the benefit of the good without diminishing the enjoyment of others or without increasing
the cost associated with the production of the good. See id.
"' Hutchison, supra note 86, at 453 (citing Sharon Rabin Margalioth, The Significance
of Worker Attitudes: Individualism as a Cause for Labor's Decline, in EMPLOYEE REPRE-
SENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE: ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 41, 41-49 (Samuel Estreicher ed., 1998).
"5 JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 14 (1996).
156 Id. at 15.
'5' On one account, "[ildentity is an ascriptive concept.... Ascription emphasizes the
nonvoluntary mode of determining [group] membership. Membership is based on a mere
quality [e.g., ethnicity, race, or gender] rather than some ... voluntary share in association."
John D. Ely, Community and the Politics of Identity: Toward the Genealogy of a Nation-
State Concept, 5.2 STAN. ELEcTRONIC HUMAN. REV. (1997), http://www.stanford.edu/group/
SHR/5-2/elly.html. Voluntariness can be supplied in the sense that individuals accept identity
as a membership marker.
.58 See Vernon J. Dixon, Some Thoughts on Teaching Predominately Affective-Orientated
Groups, in INTRODUCING RACE AND GENDER INTO ECONOMICS 177, 177-89 (Robin L.
Bartlett ed., 1997); see also James McNair, Ford Settles Employee SuitAlleging Bias in Testing,
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entirely persuasive or not,'59 it suggests that the preferences of many present-day
individuals, when understood properly, are unlikely to be congruent with majori-
tarian preferences that infect union solidarity declarations.
Taken together then, all endeavors premised on a "universal" solidarity that are
focused on "achiev[ing] the collective good run the risk of submerging the identity
of subgroups and individuals to the service of others," including others' private
interests.'60 Instead of discovering some commonality of interest favoring contro-
versial values embedded in a cohesive version of solidarity, it is possible that these
presumably universally held opinions are nothing more than "convenient intimations
of shared meaning, as divined by prophetic or traditionalist avatars of the people [i.e.,
workers].' 6' Equally likely, these supposedly consensus views "are never checked
against actual opinions, least of all those of the most disadvantaged ... people [i.e.,
union dues objectors]."' 62 When either a leader or a group majority becomes fascinated
by some hierarchy of public goods/purposes such as democratic socialism 163 or in-
defensible racial or gender exclusion, and then seeks to employ mandatory, or even
voluntary, union dues to promote such goals,
it is difficult [within the confines of a postmodern worldview] to
conclude that such a purpose[, however desirable,] is derived or
even derivable from some transcendental standpoint.
... Postmodernism diminishes the viability of... cooperation
[and enhances the value of independent action] insofar as it demon-
strates that there may be no conclusive intersection between the
union' s goals and the goals of various collective and individual
identities [present within either a local or national union]."
USA TODAY, June 6, 2005, at 6B (reporting that settlement of a racial bias claim was not
about money but rather improving the opportunities provided to African American applicants).
1' See generally Harry Hutchison, From Bujumbura to Mogadishu: Ethnic Solidarity,
African Reality, American Implications, 31 GEO.WASH.J.INT'LL. &ECON. 141 (1997) (review-
ing KErrH B. RICHBURG, OUT OF AMERICA: A BLACK MAN CONFRONTS AFRICA (1997), and
offering a cautionary explication of postmodernism and appeals to identity).
'6 Hutchison, supra note 86, at 470.
161 Bernard Yack, Liberalism Without Illusions: An Introduction to Judith Shklar's Political
Thought, in LIBERAISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS: ESSAYS ON LIBERAL THEORY AND THE POLITICAL
VISION OF JUDITH N. SHKLAR 1, 8 (Bernard Yack ed., 1996) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
162 Id.
163 CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 30, at 19 (linking John Sweeney, president of the AFL-
CIO, to the Democratic Socialists of America, a group that evidently "rejects any economic
order sustained by private profit" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
"6 Hutchison, supra note 86, at 471, 476.
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Hence, if expressive individuals and various postmodern subgroups within the union
are to be true to their own identity (whatever that may be), the extraction of their
funds in support of this hierarchy of desire (solidarity) exposes these individuals to
the real risk that their interests will remain subordinated to those of the dominant ma-
jority. Accordingly, independent action, such as the withdrawal of dues payments,
premised on affective-group (race, class, gender) affiliation or, alternatively, one's
own expressive individualism, will become more attractive as "the benefits of...
(cross-class, cross-racial[, cross-gender]) [union] decline."'' 65
It may be true that in advanced capitalist systems like the United States, indi-
viduals try "to ward off alienation and anomie with ... collective symbolism and
ritual, complete with [some form of] group solidarity."' 66 Yet it seems equally true
in the postmodern world (A) that anyone can assume any of a myriad forms of
authentic identities 67 that distinguish and separate individuals and subgroups of
individuals from one's peers (whoever they may be), and (B) that everyone "should
be repelled by the notion of making contact with something larger and more endur-
ing than oneself."1 68 If this portrait depicts contemporary America, solidarity can be
seen as nothing more than "coercive consensus." '169 Thus, fragmentation at the level
of society and the level of group is probable if not inevitable - nor is it permissible
for society to rank permanently in order of importance any of these various identities,
if one believes, as pragmatists like Rorty and Dewey believe, that there is no "legiti-
mating ground for a fixed and durable political hierarchy." 70
To be sure, Rorty, and possibly other postmodern observers, accept some con-
ception of solidarity.' Moreover, we need not be persuaded fully by his Nietzschean
165 Id. See also id. ("Thus, the benefits of union solidarity will decline as the calculus of
cooperation versus independence changes in favor of independence." (citation omitted)).
'66 TERRY EAGLETON, THE IDEA OF CULTURE 70 (2000).
167 For a discussion of, and a disagreement with this development, see Charles Taylor, The
Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION
25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (arguing that the process proceeds as follows: self-knowledge
as self-creation leads inevitably to the origination of self-identity).
168 Hutchison, supra note 159, at 144.
169 EAGLETON, supra note 166, at 72. This conclusion may be consistent with two views
of the First Amendment. One narrative sees the First Amendment as an aspiration that implies
the necessity "of securing an open environment in which all can equally experiment with
how to think and speak[, disassociate] and where no one can determine for anyone else what
is orthodox." Benkler, supra note 69, at 26. An alternative view rests on the premise that
"government power rather than private power, is the main threat to free expression." Id. at
26-27 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 683-84 (1994)).
170 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 104 (2003) (discussing
Dewey's views).
171 See RORTY, supra note 120, at xvi.
It is created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the
pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of people. Such increased
sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalize people different from
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understanding, nor accept fully postmodernism with "[ilts demotic sympathies [that]
spring more from a scepticism of hierarchies."' 72 Rorty's antifoundationalism may
denote the contemporary manifestation of Sophism that appears to deny reality while
resisting all metanarratives that can make sense out of life.'73 Worryingly, the com-
plete acceptance of Rorty' s view reifies particularism and its suspicion of universalist
claims, 74 thus severing the individual completely from society. To the extent that
postmodern claims are grounded in mandatory and normative demands as opposed
to optional and descriptive aspirations, it may lead government "to alter the terms
of civil association in ways that will neither resolve the problems ... nor bring...
social harmony."' 75 Postmodernism may run the risk of "fall[ing] victim to the
'fraternal conceit': the fanciful notion that community and social solidarity can be
secured" by a compulsory form of "political association." 176 Equally clear, post-
modern thought gives rise to other critical concerns that limit the viability, if not the
coherence of postmodem discourse. 177 Nonetheless, Rorty's postmodem/pragmatist
ourselves by thinking, "They do not feel it as we would," or 'There
must always be suffering, so why not let them suffer?"
Id. (emphasis in original). It is possible that contemporary liberal politics has been captured
and captivated by the notion of minimizing cruelty particularly in some public form. Cf. Yack,
supra note 161, at 3-5 (discussing cruelty as part of Judith Shklar's liberal theory). For a
discussion of the improbability of self-creation, see HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 13 (2d
ed. 1970) ("[A]I1 notions of man creating himself have in common a rebellion against the
very factuality of the human condition - nothing is more obvious than that man, whether
as a member of the species or as an individual, does not owe his existence to himself .....
172 EAGLETON, supra note 166, at 77 (discussing postmodernism more generally).
173 See BUDZIszEwsKI, supra note 21, at 167.
174 See EAGLETON, supra note 166, at 76.
175 CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE FRATERNAL CONCEIT: INDIVIDUALIST VERSUS COLLEC-
TWIST IDEAS OF COMMUNrrY 2 (1991).
176 id.
177 The analysis proceeds as follows. Postmoderns contend that there is no such thing as
truth out there. See, e.g., RORTY, supra note 120, at 5. If correct, then contemporary man
may be left "[w]ithout the means to identify the good, [and hence] ... remains ignorant of
just how the evil he is able to identify has come about... [despite the fact that] his intuition
is telling him that what he sees is evil." DELSOL, supra note 1, at 52. Then, if we in fact are
able to identify absolute evil out there, we are forced "to believe that an order exists beyond
our will, beyond our capacity as creators of order" - thus placing into question "the subjective
morality of our times." Id. at 53.
We cannot proclaim, "To each his own morality," and at the same time
decry racism and apartheid. There is a flaw in this reasoning that we
will inevitably have to confront. We can remain faithful to subjectivism
and accept everything, including the unacceptable, which then simply
becomes unacceptable "for some," or we can hold on to our absolute
judgment about evil, and thus cast aside our subjectivism.
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analysis can be seen as an imperfect philosophical complement"' to a public choice
inquiry wherein collective action problems and the impossibility of comprehensive
interest convergence'79 among all members of the group undermine both the attractive-
ness and possibility of voluntary cooperation. These difficulties have been known
for some time and precede the advent and recognition of postmodern claims that
verify rising fragmentation.
B. The Public Choice View
John Gray's distinctive contribution to the proper understanding of modem mass
democracies concludes that modem
states tend overwhelmingly [to fail] ... to protect or promote the
public interest. Contrary to the classical theory of the state as the
provider of public good - goods, that is to say, which in virtue
of their indivisibility and non-excludability must be provided to
all or none - modem states are above all suppliers of private
goods.18
0
Rather than provide simply "the pure public good of civil peace," it is increasingly
likely that the mission of "the modem state [is]... to satisfy the private preferences
of collusive interest groups,''. whether or not the pursuit of such aims is cloaked
178 In no sense should this be understood to imply that Rorty actually makes philosophical
claims as traditionally understood. Instead, consistently with Paul J. Griffiths's critique, Rorty
can best be understood as one who identifies "[a] whole vocabulary - that of truth, reality,
objectivity, universality" - which is simply refused. Paul J. Griffiths, Offer Declined, 154
FIRST THINGS 38, 40 (2005) (reviewing RICHARD RORTY & GIANNI VATriMO, THE FUTURE
OF RELIGION (2006)).
Refusal is not denial. It is, instead, the abandonment of one lexicon and
the deployment of another. Someone who turns from philosophy toj azz
improvisation has not refuted or rebutted philosophy, but merely refused
or abandoned it. To refute or rebut would still be to practice philosophy,
and this Rorty... do[es] not wish to do.
Id.
9 Among other things, "'Arrow Impossibility Theorem,' suggests that majority-rule deter-
mination of social preferences must be either chaotic or illusory." JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED,
CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 12 (1997). As is
well-known, "[t]he Arrow Theorem generalizes an eighteenth-century proof called Condorcet's
Paradox .... [demonstrating] that no voting rule... allows voters to express their true
preference." Id. This leads inevitably to an indeterminate outcome. See id. at 13.
80 JOHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICALTHOUGHT 11 (1993) (emphasis
in original).
t' Id. at 11-12. See also James M. Buchanan, The Constitution of Economic Policy, in
PUBL1C CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONALECONOMICS 103,107-08 (James D. Gwartney& Richard
2006] 1339
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
in language implying some pure public purpose or alternatively infused with the lan-
guage of market failure.' 8 2 It may be possible, therefore, to achieve private aims and
objectives through government processes more efficiently than by relying on market
processes.'83 Hence, "[m]odern democratic states have themselves become weapons
in the war of all against all, as rival interest groups compete with each other to capture
government and use it to seize and redistribute resources among themselves."' The
"central tendency" of this political process may rightly imply that "many, perhaps
most, statutes, if evaluated honestly and realistically, would be found to lack any
true basis in the public interest."' 5
As Dennis Mueller illumines, "[i]nterest groups come in a wide variety of insti-
tutional forms and sizes. Some seek to further the objectives of their members as
factors of production or producers.' 8 6 Examples of such interest groups include
"labor unions, farmer associations, professional associations .... and industrial trade
associations."' 87 Meanwhile, other groups "seek to influence public policy or public
opinion with respect to particular public good - externality issues.' 88 Examples
include "[p]eace groups, environmental groups and the National Rifle Association."1 89
Frequently, "a group is organized to pursue one objective, and then once organized
turns to other forms of activity to benefit its members."' 9 Consistently with this
conclusion, "[l]abor unions came into being to improve the bargaining power of
workers vis-a-vis management. But once the large initial costs of organization had
been overcome," they turned their attention to other efforts that benefitted workers,
union leaders, union majorities, or those who can be seen as outsiders.' 9' To be sure,
E. Wagner eds., 1988). But see FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 9, at 7 (offering a limited ver-
sion of public choice theory, suggesting that self-interest simply means avaricious greed in a
simple monetary sense and thus implying that self-interest can be separated from ideological/
nonmaterial considerations).
182 WILLIAM C. MrrcHEI.. & RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND POLITcs: MARKETS, WELFARE,
AND THE FAILURE OF BUREAUCRACY 1 (1994) ("The vision underlying this expansion [of
regulation and bureaucracy] is that government succeeds where markets fail."). It is possible
that "welfare economists [have] dethroned markets" in western countries, and have "admini-
stered the coronation of government" premised on the claim of "undersupplied public goods,
exorbitant and ubiquitous social costs of private actions... and [attached to the notion of]
unfairly distributed wealth and income." Id. at 3.
183 See id. at 108.
'84 GRAY, supra note 180, at 4.
185 RICHARD A. POSNER, THEECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 382 (1981) (describing but not neces-
sarily "condemn[ing] as unconstitutional the most characteristic product of a democratic...
system").







A CLEARING IN THE FOREST
if the group is comprised of individuals who are part of a community of interest,
there may be some incentive to free ride.'92 On the other hand, the absence of a
commonality of interest vitiates free-rider concerns and claims.
If one believes that "there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at
least one natural right, the equal right of all" individuals to make choices free from
coercion or restraint from others. 9 3 Hence the servicing of private interests by the
government or by groups leads inevitably to inter-group and intra-group conflict.
Correspondingly, the benefits that flow from either fraternal organizations or free,
individually-focused action have been diminished relative to the benefits that are
achievable if and when the government is captured by private interest. Hence, "[t]he
transformation of the modern state" into a provider of private or quasi-private/quasi-
public goods "has... weaken[ed] the vitality of autonomous institutions," as well as
the vitality "of free individual activity."'" When government, in the shape of a majori-
tarian democracy, "bestows favor upon a group" (Group A), often this group's activity
is encouraged at the expense of other groups or subgroups (Groups B and C).' 95
This is premised on the prediction that a specific form of government regulation pro-
motes egalitarianism, the interests of the poor,' 96 or the general interests. While this
intuitively utilitarian calculation involves "the possibility of trading off the interests
in the life or liberty of... [some] people against a [perceived] greater sum of the lesser
interests of others,' 97 as a general matter, "[t]here is neither theoretical justification
nor empirical evidence to support this [welfare enhancing] assumption."'198
While it is predictable that someone or some group benefits from government
policy, the named beneficiaries may simply provide camouflage for the actual bene-
ficiaries who lobby, litigate, engage in political fundraising, or otherwise invest in
192 Id.
19' H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 77, 77 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1984). But see Margaret MacDonald, Natural Rights, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS
supra, at 21 ("That men are entitled to make certain claims by virtue simply of their common
humanity has been equally passionately defended and vehemently denied.").
194 GRAY, supra note 180, at 12. See also DAVID T. BErro, FROM MUTUAL AID TO THE
WELFARE STATE: FRATERNAL SOCIETIES AND SOCIAL SERVICES, 1890-1967 (2000). During
the period from 1890 through the 1920s, "more Americans belonged to fraternal societies
than any other kind of voluntary association, with the possible exception of churches." Id.
at 2. Ethnic social welfare organizations provided more assistance than other institutions,
both public and private. See id. In contrast to government aid, which rested on hierarchy,
"fraternal aid rested on an ethical principle of reciprocity." Id. at 3. Accordingly, "[tihere is
reason to believe that... [there is an inverse correlation] between the emergence of the
welfare state and the decline of fraternal services." Id. at 228.
"' See, e.g., Richard E. Wagner & James D. Gwartney, Public Choice and Constitutional
Order, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 181, at 29, 51.
196 Id. at 52.
'9 Jeremy Waldron, Introduction to THEORIES OF RIGHTS, supra note 193, at 1, 18-19.
198 Wagner & Gwartney, Public Choice and Constitutional Order, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND
CONSTTUTIONAL EcoNoMIcs, supra note 181, at 29, 50.
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the effort to maintain, expand, and ensure survival of the benefit (subsidy).'99 Simi-
larly, it is possible that groups can be captured by the self-interests of subgroups,
group majorities, or entrenched leaders.2" Those in power may then deploy general
group revenues to finance special interest benefits as opposed to excludable club goods
that might provide benefits solely to members. Claims that the true beneficiaries
include all group members and that all group members benefit equally are used to
defend special interest privileges that accrue to some (including those outside the
group) but not all members. Such claims can best be described as subterfuge. Operat-
ing consistently with the prospect of group capture, special interest legislation2"'
(such as expanded access to food stamps, national health insurance, or other non-
excludable collective goods2°2) may be demanded by factions within a union or other
group. This process leads inevitably to a difficult-to-justify redistribution of group
revenues to provide largely private benefits (positive externalities) to outsiders as well
as a limited yet influential cohort of insiders who favor such a result. In sum, the
prospect for collective self-interest determination premised on goal uniformity de-
rived from group solidarity may be grim unless evidence of preference and interests
unanimity emerges.
C. Implications for Labor Unions
As a general proposition, the foregoing appraisal applies to labor market regu-
lation in the form of the NLRA,2 3 the RLA,204 and similar statutes affecting state
government employees. 205  This appraisal implies that labor market regulation
creating compulsory union fails to promote and preserve either the general or group
interest. Instead, statutory protection tends to yield largely private benefits. Secondly,
this appraisal predicts labor unions, just like any other group, can be captured to
199 See generally id. at 5 1.
200 See Schwab, supra note 40, at 367-74, 380-83.
2o' For an exposition of the distinction that scholars and the courts make between special
interest legislation and class legislation, see David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism,
Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1,
11-31 (2003).
202 See, e.g., Hugh L. Reilly, The Constitutionality of Labor Unions' Collection and Use
of Forced Duesfor Non-Bargaining Purposes, 32 MERCER L. REV. 561, 571 (1981) (listing
some of the lobbying goals apparently funded by union dues in the Communications Workers
of America v. Beck litigation).
203 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2000).
204 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88.
205 Since "[tihe [NLRA] encourages union organizing efforts by forbidding the employer
to fire or threaten union organizers and sympathizers," and since "the Norris-LaGuardia Act
forbids yellow dog contracts, which would enable the employer to exploit the workers' incen-
tives to free ride," organizing campaigns have an advantage vis-a-vis employers. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 90, at 354.
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benefit either the union majority and/or union leaders while failing to consider ade-
quately the actual diversity of views and interests within the group. This analysis
breathes life into two equally poignant probabilities: (A) Terry Eagleton's claim
that during an earlier time, the international and largely Western labor movement
spoke to the masses - today it speaks to the elites; 206 and (B) if solidarity implies
"the way of life of a particular people living together in one place," 207 as T.S. Eliot
contends, union leaders may no longer inhabit the same place as rank and file union
dues payers. Both of these possibilities operate coherently with the observation that
"[m]odern thought is much more elitist than ancient thought, though it talks a less
elitist line. 208
Coextensively with these various contentions, it should be observed that we live
in an epoch that has witnessed radically new perspectives on human liberty and auton-
omy. Evidently, the Supreme Court has confirmed the correctness of this possibility.
On its account, "[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State."2' Conversely, Professor Budziszewski counsels
that the notion of radical autonomy, if taken too far, leads inevitably to the following
conclusion:
If morality is created, not discovered, then surely different groups
and individuals will create different moralities, for they will "care
most" about different things. There will be no common standard
by which to adjudicate the conflicts among these invented moral-
ities. The clashes among them will be like clashes of clothing
styles, with this strange difference - that the stakes are who lives
and who dies.21°
If the Supreme Court is correct, it becomes doubtful that the liberty interest the Court
seems determined to protect can coexist peacefully with the right of unions and union
leaders to speak on behalf of the entire workforce in their search for the meaning of
the universe or the mystery of human life. If Budziszewski's cautionary explication
is correct, the descriptive component (but not the normative element) of his analysis
echoes Rorty's claim that morality (solidarity) is simply a component of self-creation.
That provokes a question: How can workers freely engage in this self-creation
process when a union, ably assisted by statutory coercion, acts as an agent that aims
206 EAGLETON, supra note 166, at 77.
207 Id. at 112 (quoting T.S. Euor, NOEs TowARDs THEDEFiNrON oFCuLTURE 120 (1948)).
208 BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 21, at 164.
209 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
210 BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 21, at 6-7.
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to produce a radically opposite morality grounded in opposing preferences that are
attached to some hierarchically determined and collectively imposed understanding
of self-interest?
While few deaths have been reported in connection with union organizing, the
stakes remain high. Labor unions, therefore, form the hub of an important debate
about how to view human association - either within the parameters of government
regulation or as part of a largely consensual group. Two options exist. On one hand,
a collectivist conception attracted to government regulation "sees political society
as a form of association that has value only insofar as it serves to unite men in a
community in which the bonds of social solidarity are strong..2 ' From this per-
spective, "human freedom will be attained only when civil association [commands] ...
that individuals act collectively in pursuit of their [hierarchically mandated] common
ends. 212 This approach likely extends the bounds of a mandatory collectivity to
unions as statutory instruments of the polity in the quest for presumptively common
objectives. On the other hand, classical liberalism implies that a defensible form of
association consists of consenting "individuals bound by rules ofjust conduct which,
by specifying the terms of cooperation, regulate their behaviour and ensure peace:
civil association has no purpose other than to preserve order so that the individual
might pursue his own (private) ends, together with others or alone. 2 13 Labor unions,
under this approach, can only be legitimated when they act as purely voluntary
associations that require consent before the obligations of membership attach.
The United States has opted for the former approach. Correctly scrutinized, "the
regulation of labor markets has created a legal edifice of stunning complexity,,
214
augmented by the probability that most economic rents accrue to labor.215 Despite
statutory success, evidence continues to mount confirming a sharp decline in union
density. Declining strength leads to the assertion that "private sector labor law...
211 KUKATHAS, supra note 175, at 2.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 151. Accord United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,763 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ("The NLRA... establishes
an elaborate and complicated structure that governs labor relations in almost all of the industries
within the nation's private sector." (footnote omitted)).
One source of complexity arises from the fact that "membership in a labor union allegedly
constitutes a contract between the member and the union, the terms of which are governed
by the constitution and by-laws of the union .... This contractual conception ... widely
prevails in this country." Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 618 (1958).
Sometimes state law provides a remedy for breach of contract. See, e.g., id.
215 Lawrence F. Katz & Lawrence H. Summers, Industry Rents: Evidence and Implications,
in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACIvrry: MICROECONOMICS 209, 210 (Martin Neil
Bailey & Clifford Winston eds., 1989) (noting that "[ciapital owners in the American econo-
my receive few monopoly rents," and most rents, perhaps 80 to 85 percent, go to labor).
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has shrunk in its reach and its significance, and is clearly ailing, 216 thus, hampering
"workers' efforts to advance their own shared interests through self-organization and
collective protest, pressure, negotiation, and agreement with employers. 21 7 This
contention suggests that there is a "'gap' between the desire for and the supply of
collective representation in workplace governance '211 - implying that this socially
beneficial and market-correcting outcome is under-produced. Proving this claim 219
requires substantiation of interest convergence among workers. The postmodem
216 Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 CoLUM. L. REv. 1527,
1527 (2002). But see Harry G. Hutchison, Diversity, Tolerance, and Human Rights: The
Future of Labor Unions and the Union Dues Dispute, 49 WAYNE L. REv. 705, 721 (2003).
[O]rganized labor's future within the United States must observe that
union density in the private sector continues its downward spiral. In
reality, current union penetration... fails to differ greatly from union
density prior to the passage of the NLRA.... [T]his... return to the
status quo ante[, without more, fails to] constitute a principled ground
for alarm.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Of some interest, the evidence may imply that unions have been too
successful in certain industries in driving wages and benefits above the level that is sustain-
able. See, e.g., Brett Clanton & Daniel Howes, Suppliers Urge UA WtoAid GM, Ford, DETROIT
NEwS, May 9, 2005, at IA.
217 Estlund, supra note 216, at 1527.
218 Id. at 1528 (footnote omitted). These views may reflect a dubious attachment to the
purportedly blissful but actually spotty days of the labor movement during and after the New
Deal. On one account, the passage of the Wagner Act represented "labor's legal zenith."
GETMAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 5. But see VEDDER & GAUAWAY, supra note 51, at 141-46
(showing data supporting that government sponsored "unionization was the more important
cause of prolonged high unemployment" during the period immediately following the
passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the National Labor Relations Act, which
includes the downturn in 1937-1938.). For a global view of unions, see JACQUES ELLUL, THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 358 (John Wilkinson trans., 1964) ('The worker through his unions
is intensifying his own thralldom to techniques, augmenting their powers of organization, and
completing his own integration into that very movement from which ... unionism had
originally hoped to free him.").
219 On the implausibility of government market correction and the probability of increas-
ing imperfection, in the context of labor law, see Charles W. Baird, Labor Law and Labor-
Management Cooperation: Two Incompatible Views, 6 CATO J. 933, 935 (1987) available
athttp://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj6n3/cj6n3-13.pdf. ("[T]wo sources of government failure
[impede government regulation]: the knowledge problem and the political problem."). But
see Stearns, supra note 122, at 1242 ("Assuming participants legislate without knowing how
the rules they devise will affect particular constituents in future transactions, all parties then
have an interest in selecting efficient, utility-maximizing rules."). This view does not advocate
limiting legislative action to correcting market failures; rather, it argues that "the legis-
lature... [may] have a comparative advantage relative to market participants" in correcting
certain kinds of market failures but may lack that comparative advantage when engaging in
certain kinds of distributive legislation. Id. at 1243. See also id. at 1242-43 nn.85-87 and
accompanying text.
2006] 1345
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
project, public choice theory, and a reasonable understanding of human autonomy
flatten this possibility.
Indeed, just as difficulties exist in translating individual preferences into a social
preference, difficulties persist in transmuting individual union members' preferences
into some collective preference.22 Labor unions, protected by favorable legislative
mandates that compel dues and fees in exchange for benefits that members presum-
ably desire, may not represent a model of cooperation at all, and thus may accentuate
collective action problems. Instead, unions may represent an involuntary collection
of people who happen to share some (but not necessarily preference defining) char-
acteristics. 22' This deduction implicates a tantalizing prospect: if collective bargain-
ing and societal transformation are seen as a socially beneficial outcome (however
that contention is arrived at), then government regulation is required, since it is un-
likely that self-interested individuals will behave in such socially beneficial ways
except under ideal circumstances.222
Unions and other groups, of course, exist. Explaining their existence (particu-
larly large unions) may require "some other explanation than collective self-interest ' 223
since "worker solidarity . . . [may] not suffice 24 or, alternatively, may not exist.
Nonetheless, Mancur Olson explains the existence of groups premised on the avail-
ability of "selective incentives that benefit group members such as... compulsory
membership and picket lines., 225 Evidently "[w]ithout such 'incentives,' the self-
interest assumption of group theorists would generate a point prediction of zero
collective action in large groups [such as unions], and would therefore be falsified
in virtually every case. 226 On the other hand, Olson concedes that groups may be
comprised, at least partially, of "altruistic individuals" or, alternatively, "irrational
individuals. ' 227 At a minimum, this implies that selective incentives, such as union
security agreements coupled with the right to terminate workers for nonpayment of
dues, may not be necessary in every case.228 Nevertheless, collective action problems
persist particularly "[w]here the benefits from collective action are not the same across
all group members., 229 In that case, "there is a systematic tendency for 'exploitation'
220 McNuTr, supra note 151, at 47. This difficulty will continue to persist unless some
form of unanimous agreement can be discovered. See id.
221 Cf. Posner, supra note 143, at 135.
222 See Katz, supra note 89, at 41. If Katz is correct, the failure of workers to voluntarily
cooperate in the formation of a union for collective bargaining purposes may constitute
evidence of market failure, thus providing substantial scope for legal rules and institutions
to promote an efficient exchange of wages for the use of human capital.
223 Friedman, supra note 10, at 20.
224 MUELLER, supra note 6, at 309.
225 Friedman, supra note 10, at 20 (citing MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE




229 MUELLER, supra note 6, at 309.
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of the great by the small."23 In sum, consistent with public choice theory and Terry
Eagleton's intuition,231 union hierarchs tend to exploit labor organizations for their
own private benefit while speaking to and on behalf of elites as opposed to all
workers.
Since the inception of "protected status under ... collective bargaining statute[s],"232
attached to the Pigovian interpretation that government exists as "a corrector of
market failure, ' 233 unions, workers, and employers have been parties to a plethora
of rulings and counter-rulings from administrative agencies and (often incomplete)
judicial decisions as part of the federal and various state governments' attempt to
locate, presumably, missing labor market efficiency or to resolve collective action
disputes. The NLRA, through its enforcement mechanism, relies on court adjudi-
cation of increasingly technical and often repetitive arguments that are revisited in
the form of additional litigation or ambiguous and often conflicting National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) re-evaluations.2 4
Following the issuance of a Board decision, courts are then disposed to issue
proclamations about the necessity of deferring to the omni-competence of adminis-
trative agencies, along with an explication of the interstices of the agency's rule-
making authority. This progression mirrors Justice Frankfurter's observation about
the hyper-technical "process of litigating elucidation. 2 3' Litigating elucidation has
a cost in addition to evident increases in transaction costs: it may obscure and en-
cumber rights that union dissenters should enjoy since it is doubtful all members (dues
payers) share the same interests that union leaders or academic observers freely assert
on their behalf. Another factor that obscures rights that dissenters may possess is
simply the costs associated with delays in processing dues objector cases - delays
that approach or exceed seven years.236 Since labor unions are unlikely to operate
within the parameters of unanimous consent, public choice theory as revitalized by
postmodern insights forecasts that the rights and interests of the minority (union
230 Id. (emphasis and citation omitted).
231 See supra notes 166, 169 and accompanying text.
232 EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 151.
233 McNuTr, supra note 151, at 2. Market failure occurs when the allocation of resources
is inefficient. See John 0. Ledyard, Market Failure, in ALLOCATION, INFORMATION, AND
MARKETS 185, 185 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1989). "Market
failure is often the justification for political intervention in the marketplace," premised on
the conclusion that "everyone [or at least one person] can.., be made better off" without
making anyone worse consistent with Paretian claims. Id. To be clear, the Pigovian premise
may not sustain a social welfare justification for collective bargaining statutes. Cf. Baird,
supra note 219, at 933-37 (arguing that government impedes the development of effective
forms of worker-management cooperation).
234 See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Toward a Robust Conception of "Independent Judgment":
Back to the Future?, 36 U.S.F. L. REv. 335, 341 (2002) (discussing the evolution of the
NLRA's exclusion of "supervisors" from the collective bargaining unit).
231 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
236 See, e.g., HUNTER, KERSEY & MILLER, supra note 35, at 8.
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dues objectors) are likely to be subordinated to the tendency of modern mass democ-
racies and groups to service private interests as opposed to the interests of either the
group, identifiable subgroups, or individual members. The United Food opinion
extends this possibility.
m. UNION ORGANIZING: GERMANE OR NONGERMANE?
AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED FOOD CASE
The legitimacy of compulsory union dues turns on which activities are considered
germane or non-germane, as well as a determination of whether activities implicate
communicative speech adverse to the interests of dues objectors. Conclusions about
whether certain union expenditures are germane (and therefore defensible under
standard judicial and economic analyses) may depend on one's conception of the
workplace, the persuasiveness of the empirical data available, and one's understand-
ing of communicative content associated with a challenged activity, even if no ideo-
logical purpose is conceded by the labor union in question. Determining whether
activities are representational or non-representational depends, in part, on rival eco-
nomic claims and conclusions that implicate a cost-benefit calculus that either supports
or opposes the presumed social welfare benefits of unionization. Before examining
case-specific economic evidence concerning the effect that union organizing tends to
have on wages, it may be useful to note that largely neoclassical "[e]conomic studies
find that 'most, if not all, of the gains of union labor are made at the expense of non-
unionized workers, and not at the expense of earnings on capital." 237 Some studies
find that union monopolies raise wages of union members in exchange for both
market inefficiency and inequality; hence, a number of "economic studies implicitly
or explicitly judge unions as having a negative impact on the economy" 238 and on
social welfare,239 including but not limited to a rise in unemployment rates.24° This
237 STEvEN E. RHOADS, THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 256 n.55 (1985) (quoting Harry Johnson & Peter Mieszkowski, The
Effects of Unionization on the Distribution of Income: A General Equilibrium Approach, 84
Q.J. ECON. 539, 560 (1970)). This observation becomes more important when we recognize
that "[flor most workers, all or almost all their income is derived from the sale of their labor."
STEPHEN J. SPURR, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 18 (2006).
238 RHOADS, supra note 237, at 256 n.55.
239 EHRENBERG & SMrrH, supra note 37, at 461-62 (noting that some evidence indicates
that unionization, for a variety of reasons, contributes to social welfare losses). But see id.
at 462-63 (discussing potential increases in social welfare derived from unionization).
24 See supra note 51. But see Peter Kuhn, Unions and the Economy: What We Know;
What We Should Know, 31 CAN. J. ECON. 1033 (1998). While "standard microeconomic
theory... predicts that... [labor's] factor-demand elasticities should be negative," suggesting
that unions raise wages and reduce employment, Kuhn contends "that unions' effects on em-
ployment are theoretically ambiguous" within a North American context. Id. at 1040. Kuhn
does concede the centrality of a negative union employment effect in much of the European
macroeconomic literature. See id.
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process may entail a two-fold response to a union's successful attempt to raise wages.
First, higher wages may lead some employers to substitute away from labor and to-
ward capital ("substitution effect"24'). Second, firms may respond by deciding that
the cost increase associated with higher wages requires an increase in the price of
its products, thus reducing the firm's sales and hence its demand for labor ("scale
effect" 242). While a number of defenders of the labor movement concede that "unions
raise wages in ways that misallocate labor and reduce social output," unions also
"change[] work relations in socially beneficial ways. 243 These socially beneficial
advantages are not only far from being fully quantifiable, but may also be highly
suspect.244 These presumed advantages are linked to the conclusion "that the nation
should [endeavor to] reverse the decline in union [strength]."245 On the other hand,
the largely negative social welfare outcomes associated with unionization may pro-
duce skepticism about the asserted benefits associated with union organizing.
Returning to the question of the wage-effect of union organizing, a comparison
of spillover effects with threat effects yields conflicting answers. Spillover analysis
indicates that the achievement of higher wages for newly organized workers, like pre-
viously organized ones, means typically a union can only "succeed[] in raising the
wages of its members who ke[ep] their jobs.' 2 6 Union organizing implies that unions
shift[] some of [their] members to lower-wage jobs in the non-
union sector and, because of this spillover effect.... lower[] the
wage rate paid to individuals initially employed in the nonunion
sector. As a result, the observed union relative wage advantage...
will tend to be greater than the true absolute effect of the union on
its members' real wage.247
By contrast, the threat effects of unionization imply that "[n]onunion employers,
fearing that a union would increase labor costs and place limits on managerial pre-
rogatives, might seek to buy off their employees by offering them above-market
wages. 248 While the wage increase and resulting decline in employment in the union
sector result in a shift in "the supply of labor to the nonunion sector,, 249 employers
241 I am indebted to Stephen Spurr for this observation. E-mail from Stephen Spurr, Professor
of Economics, Wayne State University (Aug. 23, 2005, 16:06:34 EST) (on file with author).
242 Id.
243 Richard Freeman, Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or Irrelevant?, in
UNIONS ANDECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 143, 144 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds.,
1992) (footnote omitted).
244 See id. ("Unions and collective bargaining change work relations by lowering turnover
and . .. increasing productivity ... .
245 Id. at 145.
246 EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 37, at 453.
247 Id. (emphases omitted).
248 Id. at 454.
249 Id.
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are not free to take advantage of this because they fear unionization, and hence, they
attempt to buy off their employees with above-market wages.250 The threat of a
union, therefore, results in a reduction in employment in the nonunion sector as the
employers pay higher wages in lieu of unionization. 251 "[B]ecause the nonunion
wage is now higher than the original wage, the observed union relative wage advan-
tage is smaller than the absolute effect of unions on their members' real wages. 2 2
Taken as a whole, the evidence demonstrates in some cases that threat effects pre-
253dominate, suggesting little benefit can be achieved by union organizing financed
by already organized workers. This seems particularly true when the focus is on the
wage effect received by already organized workers from a union organizing campaign
aimed at unrepresented workers. In other cases, spillover effects predominate,254
implying that already organized workers may receive a positive wage benefits when
unions organize unrepresented workers.
Some economic evidence, to be sure, exists in support of the possibility that
workers "covered by union contracts earn wages that are, on average, 15 percent
higher than observationally equivalent non-covered workers."2 "5 Conversely, it may
also be the case "that workers who are observationally equivalent... [in an] analys[is]
of standard social surveys are not equivalent to employers. 2 6 This conclusion
diminishes the putative wage effects associated with union organizing. At least one
major large-scale study concludes that little or no positive wage benefits can be de-
rived from a successful organizing campaign.2 7 Such evidence serves to confirm
Milton Friedman's pessimistic assertion "that the ability of unions to raise wage
rates.., was somewhat exaggerated, because most unions could not overcome market
forces that would tend to keep wages aligned with competitive rates., 258 Further, if
and when high wages and benefits are achievable, it is far from clear that they will be
an unmixed blessing for organized workers from a long-run perspective.259 Moreover,
250 Id. at 454-56.
251 See id. at 454.
252 id.
253 See id. at 456-57.
254 See id. 457-58.
255 Kuhn, supra note 240, at 1036.
256 Id. at 1037 (emphasis in original).
" John DiNardo & David S. Lee, Economic Impacts of Unionization on Private Sector
Employers: 1984-2001, at 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10598,
2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 10598 (using multiple establishment-level
data sets representing establishments facing organizing drives in the United States during
1984-2001 and noting that "union wage impacts are small - centered around zero").
258 Id. at 4.
259 See, e.g., Daniel Howes, Gettelfinger Didn't Have Any Other Choice in the Visteon
Deal, DETROIT NEWS, May 25, 2005, available at http://www.detnews.con/2005/insiders/
0505/30/CO1-192690.htm (discussing the unemployment effects associated with collective
bargaining success in the form of negotiations that lead to high wages and benefits); see also
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when labor unions achieve a wage premium, the evidence suggests that such success
has a negative effect on job growth because "U]ob growth taking place in new work-
places is almost entirely nonunion, at least initially."'2 60 To the extent that vibrant
competition exists within organized industries and among organized firms, the
economic evidence suggesting fluctuating ambiguity may be consistent with F.A.
von Hayek' s idea that competitive markets produce a "rivalrous flux" or "a kind of
partially ordered chaos" as opposed to a stable equilibrium. 26' Taken as a whole, the
economic evidence does not support the conclusion that already organized workers
are likely to receive a causally connected wage benefit from extra-bargaining unit
organizing efforts.
On the other hand, a contrary view - disconnected from the empirical evidence
- emphasizes that such pessimistic claims "neglect[] the role unions play in giving
workers a voice both at the workplace and in the political arena. 2 62 Assuming the
accuracy of this observation, it is possible to understand efforts aimed at depriving
unions of dues that fuel organizing campaigns as an unnecessary constraint on unions'
political mission to transform society and an unnecessarily crabbed conception of
the union movement. These observations underscore the conviction that what is
germane to a labor union's activity operates at the intersection of economic analysis
and the union's political, social, and ideological agenda in conflict with the diversity
of member views on such issues.
A. The United Food Case
Despite the mixed economic data, the United Food263 case provided an opening
for the NLRB to reconsider Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship
Clerks,264 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association,265 and California Saw & Knife
Stan Greer, Nat'l Inst. for Labor Relations Research, Is Forced Unionism Fueling the Health-
Insurance Crisis?, available at http://www.nilrr.org/HealthCrisis.htm (noting that "'exclusive'
union bargaining has had a negative impact on the businesses' rates of investment and accu-
mulation of physical and innovative capital," leading to a strong correlation between the
presence of state right-to-work laws and the more rapid growth in the number ofjobs offering
medical benefits).
260 Barry T. Hirsch & Edward J. Schumacher, Private Sector Union Density and the Wage
Premium: Past, Present and Future, 22 J. LAB. REs. 487, 492 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
261 For a discussion of von Hayek and related issues, see MITCHELL & SIMMONS, supra
note 182, at 198-201.
262 RHOADS, supra note 237, at 256 n.55 (citation omitted).
263 United Food & Commercial Workers Locals 951, 7 and 1036 (Meijer, Inc.), 329
N.L.R.B. 730 (1999), enforced in part, 307 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1024 (2002).
264 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
265 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
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Works.266 This reconsideration interacts with the Board's application of Communi-
cations Workers of America v. Beck 267 to the pivotal issue - the chargeability to
nonmembers of fees related to expenditures for organizing activities. 268 "The con-
solidated complaint alleged... that Local 951 and Local 7 violated Section 8(b)(l)(A)
of the Act by allocating expenditures for organizing as chargeable to objecting non-
member employees and by expending dues and fees collected from them for such
activities., 269 The various complainants, subject to some exceptions, were governed
by a union security clause although each had resigned from full membership in the
union and had notified their respective union that they "objected to paying for non-
representational activities., '17 ° Local 951 acknowledged the resignations but con-
tinued to demand full payment of dues "to be placed in escrow pursuant to Local
95 1's service rebate procedure. 27' Local 7, in effect, acknowledged the resignations
and indicated that the complaining employees would now be accorded "financial
core member" status at reduced fees.272
1. The NLRB Opinion
The administrative law judge hearing the case "dismiss[ed] the complaint alle-
gations that Locals 7 and 951 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by allocating expenditures
for organizing as chargeable to nonmembers.... [and] rejected contrary precedent
in Railway Labor Act and public sector employment cases. 273 Instead, Judge William
J. Pannier III "noted that the Board had concluded in California Saw & Knife Works
that Railway Labor Act and public sector case precedent does not govern evaluation
and allocation of union expenditures under the Act. 274 Significantly, he "did not
make a ruling on the expert testimony that was presented concerning ... wages,
benefits, and working conditions, .... which [might] prevail in the industry or area
[that became organized]. He found, however, that Congress believed' there was a
positive correlation between organizing and wages.275 Whether Congress ever ex-
pressed this collective belief, or concurred in the judgment that organizing can serve
to justify compulsory dues assessments against dissenters, may be dubious and dif-
ficult to prove. Instead of providing convincing evidence on these questions, the
administrative law judge offered the simplistic but "commonly held belief that the
266 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995).
267 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
268 United Food, 329 N.L.R.B. at 730-31.
269 Id. at 730.
270 Id. (Local 951); id. at 731 (Local 7).
271 Id.
272 Id. at 731.
273 Id.
274 id.
275 Id. (emphases added).
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competitiveness of a unionized employer is adversely affected when that employer's
competitors are not unionized, because those competitors possess greater latitude to
reduce prices than does the unionized employer., 276 While that claim may have
some merit, the judge focused on the fact that "unionized employers object[] to
unions' demands for increased wages and benefits. 277 On the other hand, the judge
failed to offer any evidence to suggest that nonunion employers endorse or encourage
employee demands for increased wages and benefits. Hence, his proof, however
exacting, appears unpersuasive from both an economic and legal standpoint.
But even accepting his analysis, it can be argued
that organizing ... directed toward unrepresented employees...
could be said to be unrelated to the union's performance of its
duties to the employees whom it represents. Additionally, any
effect on the union's bargaining strength derived from its organiz-
ing efforts is arguably too attenuated to support finding organiz-
ing expenses to be chargeable.278
Moreover, as the complainants pointed out, the Supreme Court in Ellis determined
that organizing expenses are nonchargeable to objecting non-
members under the Railway Labor Act... and that the Supreme
Court in Beck found the provisions of the Railway Labor Act
and the National Labor Relations Act that authorize compulsory
unionism to be identical in all material respects and that Congress
"intended the same language to have the same meaning in both
statutes. 279
In sum, there are powerful arguments and some empirical evidence that imperil the
conclusion that organizing expense ought to be charged to objecting nonmembers
under the NLRA.
Dismissing such arguments and evidence, the Board found sufficient empirical
evidence to connect organizing and wages rates. 280 Hence, the Board concluded that
"organizing is both germane to a union's role as a collective-bargaining representa-
tive and can benefit all employees in a unit already represented by a union. 28' The
Board found higher wages provided a direct, positive benefit to all workers in a unit
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id. at 732 (discussing the general counsel's objections to the administrative judge's
findings).
279 Id. (quoting Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 747 (1988)).
280 See id. at 738.
281 Id. at 736.
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already represented by a union.282 Consistently with free-rider fears, dues objectors
must pay "their fair share of the union's organizing expenses."2"3 The Board came
to this conclusion without requiring proof that such organizing activity actually
results in higher wages or collective bargaining contracts for newly represented
workers or even results in a favorable representation decision that affects targeted
workers. Although representation and collective bargaining agreements are salient
predicates to the Board's holding, the NLRB observed questionably and explicitly
that contrary precedents disallowing organizing expenses under the RLA or within
the public sector are "not binding in the context of ... NLRA [decision-making]."2
2. A Dissenting View
Member J. Robert Brame found the majority opinion of the Board unconvincing.
Instead, he found that "the issue of organizing expenses [wa]s, without question, con-
trolled by the Supreme Court's decision in Ellis v. Railway Clerks."2"5 Member Brame
found three specific deficiencies in the NLRB's decision making:
First, the Court found no basis in the legislative history for the
notion that, in authorizing the union shop, Congress aimed to
enhance union organizational efforts. Second, the Court recog-
nized that, where a union shop provision is in place, the bargain-
ing unit employees are already organized, so organizing expenses
are necessarily spent on employees outside the unit, and the
Court found that using dues to recruit members outside the unit
"can afford only the most attenuated benefits to collective bargain-
ing on behalf of the dues payer." Third, the Court reasoned that,
as organizing "only in the most distant way works to the benefit
of those already paying dues," organizing was not the sort of
benefit that Congress had in mind in authorizing union security
to prevent "free riders" from enjoying benefits obtained by the
union for which they had not paid.2
282 See id. at 738 (finding "a direct, positive relationship between the wage levels of union-
represented employees and the level of organization of employees of employers in the same
competitive market").
283 Id. at 736.
284 Id. (citing California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224,227 (1995)). The Board
specifically found that "unlike the NLRA, the focus of the Railway Labor Act was not on
organizing.... In contrast to the [RLA] ... when the [NLRA] ... was enacted, the industries
that it covered were, in general, thinly organized, and one of the principal purposes of the
[NLRAI... was to foster organization." Id. at 737.
285 Id. at 744 (Brame, M., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
286 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Member Brame concluded that the foregoing "reasons apply with equal force
to union security under the National Labor Relations Act."2 7 The evidence shows
that "the purpose of allowing union-security agreements under each statute was the
same - to prevent 'free riders,' not to promote union organizing."288 Free riding
analysis becomes identical under either the RLA or the NLRA. Moreover, the legis-
lative history offers "nothing to indicate that Congress' purpose in permitting union-
security agreements under either the National Labor Relations Act or the Railway
Labor Act was to promote organizing. 2 9 This leads to the conclusion that organiz-
ing expenses are nonchargeable within the meaning of either the RLA or the NLRA.29°
Additionally, because "unit employees are already organized, .... organizing expenses
are necessarily spent on employees outside the unit. Thus .... using dues to recruit
members outside the unit 'can afford only the most attenuated benefits to collective
bargaining on behalf of the dues payer"' whether the workers operate within either
the RLA or NLRA framework.29' It also supports the determination that workers
within the already organized unit will become forced riders. They incur costs to en-
sure that outsiders (newly organized workers) enjoy one of the supposed principal
economic benefits - higher wages.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Beck precludes any qualms about the
persuasive appeal of Ellis and RLA precedents regarding union organizing expenses,
and accordingly, it furthers Member Brame's critique. "[T]he [Beck] Court found
the provisions of the Railway Labor Act and those of the National Labor Relations
Act ... authoriz[ing] union security agreements [were] 'in all material respects
identical,' 29 2 and thus, the statutes "have the same meaning." 293 Neither the language
nor the legislative history of the two statutes warrants differing interpretations on the
chargeability of union organizing expenses.294 Therefore, Member Brame found as
a matter of law that labor union organizing expenses are nonchargeable.295
But assuming arguendo that is not so, the evidence offered in support of the
NLRB's conclusion "falls well short of demonstrating as a factual matter that organiz-
ing efforts afford anything more than 'only the most attenuated benefits' to collective
287 id.
288 Id. See also Calvin Siemer, Comment, Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association: Accounting
to Financial Core Members: Much A-Dues About Nothing?, 60 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1057,
1062 (1992) ("The Taft-Hartley Act was... an attempt to balance the competing interests
of employees who wished to work in a union shop without becoming union members with
the union majority's interest in avoiding 'free riders."').
289 United Food, 329 N.L.R.B. at 744.
290 See id.
291 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,
452 (1984)).
292 Id. (quoting Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 742 (1938)).
293 Id. (quoting Beck, 487 U.S. at 747).
294 See id.
295 See id. at 746.
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bargaining on behalf of employees who are already organized. 296 While conceiv-
ably "some [general] statistical correlation between the percentage of employees
who are organized and wage levels of represented workers" may exist, the anecdotal
evidence offered by the Respondents "fails to establish a cause and effect., 297 Put
simply, the Board "majority assumes without supporting evidence a myriad of nec-
essary steps in the asserted relationship between expenditures for organizing and the
wages paid to already-represented employees.298 Member Brame ramps up his
critical appraisal of the majority's opinion:
For example, they ignore the fact that not all organizing activities
lead to voluntary recognition or elections and that, even when
elections are held, unions win only about half. Additionally, as
reported Board cases show, not all election wins result in con-
tracts, and not all contracts provide for increased wages. Further,
not all increased wages at a newly organized employer result in
higher wages at its already-unionized competitor.299
Finding that the wage effect of an organizing campaign depends on several factors,
including "the level of unemployment in the market, the size of the organized
[workforce]... relative to the total labor market .... the elasticity of demand for the
end products, [and the] availability and cost of labor saving devices, ' 3° as well as
the terms and conditions of the new collective bargaining agreement, it is difficult
to establish that more than the most attenuated benefits accrue to dues payers of the
already organized facility. While it is probable that only those who are predisposed
to find in favor of the various union units can ignore these claims, and notwithstand-
ing the considerable logic, the empirical evidence, Member Brame's careful reading
of Supreme Court precedents 301 in Ellis and Beck, the legislative history, and the
296 Id. at 745 (quoting Ellis, 466 U.S. at 452).
297 id.
298 id.
299 Id. (footnotes omitted).
300 id.
30' Supreme Court precedents include: Ellis, 466 U.S. 435 (disallowing the exaction of
union dues from dissenters for general organizing and litigation expenses that are unrelated
to collective bargaining); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Our decisions establish with unmistakable clarity that the freedom
of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and
ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
These principles prohibit a State from compelling any individual
to affirm his belief in God or to associate with a political party... as
a condition of retaining public employment. They are no less applicable
to the case at bar, and they thus prohibit the [union] ... from requiring...
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pertinent statutory language, the Ninth Circuit Court, after initially agreeing with
him, 30 2 was unimpressed.
3. The Ninth Circuit's United Food Opinion
As we have seen, the Supreme Court's Beck30 3 holding established predictably
the right of union dissidents covered by the NLRA (and hence employed within the
private sector workforce) to refrain, like similar dissidents covered by the RLA304 and
like agency shop objectors in the public sector,3 5 "from paying their union dues if
those dues were earmarked for [non-germane purposes]. ' 3° Beck has triggered a
firestorm that continues to reverberate within and outside the union movement,
30 7
and has provoked the disputable claim that the policy, purpose, and accomplishments
of the NLRA directed toward reducing bargaining power inequality38 have been
[any government employee] to contribute to the support of an ideo-
logical cause he may oppose as a condition of holding ajob as a public
school teacher.
Id. at 233, 235 (citations omitted). Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961)
(entitling dissenting workers to recover for the pro rata share of union dues expended for polit-
ical purposes).
302 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 249 F.3d 1115,
1117 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that "organizational activity is not necessary for the union's per-
formance of its duties as the exclusive representative of the employees" and that "requir[ing]
non-member employees to fund such activity is not authorized by section 8(a)(3) of the
[NLRA]").
303 Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
304 See Ellis, 466 U.S. at 452-53; Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 367 U.S. at 775. Nonetheless,
there are apparently significant limitations on the usefulness of analogies that can be drawn
between the two labor statutes. See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local
1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).
305 Abood, 431 U.S. at 233-35 (disallowing an attempt by a public sector union to compel
payment in support of an ideological cause that the dues objectors opposed).
306 WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLrICS, AND THE NLRB - A
MEMOiR 73 (2000) (citing Beck, 487 U.S. 735).
307 Hutchison, supra note 86, at 456-57 (discussing this development).
308 Among other things, it has been argued that the Wagner Act "reflected the growing
distrust of market solutions to social and economic problems." RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD,
supra note 79, at 13. The Wagner Act also reflected dissatisfaction with the "inability of the
courts to provide viable solutions to the problems presented by the labor movement" and
hence, "[tihe industrial revolution, [with its] ... combination[] of capital and of labor ....
presented problems that called for broad legislative solutions." 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS, AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 3-4 (Patrick
Hardin ed., 3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW]. On one account the
NLRA was seen not only as "a weapon against the disruption of industry by labor-management
disputes," but also as "an 'affirmative vehicle' for economic and social progress." Id. at 27-28
(quoting Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance, 29 GEO.
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thwarted by the Supreme Court.3 9 One narrative maintains that limiting the union
majority's ability to charge compulsory dues imposes a constrained "view of the
normal and proper role of a labor union" and impairs activities aimed at transform-
ing "the balance of power outside the immediate workplace., 30 Allowing dues ob-
jectors to escape ideological and other nonrepresentational expenditures can be seen
as neutral only if one also agrees that it is possible to "handicap the mouse without
increasing the power of the cat. '31n Hence, the Ninth Circuit, if it was so inclined,
could rely on readily available ammunition to emasculate Supreme Court precedent.
a. The initial decision
Before reviewing the en banc holding of the Ninth Circuit, it is useful to consider
briefly the initial decision of the court. The initial decision determined that Supreme
Court reasoning in Ellis, Lehnert, and Beck required a decision in favor of union
dues objectors.3" 2 The Ninth Circuit panel determined that "[a]lthough the [Supreme]
Court's decisions in this area 'prescribe a case-by-case analysis in determining
which activities a union constitutionally may charge to dissenting employees,' the
Court has already established 'several guidelines to be followed in making such
determinations.' 313 The Ellis decision "held organizing expenses to be 'outside
Congress' authorization' in section 2, Eleventh of the RLA.' '3 4 Lehnertconfirms that
WASH. L. REv. 199, 218 (1960)). Further, it has been asserted that the NLRA was seen as
a mechanism to "lessen the inequality of bargaining power between labor and management."
Bryan M. Churgin, Comment, The Managerial Exclusion Under the National Labor Relations
Act: Are Worker Participation Programs Next?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 557, 557 (1999).
" See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 50, at 603-04 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision
to preclude "unions from funding organizing activities... undermines national labor policy").
Still, another commentator dubiously observed that the Beck decision created a "politically
volatile rule-making" quandary because the NLRB' s rule-making efforts aimed at a balanced
approach to the Beck holding have been thwarted by "the extraordinary and inordinate in-
fluence of the right-wing National Right to Work Committee, which [assertedly] had a veto
over Board nominations and confirmations." GOULD, supra note 306, at 73. Hence, both the
Beck decision and efforts to enforce limitations on the use of union dues might be charac-
terized as unjustifiable government regulation of a purely private contractual relationship
between employers and the employees' representatives if collective-bargaining contracts
under the NLRA can be accurately seen as part of a private voluntary exchange relationship.
But cf Baird, supra note 92, at 2. ("[G]overment coercion pervades the entire collective-
bargaining process.").
310 Friesen, supra note 50, at 639.
31 Kenneth Cloke, Mandatory Political Contributions and Union Democracy, 4 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 527, 567 (1981).
312 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 249 F.3d 1115,
1118-20 (9th Cir. 2001).
311 Id. at 1119 (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991)).
314 Id. (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,451 (1988).
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RLA cases, including Ellis, serve "to determine the scope of the chargeable activ-
ities under the NLRA § 8(a)(3)." ' 5 Subsequently, the Beck case found statutory
equivalence between the NLRA and the RLA.316 Therefore, union organizing expen-
ditures cannot be authorized by the NLRA.31 7 While this decision is clear, cogent,
and persuasive, the Ninth Circuit court en banc disagreed.
b. The Ninth Circuit en banc: an invitation accepted
Despite the failure of the Beck Court to find state action31 and to rest its deci-
sion expressly on the Constitution, that decision operates harmoniously with First
Amendment values. Undeniably, "[t]he Supreme Court has firmly rejected argu-
ments that union political activities are germane to its representation function, despite
the pleas of... labor leaders[] and scholars that political advocacy benefits workers. 319
Because organizing might be conceivably distinguished from politics, one issue
lingers: Does "the Constitution require[] organizational expenses to be treated in the
same manner as political ones[?] ' 320 A thoughtful assessment of the United Food
opinion must both consider the reach of First Amendment norms and engage in
statutory analysis that concentrates on whether a given activity is germane. Whether
an activity is germane or not is linked to this question: Will union dissenters obtain
self-interested benefits from the challenged activity?
Focusing on statutory issues, the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion concentrates
initially and unremarkably on the rhetoric of free riding. Specifically, the court deter-
mined that "[t]he NLRA... permits the exclusive bargaining representative and the
employer to require that all employees become dues paying [core] 'members' of the
union" pursuant to NLRA § 8(a)(3). 321 This follows because the union "represent[s]
all employees in a bargaining unit.., when bargaining for wages, benefits, and work-
ing conditions, and when resolving grievances with the employer., 322 Exclusive
representation, from the court's perspective, implies that all employees share a
"community of interests. 323
315 id.
316 See id. at 1120.
311 See id. at 1117.
318 See Friesen, supra note 50, at 623.
311 Id. at 628 (footnotes omitted).
320 Id. at 628-29.
321 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,764
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
322 Id.
323 Id. at 764 n.3 (citing Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Impli-
cations of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REv. 519,
621-24 (2001)).
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Despite disagreeing with the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concedes that Beck
and Ellis place limits on the ability of unions to charge nonmembers (dissenters). 324
Hence, it is clear that "nonmembers need pay 'only those fees and dues necessary
to "performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing
with the employer on labor-management issues.""' 325 Still, under this fair share stan-
dard, objecting employees can be required to pay for more than "the direct costs of
negotiating and administering a... contract. ' ' 326 They are also required to pay for
expenses associated with "undertakings normally or reasonably employed to imple-
ment or effectuate the duties of the[ir] union" in its capacity as their collective bargain-
ing representative.327
When the union resolves to fund duties that are unnecessary, principled free-
rider scrutiny liberates dues objectors from any related dues payment obligation.
Who decides which activities are necessary is obviously an important question. In
partial answer to that question, the United Food court invokes precedent: "'necessary
duties' [are] those functions that are 'germane to collective bargaining, contract
administration or grievance adjustment.' "328 Two interrelated questions frame the
central issue: Does a union "violate[] the Beck rule by compelling nonmembers
[dues objectors] to pay their share of the costs of organizing their employers' com-
petitors or conversely .... [are] unions ... permitted under the NLRA to charge
nonmembers for the costs of such organizing activities[?] 3 29 In answering these
questions, the court, citing Chevron330 with approval, states that generally, it is
"required to defer to the NLRB - statutory interpretation[s]... on questions of fact
and policy."'33' The Chevron rule requires judicial deference when the administra-
tive agency's "interpretation is rational and consistent with the statute., 332 When the
statute is cloudy, "Chevron dictates that 'a court may not substitute its own con-
struction of [the] statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by... an
agency.' ' 333 Since the court concludes that section 8(a)(3) "does not describe what
types of expenditures may or may not be made from... dues, ' 3 statutory ambiguity
necessitates deference to the NLRB in order to sort out the specifics of the case.335
324 See id. at 765.
325 Id. (quoting Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,762-63 (1988) (quoting
Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,448 (1984).
326 Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448.
327 Id.
328 United Food, 307 F.3d at 765 (emphasis in original) (quoting Beck, 487 U.S. at 745).
329 Id.
330 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
331 United Food, 307 F.3d at 766.
332 id.
333 Id. at 767 (alterations in original) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
334 Id.
311 In Califomia Saw, the NLRB determined that the legality of charging objectors for
particular union expenses depends on "whether they are germane to the union's role in collec-
tive bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment." California Saw & Knife
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Dues objectors reached the opposite conclusion. They argued deference is unwar-
ranted when a constitutional question is validly presented. They cited a prior Ninth
Circuit opinion - Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 336 - in support of this con-
viction. The dues objectors in Seay "asserted a substantial First Amendment claim:
They contended that their dues 'were used in substantial amounts for political and
ideological purposes contrary to [their] wishes and in derogation of their constitu-
tional rights under the First, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.' 337 Unfortunately for
the objectors in United Food, the court determined that the case before it did "not
involve any claim (let alone a substantial claim) regarding First Amendment rights,
but rather the question of whether organizing an employer's competitors [was] ...
germane to collective bargaining. "338 Hence, the Seay case, however viable, "in no
way affect[ed the court's] ... obligation to defer to the Board., 339
The court also rejected the nonmembers' contention that other cases establishing
constitutional requirements for union collection of agency fees necessarily require
an interpretation of the Constitution in order to discover what is germane for collec-
tive bargaining purposes. 34° The rejection of the dues objectors' claim resulted from
the deduction that union organizing constitutes a non-political activity irrespective
of whether it can be seen as germane to collective bargaining or not.34' Once, that
determination was reached, the pertinent question in any given case would turn on
how closely related are collective bargaining and the contested activity. 34 2
Persuaded that "[t]he Supreme Court has 'not hesitated to defer to the Board's
interpretation of the Act in the context of issues' that 'implicate[] its expertise in
labor relations,' ' 343 and rejecting any constitutional claims, the United Food court
stakes the persuasive power of its analysis on the observation that the "germane versus
non-germane issue requires an informed assessment of the practical relationship
between the challenged activity and the bargaining process." 3" An informed approach
Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 239 (1995). Additionally, the Board held that a union does not act
unlawfully by charging objectors for representational expenses on other than a unit-by-unit
basis. Id. at 237 & n.66. Teamsters Local 75 (Schreiber Foods), 329 N.L.R.B. 28, 31 (1999)
cites California Saw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 239, for the proposition that a union does not "act
unlawfully 'by charging... for litigation expenses as long as the expense is for "services that
may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of their
membership in the parent organization ....
336 427 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1970).
337 United Food, 307 F.3d at 767 (alteration in original) (quoting Seay, 427 F.2d at 999).
338 id.
339 Id.
31 Idat 767-68 (citing Dean v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 924 F.2d 805,809 (9th Cir. 1991)
(citing Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 310 (1986))).
341 Id. at 768.
342 Id.
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sanctions the exercise of the NLRB's expertise, and deference is therefore required."5
Consistent with this deduction, the court holds that dues objectors "fail substantially
to contest the Board's actual factfinding in this case." 346 While there is some evi-
dence and much analysis that implies that the Board's factfinding was indeterminate
or mistaken," 7 the court concludes that "the Board's determinations are fully con-
sistent with the realities of collective bargaining. 348 In support of this comment, the
court offers this analysis: "Because the union can only become the collective bargain-
ing representative if enough employees agree, the initial recruitment and incorpora-
tion of new members into a nascent bargaining unit through organizing is crucial."' 9
Crucial for whom? Crucial for union leaders concerned about declining member-
ship and political influence or, alternatively, crucial for purposes of establishing the
existence of self-interested benefits obtainable by dues objectors? Further, the
court's reliance on majority rule may be, in the end, misplaced. Simple democratic
majoritarianism does not prove either a commonality of group interest or consent by
all members in support of union defined goals, of increasing union strength and polit-
ical clout. The court's analysis may reveal a misunderstanding of what is necessary
to show that the already organized workers represent a unified as opposed to a heter-
ogeneous group. Since the union local is unlikely to represent a cohesive community
of interest, interrogation of the purposes that organizing serves ought to be oblig-
atory before concluding that organizing activities are crucial to the economic success
or political interest of dissenting workers.
The court does not engage in such an interrogation. Nonetheless, the court accepts
the following conclusions: (1) organizing of competitor employees "'eliminat[es]
competition of employers and employees based on labor condition regarded as sub-
standard"'; 35 (2) nonunion employers will tend to "pay lower wages and provide
lesser benefits"; 35' (3) competition from nonunionized employers "significantly
weakens the union's ability to bargain with the [already organized] employer and de-
creases the union's prospects of achieving the economic objectives of the members
of the bargaining unit. 352 Moreover, the court was convinced "that extra-bargaining
unit organizing is germane to collective bargaining and a proper use of nonmembers'
dues. 353 Equally true, the court asserted that its conclusion "was supported by ex-
tensive economic research and data on organizing and collective bargaining in general,
345 id.
346 id.
" See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
341 United Food, 307 F.3d at 768.
349 Id.
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as well as with respect to the retail food industry., 354 Dismissing Ellis, the court was
prepared to accept the NLRB's determination "that under the 'necessary' or 'germane'
to collective bargaining standard of Beck, nonmembers may be compelled to bear
their fair share of the costs of organizing." '355
Before considering what constitutes a germane expenditure more fully below,
it is useful to examine the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of Ellis. The United Food court
distinguished the two cases by drawing an inference from the absence of an ad-
ministrative agency under the RLA and the presence of one under the NLRA.356
Furthermore, the United Food court was persuaded that the Supreme Court had
determined previously "that the only purpose organizing under the RLA could serve
was to strengthen the union generally., 357 Because railroad/transportation unions
were strong already (at least in the eyes of the court), and because organizing "pro-
vided only attenuated benefits to nonmembers within a [transportation industry] bar-
gaining unit, the Court, [on the Ninth Circuit's account,] held that under the RLA
organizing costs could not be charged to such individuals. 358
In the United Food opinion, the court deals brusquely with the nonmembers'
contention that "the [Supreme] Court's statements in Beck that the RLA provision
at issue in Ellis and the NLRA provision at issue in Beck are 'statutory equivalents,'...
and that 'Congress intended the same language to have the same meaning in both
statutes."'359 Given the cogency of the Ninth Circuit's initial finding, the en banc dis-
missal of the complainants' argument is remarkable. On the United Food court's
account, the Supreme Court's statements were simply aimed at confirming that the
"two Acts were designed to afford employees the same protection: that Congress
intended to protect employees covered under both Acts against the unions' use of
their dues for purposes not germane to collective bargaining, ' '3' as opposed to pro-
viding specific guidance on specific union dues expenditures. The Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that while union organizing conducted for the general purpose of strengthening
354 Id.
355 id.
356 Id. at 769-70. The court goes on to point out that "[t]he Ellis decision was made in the
context of a statute designed to regulate the railroad industry[, which a]t the time the RLA
was enacted.., was [already] highly organized." Id. at 770. In addition, the court relies on
the claim that when the pertinent statutory provision of the RLA was enacted, "the president
of a major railroad labor union.., represented to Congress" that the creation of "the union
shop would have no effect on the bargaining power of unions covered by the Act .... [but]
would serve only to make those unions stronger." Id. In addition, in Ellis, the facts supported
the contention that the organizing at issue "was directed in part at employers that were not
in the same branch of the transportation industry as the bargaining unit employer, and even
at employers that were not in the transportation industry at all." Id.
357 Id. at 770.
358 Id.
351 Id. (quoting Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 747 (1988)).
360 Id. at 770-71.
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the union is not germane under the RLA, such extra-bargaining activity is not ex-
plicitly precluded by either the language of the NLRA or by the Supreme Court in
Beck.36' Perforce, such activities are permissible. If this analysis is accurate, the
court's holding may turn Beck's incorporation of Ellis on its head while leaving for
another day the possibility that organizing aimed at strengthening unions generally
can be charged to dues objectors - if and when the NLRB first sustains such claims.
Taken together then, there are two principal reasons why the court surmised that
"the [Supreme] Court did not intend that 'statutory equivalen[ce]' be applied at the
level of specificity" 362 necessary to decide this case. The reasons include "the fact
that Congress established... different procedures for the interpretation of' the NLRA
as opposed to the RLA.363 "Under the NLRA, primary jurisdiction over its interpre-
tation lies with the NLRB, but under the RLA, exclusive jurisdiction lies, as with
many statutes, with the courts., 364 The second reason is connected to the conclusion
that the Ellis Court "explicitly based its decision upon its close review of the legis-
lative history of the RLA. 365 Finding that "[t]he RLA establishes a highly detailed
mandatory scheme for dispute resolution that has no parallel in the NLRA, ' 366 the
Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]he fundamental premises and principles of the Railway
Labor Act are not the same as those which form the basis of the National Labor
Relations Act. 367 Citing a limited number of scholarly opinions with approval,368
the United Food court determined that not only are the two statutes different, but
that it was possible that Beck's statutory explication failed to offer much guidance,
if any, on the details of what is "germane" under the NLRA. 69 Supplementing this
claim, the court correctly stated that Beck did not specifically deal with which activ-
ities are precluded by the NLRA.370 Beck dealt with the general question of whether
the NLRA, like the RLA, precludes nongermane expenditures from being assessed
against dues objectors. 37' The Beck Court "left to the Court of Appeals the ultimate
resolution of the question of which specific expenditures were germane and there-
fore chargeable to nonmembers. 372 Whether Beck supplies an appellate court with
adequate latitude to justify the United Food opinion is a question best left to the next
subsection.
361 See id. at 771.
362 Id. at 771 (first alteration added). But see Beck, 487 U.S. at 756 (discussing Congress's
intent to place industries governed by the RLA and the NLRA "on equal footing insofar as
compulsory unionism was concerned").
363 United Food, 307 F.3d at 771.
364 id.
365 Id. at 772 (emphasis added).
366 id.
367 Id. at 773.
368 See id. at 772 n.17.
369 See id. at 774.
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It is clear, however, that the Ninth Circuit is drawn to the following understand-
ing of Beck: (1) because the Supreme Court left it to appellate courts to determine
the explicit parameters of what activities are "germane," circuit courts are entitled
to defer to the NLRB; and (2) because the NLRB engaged in a process of "fact-
finding and a searching examination of the statute," neither the language of Beck nor
the NLRA precludes the Board's conclusion that union-organizing expenditures are
germane to collective bargaining.373 Thus, the Ninth Circuit accepted an invitation
proffered by union advocates to sustain organizing efforts aimed at stemming the
decline in union workplace penetration.374
B. Analysis
Because of the specific facts of the case, because of the empirical record that
was made available to the court, the NLRB, and the ALJ, and because all workers
represented by the national union or local unit may share precisely the same interest,
it is not impossible that the Ninth Circuit decision (en banc) enforcing the Board's
order could be correct. More likely, however, the decision is mistaken. This should
not be surprising given the Ninth Circuit's prior history, including the fact that one
of its earlier decisions holding that a union was permitted to charge its organizing
expenses to dues objectors, within the meaning of the RLA, was categorically reversed
by the United States Supreme Court in Ellis.37
Ellis held that because "[o]rganizing money is spent on people who are not union
members, and only in the most distant way works to the benefit of those already
paying dues,"376 such expenditures are, therefore, "a far cry from the free-rider problem
with which Congress was concerned. '377 Since "organizing expenses are spent [to
benefit those] outside the ... [already organized] unit,' 378 it is doubtful, that any
amount of legislative history can negate the logic of the Ellis Court. Moreover, the
Court held impermissible a claim that the Ninth Circuit found persuasive: "organizing
373 Id. at 774.
311 See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 50, at 613-14.
175 Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,457 (1984).
In [a case that preceded Ellis, Int'lAss'n of] Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740 (1961), the [Supreme] Court held that the [RLA] does not authorize
a union to spend an objecting employee's money to support political
causes... [because such expenditures are] unrelated to Congress' desire
to eliminate "free riders".... The [Machinists] Court did not express
a view [as to the chargeability of] "expenditures for activities in the area
between the costs which led directly to the complaint as to 'free riders,'
and the expenditures to support union political activities."
Id. at 438-39 (quoting Street, 367 U.S. at 769-70).
376 Id. at 453.
377 Id.
378 Id. at 452.
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expenses could be charged to objecting employees because organizing efforts are
aimed toward a stronger union, which in turn would be more successful at the bar-
gaining table. '379 As more fully explained below, the Ninth Circuit's decision, when
analyzed simply as a limited holding, supplies evidence that organizing expenditures
are too attenuated to be seen as germane even within the parameters of the NLRA.
When analyzed as a general holding applying to all free-rider circumstances, the Ninth
Circuit's opinion eviscerates the Ellis opinion. Nevertheless, it may be conceivable
that statutory differences between the NLRA and the RLA translate into different
and diverse understandings of free riders within the meaning of the two statutes.
The next section examines this possibility.
1. Statutory Equivalence or Statutory Ambiguity?
Although the Supreme Court abandoned the Ninth Circuit's explication of the
facts and the law in Ellis, the court once again proffered the same basic holding in
United Food. The premise is different. Reasoning that statutory ambiguity asso-
ciated with the NLRA provides scope for the NLRB to offer a result that differs
from Ellis, the court enforced the NLRB holding. The court's decision to enforce
the Board's order may have been made easier by virtue of the fact that the United
Food court did not focus on the judicially created duty of fair representation.3"' Con-
centrating primarily on the statutory claim associated with unfair labor practices
provides grounds to argue that what constitutes a free rider under the RLA differs
from the NLRA.
The contention that the RLA differs from the NLRA is necessitated by legal prece-
dent which clearly states that union organizing expenses - which are of necessity
aimed at employees outside the relevant bargaining unit - are nonrepresentational
and hence nonchargeable as a matter of law within the meaning of Beck and Ellis.381
Glenn M. Taubman's brief in support of the charging parties exceptions adverts to a
"record [that] shows that the UFCW unions - particularly Local 951 - have charged
non-members and objectors for the vast majority of their 'organizing' expenses. "382
379 ld. at 451.
380 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,765
(9th Cir. 2002) (discussing petitioners' contention that the challenged fees constituted an unfair
labor practice).
38! See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745-47 (1988) (holding that
RLA cases are controlling for purpose of understanding free riders under the NLRA); Ellis,
466 U.S. at 452.
382 Exceptions of Charging Parties Phillip Mulder, Charles Buck, Leon Gibbons and Glenn
Hilton, including Brief in Support of Exceptions 2, United Food & Commercial Workers
Locals 951, 588, 7 and 1036, No. 16-CB-3850 (2-6, 9-25, 27, 33, 35-36) (NLRB May 25,
2004) [hereinafter Exceptions of Charging Parties] (on file with author). See also United Food,
307 F.3d at 765-66 (finding that Local 7 nonmembers (dues objectors) also challenged the
chargeability of union organizing expenditures).
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In Ellis, the Supreme Court stated: "Congress' essential justification for authorizing
the union shop was the desire to eliminate free riders - employees in the bargaining
unit on whose behalf the union was obliged to perform its statutory functions ... ,383
Obviously, Local 951 does not owe a statutory obligation to employees outside of
those it represents. Union organizing, accordingly, cannot be directed toward them.
Consistently with that intuition, Ellis stated: "[W]here a union shop provision is in
place and enforced, all employees in the relevant unit are already organized. By def-
inition, therefore, organizing expenses are spent on employees outside the collective-
bargaining unit already represented. ' 38
Evidently, a unanimous Supreme Court in Ellis "conclud[ed] that it would be
perverse to" compel dues objectors "to finance the expansion of unionism to other
bargaining units."3 5 Equally clear, the Ellis Court found that extra-bargaining unit
organizing does not raise "the free rider [issue] Congress had in mind" because that
issue, of necessity, only implicates employees that the union was required to repre-
sent.386 Thus, the petitioners argue that if Local 951 desires to operate
as an omnipotent, universal collective bargaining agent for all re-
tail, wholesale and distribution employees in Michigan and else-
where, without regard to the nature of its separate certifications
and its limited statutory authorization to engage in collective bar-
gaining for a specific bargaining unit .... [that desire] cannot
change the rights which individual employees have under the
NLRA.
387
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that since section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and
section 2, Eleventh of the RLA "are in all material respects identical, '388 RLA cases
are "more than merely instructive," they are "controlling" for purposes of under-
standing the free-rider approach taken by Congress.389 In harmony with that con-
clusion, organizing has been litigated and found nonchargeable under the NLRA,
the RLA, and a number of public sector bargaining statutes. 390 Taken together, union
383 Ellis, 466 U.S at 447.
394 Id. at 452.
385 Exceptions of Charging Parties, supra note 382, at 6 (quoting Ellis, 466 U.S. at 452 n. 13).
386 Ellis, 466 U.S. at 452.
387 Exceptions of Charging Parties, supra note 382, at 6-7 (emphases omitted).
388 Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745-47 (1988).
389 Id. at 745.
" See, e.g., Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1211-12 (4th Cir. 1985)
(declaring organizing to be non-chargeable under the NLRA); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,
643 F. Supp. 1306, 1324 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (relying on Ellis and holding organizing non-
chargeable in the public sector); United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1099 (Kroger,
Inc.), 327 N.L.R.B. 1237, 1244 (1999) (relying on Ellis to hold that organizing was non-
chargeable under the NLRA); see also Exceptions of Charging Parties, supra note 382, at 10-11.
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organizing should be seen as nonrepresentational and hence nonchargeable as a matter
of law, unless a court illuminated by an exceptional revelation can find a tenable
basis to escape the preclusive effect of both Ellis and Beck.
The Ninth Circuit accepts this challenge. Much of the force of the Ninth Circuit's
United Food opinion is connected to the argument that the RLA, as opposed to the
NLRA, was not aimed at strengthening unions because labor union penetration within
the RLA sector was already quite high,39" ' whereas labor union penetration and labor
union strength in the sectors covered by the NLRA have declined dramatically since
World War ][.392 That assertion warrants examination because the decline in union den-
sity rates is traceable, at least in part, to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Amendments
to the NLRA.393 Because the American labor movement had been seen as "the most
powerful, and the most aggressive that the world has ever seen,"394 Congress enacted
the Taft-Hartley Act to constrain union power and enhance employee efforts to refrain
from engaging in concerted activities.391 "Before 1947 it was possible to imagine a
continuing expansion and vitalization of the New Deal impulse. After that date,
however, labor and the left were forced into an increasingly defensive posture. "396
Consequently, in order for the Ninth Circuit's opinion to be credible, the court must
find evidence that Congress was trying to enhance union organizing efforts and to
strengthen labor unions as part of its concern for free riders when it amended the
NLRA in 1947.
In consideration of the depth of the Ninth Circuit's conviction that the RLA and
the NLRA were meant to deal with different circumstances consider the following syl-
logism to explain how the court distinguishes free-rider jurisprudence under the RLA
from the NLRA. High wages are evidence of union success; union success is evi-
denced by high union density rates; in the presence of high union density rates (union
success), there can be no justification for charging dues objectors for extra-bargaining
unit organizing expenses because railroad and transportation workers (RLA) already
enjoy high wages; and therefore, they obtain no real self-interested benefits from
expanding an already strong union presence within the industry. If this syllogism is
correct, it implies two tentative conclusions: (1) the half-century long deterioration
in union penetration rates (union failure) in the private sectors covered by the NLRA
"9 See United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,
769-70, 772 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); see also id. at 772 n.17.
392 Id. at 772 n.17.
'9' The Taft-Hartley Act shifted the emphasis of federal labor law from a scheme designed
to protect rights of employees to organize, to a more "balanced statutory scheme" that placed
restrictions on unions while protecting the employees' right to refrain from engaging in con-
certed activities. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 308, at 40.
394 Id. at 35.
391 See, e.g., STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW 35-36 (2d ed. 2005).
396 Nelson Lichtenstein, Taft-Hartley: A Slave-LaborLaw?, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 763, 765
(1998).
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can justify ever increasing dues assessments to counteract this trend because the self-
interested benefits obtained (by already unionized workers) derived from organizing
become larger in the face of declining union strength; and (2) the current decline in
union power and strength within the transportation industry (especially within the
unionized subsector) 397 provides a factual, yet speculative, basis for the Ninth Circuit
to ponder the possibility of disregarding the Supreme Court's Ellis opinion affecting
the railroad or airline industries.
Forsaking syllogisms for the moment, consider carefully the court's free-rider
approach. The Ninth Circuit states: "Thus all persons in the bargaining unit receive
the benefits and [must accordingly] share the economic costs of union represen-
tation., 398 This conclusory statement, offered as proof of the union's claims, may not
be fully convincing. To shore up its contention, the court offers a truism: "Were 'free
riders' able to obtain the full benefits of the union's efforts without paying their share
of the costs, union membership would likely be drastically reduced and the collective
bargaining system seriously undermined. '' 399 While it is clear that a persistent decline
in union membership is a reality that existing union security agreements, so far, have
been incapable of preventing, it is far from clear that repetition of a truism proves
that dues objectors are free riders within the parameters of the NLRA when the same
analysis disproves this contention within the boundaries of the RLA.
Though the court's analysis may mirror Supreme Court precedents that utilize
the language of free riding to impose costs on dues objectors, it is not obvious that
merely repeating the Court's free-rider claims is sufficient to support the argument
that dues objectors must underwrite the extra-bargaining unit costs of organizing
unrepresented workers at competing facilities. Underwriting may operate as a partic-
ular form of income redistribution or "[f]orced subsidization of union expression." 4°
In the absence of evidence that dues objectors obtain the self-interested benefits that
have been attributable to them, subsidization operates in the shape of extra-unit orga-
nizing campaigns that may have a dual or a tripartite purpose.4°' As more fully
explicated below, it is likely that the self-interested benefits (either pecuniary or non-
pecuniary) derived from organizing efforts tend to be obtainable largely by indi-
viduals and groups who operate outside of the Ninth Circuit currently circumscribed
field of vision. This development may be attached to the NLRB's and the Ninth
Circuit's concentration on the possibility or, alternatively, the presupposition that
197 See, e.g.,Airline Workers UnderAttack, FIGHTBACK!, MarJApr. 2005, at http://www.fight
backnews.org/2005/02/airline.htm (highlighting union concessions within the airline industry).
398 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,764
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
399 Id.
40o Friesen, supra note 50, at 608-09.
40' The purposes associated with extra-unit bargaining may include (1) ideological and
social purposes, (2) other nonrepresentational purposes, and (3) providing possible economic
benefits to already represented workers. See infra Part III.
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dues objectors obtain self-interested benefits while refusing to acknowledge that self-
interest extends beyond the individuals represented by the union local.
In an effort to defend its approach from condemnation, the United Food court
argued that its holding is limited and therefore distinguishable from both Ellis and
Beck because the NLRB's decision is likewise limited. Judicial self-restraint, however
commendable, may not be enough to carry the day. A decision currently limited to
extra-bargaining organizing among competitor employers may not preclude the
NLRB from accepting any number of extra-bargaining strategies in the future that
are framed by concentrating on competition within the industry and among direct
competitors or even, if the NLRB is so inclined, outside of the competitor framework.
Before this case, it could be argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Beck con-
strained the Board. No longer hesitating along an uncertain path, consistent with the
knowledge that the lower courts and the NLRB have limited authority to re-conceive
the NLRA, both the NLRB and the Ninth Circuit have become captivated by the
possibility that challenged expenditures may be linked to the objective of strength-
ening labor unions and expanding membership and thus a potent force for trans-
formative unionism. Given the desirability of stemming the current degeneration
in union density rates, any number of challenged activities are likely to withstand
the Ninth Circuit's facile test of chargeability. On the Ninth Circuit's account, the
on-going decline in union density rates supplies a plausible pivot point for transmuting
the Supreme Court's free riding interpretation in Ellis while providing a keenly antici-
pated platform for reinterpreting Beck and the NLRA.4°2
For current purposes, Beck holds unambiguously that only necessary union duties
can be charged to union dues objectors in order to prevent the problem of free riding.
Still, as Henry Hazlitt illumines, 3 even that admission does not necessarily prevent
the Supreme Court's free-rider formulation from being perceived as deficient. Despite
its deficiencies, it is clear that Beck allows only those functions that are germane to
collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment to be charged
to dues objectors. The term "germane" can be defined as being closely or significantly
402 See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 50, at 613-14 (arguing that organizing new workers is
well within the union's expected traditional role, and that the necessity of the implementation
of this role increases given the decline in union penetration).
4 See Charles W. Baird, Henry Hazlitt on Unions: Part II, FREEMAN: IDEAS ON LIBERTY,
Mar. 2005, at 47, 47-48 (arguing that even the highest real wages received by members of
strong unions were lower than such wages would have been in the absence of unions and
historic policies related to compulsory unions). If this claim is correct, then it becomes doubtful
that more members of labor unions can plausibly be seen as free riders because it is likely that
they receive no real benefit from compulsory collective bargaining regimes. See also VEDDER
& GALLAWAY, supra note 51, at 150-53 (noting that during the 1940s, a period of massive
government budget deficits and massive increases in unionization, unemployment fell, but the
era also reflected a decline in the real wage adjusted for productivity caused at least partially
by wage and price controls). If this analysis is correct, high rates of unionization may not
translate into high real wages.
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related to the objective of the activity." Whatever the term means, the United Food
court's application of Beck intimates that a collective bargaining purpose under the
NLRA can be comprised of functions the Supreme Court has rejected when inter-
preting the RLA.
The motivation of the Ninth Circuit may require an explanation. It is possible
that sympathy for the current plight and bleak prospects of labor unions provoked
the court's approach.' °5 For quite some time, commentators have lamented the hard
times experienced by unions4' 6 and have sought to stem the degeneration of union
power and influence in the workplace via a number of vehicles, including the use of
union dues to reclaim labor union vitality. 7 Intriguingly, the court cited one com-
mentator whose sympathy for the labor movement remains unabashed."° Professor
Jennifer Friesen has argued that whatever their mission, "[u]nions depend for most
of their revenues on the dues and fees paid by the workers they represent." She
concedes, however, that unions expend "dues on extra-workplace activities... [that
purportedly] enhance the union's strength internally and in the community," for
political purposes and for purposes of "organizing nonunion employees."41 While
expanding union strength internally and within the community may be a laudable
goal, and while strengthening the union's political posture may be a valid objective,
it is doubtful that the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA were designed to en-
hance labor movement strength and power.41' Nevertheless, Professor Friesen argues
404 Cf. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 951 (2002).
401 See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d
760, 772 n. 17 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (discussing the historically low and now declining
levels of organization within industries covered by the NLRA). It is doubtful that declining
levels of unionization alone constitute justification for the judgment reached by the court.
4 See, e.g., Paul C. Weiler, Hard Times for Unions: Challenging Times for Scholars, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1016-21 (1991).
17 See Wemtz, supra note 63, at 193-207 (articulating the value of dues to the continued
vitality of the labor movement).
40s United Foods, 307 F.3d at 772 n.17.
4' Friesen, supra note 50, at 603. Friesen argues that "unions [typically] use these funds
for such core workplace purposes as contract negotiation and grievance adjustment, main-
tenance of union property, staff salaries, publications to represented workers, and benefits
not paid under the collective bargaining agreement." Id. There is scant independent evidence
that exists in support of these claims. Of note, one independent observer, the United States
Supreme Court, evidently accepted a lower court's analysis after a detailed examination of union
financial records, suggesting the following: (A) in Communications Workers of America v.
Beck, the Court found that nearly 80 percent of union dues were not chargeable, practically
the reverse of what unions and their supporters usually claim; and (B) in Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass'n, the Court found that the union spent nearly 90 percent of its dues revenue on
non-representational activity. See HUNTER, KERSEY & MILLER, supra note 35, at 15.
410 Friesen, supra note 50, at 603.
4n Union advocates admit as much. See, e.g., Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs
on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REv.
1616, 1620 (1995) (reviewing WILLiAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE
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that preventing "unions from funding organizing activities with objecting employees'
dues undermines national labor policy and is not justified by either the federal labor
statutes or the First Amendment."412 Although this conclusion is debatable, her
forceful understanding of precedent suggests that unions are precluded from using
union funds for any and all organizing activities.4 13 Although the Beck Court has been
criticized for failing to follow the canons of statutory construction,4"4 Friesen's reason-
ing creates a paradox since the Ninth Circuit's rationale relies on her analytical powers.
Her reasoning places in ruins the United Food court's claim that the absence of statu-
tory equivalence is fatal to the dues objectors' claims. So convinced of the force of
the Beck Court's holding, Professor Friesen proposes amending the NLRA to permit
the chargeability of union organizing expenditure to dues objectors.4"5 Since neither
"the text [n]or the legislative history of the NLRA" contains evidence of a statutory
goal directed toward "strengthening union power," 4 16 the statute provides additional
support for Friesen's conviction that Beck undermines what the Ninth Circuit is deter-
mined to allow. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "[b]y its plain terms....
the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not on unions or their nonemployee
organizers., '417 Furthermore, the Lechmere case fortifies the conclusion that unions
OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW (1993), and arguing that the deterioration in
union organizing power is related to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act); Lichtenstein,
supra note 396, at 765 (noting that after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, "labor... [was]
forced into an increasingly defensive posture.").
412 Friesen, supra note 50, at 604 (footnote omitted).
413 See id. Among other things, Friesen bases her emphatic conclusion on the notion that
political and/or other expenditures are authorized by labor union rules. Such reasoning may
not apply to dues objectors for a variety of reasons including but not limited to the fact that
an accurate understanding of their presumed preferences means that: (1) they must become
forced riders if they are compelled to pay for politics; and (2) their disutility derived from
forced association with detestable speech and detestable association violates their First Amend-
ment values. Friesen's claim that "membership bent on frugality or political inoffensiveness
could use internal union democratic processes to limit the purposes to which all union dues...
could be spent" may overstate the amount of democracy that actually exists. Id. at 605 n. 11.
Friesen also fails to grapple with the historically verifiable problems of majoritarian governance
systems. Friesen's approach allows the majority of unionists or the union leadership to oppress
some for the benefit of others despite the defensible conclusion that "behavior that oppresses
some for the benefit of others is pathological .... [and] unconstrained majoritarian political
process yields [such] outcomes." James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice
and the Conduct of Representative Government, in PUBLIC CHOICE AND CONSTTrUTIONAL
ECONOMICS, supra note 181, at 25.
414 See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt, supra note 57, at 72-77 (contending that the Supreme Court
in Beck did not follow the canons of statutory construction, failed to examine the NLRA's legis-
lative history, and failed to correctly defer to congressional intent).
411 See Friesen, supra note 50, at 605-06, 645-46.
416 Exceptions of Charging Parties, supra note 382, at 8 (emphasis omitted).
417 Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527,532 (1992) (emphasis in original). This holding
should serve to defeat the UFCW claim that union economies of scale (spreading collective-
bargaining costs over a wider base of employees) constitute additional justification for the
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do not have an unconstrained right to engage in organizing campaigns at the expense
of dues objectors who do not share their expansionist goals." 8
The viability of the Ninth Circuit's decision rotates on the contention that the
Supreme Court's holding in Ellis, which precludes the chargeability of organizing
expenditures, brims with sufficient ambiguity to provide space for the NLRB to ade-
quately distinguish United Food from Supreme Court precedent. Since the Supreme
Court has determined that it is clear Congress has placed both the transportation
industry and industries covered by the NLRA "on equal footing insofar as compul-
sory unionism... [is] concerned,"4 9 the Ninth Circuit must traverse troubled waters
in order to sustain its Chevron analysis. The court fails to do so.
Nevertheless, as developed more fully below, it may be constructive to temporar-
ily accept the Ninth Circuit's contentions. But even assuming that the Ninth Circuit's
reliance on Chevron is not provoked by unjustified sympathy or that its statutory equiv-
alence analysis is spot on, the court concedes that deference to the NLRB is un-
warranted if and when a valid constitutional question is presented. It is to this issue
I now turn.
2. The Constitutional Question in the Mirror of Forced Riding
Although the Ninth Circuit's own precedents affirm the viability of First Amend-
ment claims related to the NLRA,420 a brief exposition of the background of the
NLRA, as well as the disputed purposes that collective bargaining can be seen to
serve, may improve comprehension of the constitutional issues associated with the
United Food opinion. For one of the drafters of the Wagner Act, statutorily protected
unionism provides "freedom and dignity... [through] cooperation with others" for
workers "caught in the labyrinth of modern industrialism and dwarfed by the size
of corporate enterprise. 4 2' Absent from such equality of bargaining claims is an
understanding that is at the heart of the union dues dispute: cooperation in the form
of dues payments is grounded in statutory mandates that are coercive on their face.422
decision reached by the NLRB. Cf United Food & Commercial Workers Locals 951, 7 &
1036 (Meijer, Inc.), 329 N.L.R.B. 730, 731 (1999).
418 See Exceptions of Charging Parties, supra note 382, at 8; see also Lechmere, 502 U.S.
at 539-41; Harry G. Hutchison, Through the Pruneyard Coherently: Resolving the Collision
of Private Property Rights and Nonemployee Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ.L.REV. 1, 10-12
(1994).
419 Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck 487 U.S. 735, 756 (1988).
420 See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d
760, 767 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (citing Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996
(9th Cir. 1970)).
421 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 308, at 28 (quoting 79 CONG. REc. 7565 (1935)
(statement of Sen. Wagner)).
422 See, e.g., Charles W. Baird, Toward Voluntary Unionism, 17 J. PRIvATE ENTERPRISE,
77-96 (2001), available at http://www.cbe.csueastbay.edu/-sbesc/volunion.html.
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In accord with that observation, the Taft-Hartley Amendments were designed to pro-
tect and promote the freedom of association of all workers by explicitly providing
that workers had the right to refrain from engaging in concerted activity.423
Against this backdrop, the union dues dispute accentuates conflicting notions
of unions. There are three possibilities. On one account, "workers oriented toward
their own [presumed] common economic interest[s]" ought to "conceive [unions]
as limited vehicles to ... further self government,'4 24 or steadfast with the Taft-
Hartley amendments, refrain from engaging in any concerted activity. That view inti-
mates that some workers might be seen as free riders if they disguise their preference
for union representation in an effort to escape financial contributions. In the absence
of such disguised preferences, it is axiomatic that free-rider claims collapse. Attached
inescapably to this guarded conception of unions is the following question: "[M]ay
[a union] .... consistent with [workers' rights of] freedom of association [and speech],
use... [union] dues... to advance causes [or interests] not favored by all of the
[dues payers]?"425 If the answer is yes, and if the union can compel forced payments,
does unjustifiableforced riding destructive of the dues objector's interests occur?426
An alternative account of unions implies that they ought to "be conceived as the
robust engine of collective insurgency against globalization, hierarchy, unwarranted
management power, class-based injustice, and increasing disparities in income. 427
American trade unionism is based on coercion embodied in the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Its authors justified the coercion
on the grounds that the interests of workers and employers are naturally
in conflict, that individual workers have an inherent bargaining power
disadvantage with respect to employers which unions can redress, and
that unionization leads to peaceful labor relations. The principal instru-
ments of coercion in the NLRA are exclusive representation (from which
emerges union security), and mandatory good faith bargaining.
Id. at 77.
423 The Taft-Hartley Act amended section 7 of the NLRA to ensure that employees had
"the right to refrain from joining a union." RAY, SHARPE & STRASSFELD, supra note 79, at
426. "Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to 'restrain
or coerce ... employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed under section 7."' Id. (alter-
ation in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1994)). See also Kohler, supra note 14, at
186-87.
424 Hutchison, supra note 86, at 448.
425 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 56, at 1299. See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 225-26 (1977) (holding that the state may require a public worker to pay dues
or a service fee equal to dues "insofar as the [money] ... is used to finance expenditures by
the Union for the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance
adjustment" but not for purposes of expressing political views); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
426 Cf. LEEF, supra note 87, at 32-35 (discussing and rejecting the free-rider justification
for compulsory unionism).
427 Hutchison, supra note 86, at 448-49 (footnote omitted).
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This view aims to alleviate the difficulties that unions are currently experiencing,"'
and is enlarged by the necessity of rescuing "workplace democracy"429 as part of a
movement toward the development of "radical class consciousness. 4 3' This plainly
ideological approach is driven by a desire to find meaning in life through societal
transformation despite an inability to articulate convincingly what that might look
like. This dream of liberation "can be seen as part of a radical, inevitable, and his-
torically driven movement [that] ... leads to progressive human advancement in the
form of egalitarianism and solidarity. 43' This perspective may be consistent with the
AFL-CIO's objectives that include "mak[ing] the most of the solidarity and energy
of the 2004 presidential election campaign" and by "helping workers form unions
and building the most dynamic labor political program in... [its] history., 432
Taken together, this understanding of labor organizations implies that all workers
must be enlisted in the conflict to transform society and the market as part of the
quest for class-based justice.433 Workers, as thus described, operate as a prephilosophic
tabula rasa that has yet to form sufficient moral intuition. Union hierarchs, by
contrast, as members of the philosophic vanguard, act as forerunners of an inevitable
and devoutly desired future destination that workers' innate but still inchoate intel-
lect guides them to. Coextensively, this in loco parentis perspective asserts that
"[tihe core of American labor law has been essentially sealed off ... both from
democratic revision and renewal and from local experimentation and innovation, 434
428 See Weiler, supra note 406, at 1016-21; see also Hirsch & Schumacher, supra note
260, at 487 ("At the end of the century, the percentage of private wage and salary workers
who were union members was less than 10 percent, not greatly different from union density
prior to the [passage of the] NLRA."). But see EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 168 (noting that
"[t]he declining role of unions in the labor force.., is a direct and predictable response to
the changes in the means of production that allow firms to escape the limitations of an
inferior form of labor organization" - statutorily protected unions); Richard A. Epstein, A
Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE
L.J. 1357, 1407 (1983) (arguing that private sector unions "continue[] to lose ground"
because they no longer "provide their membership with benefits that exceed their costs").
429 For a description of workplace democracy, see Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy
& Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988).
430 For a description of the move toward radical class consciousness within the labor move-
ment, see Hutchison, supra note 234, at 335-38, 353-58.
431 Id. at 368 (critiquing this view) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
432 Strengthening Our Union Movement for the Future, http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/our
future (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
131 Cf. Feldman, supra note 3, at 193 (suggesting that the law fails to protect workers in
their search for class-based justice).
434 Estlund, supra note 216, at 1530. Consistent with this claim, Professor Estlund also
adverts to changes in the labor force, claiming that gender, "racial[,] and ethnic diversity has
burgeoned" since the passage of the NLRA. Id. at 1535-36. This contention, at least with
respect to the employment of African Americans and other members of nonwhite groups is
dubious since African American labor-force participation and employment declined after the
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thus imperiling "the collectivist premises of the New Deal labor law regime. 435 In
other words, represented workers should become justifiably forced riders for the
greater good, and accordingly, they should be denied the right to withdraw their
financial support from the class-based benefits the union movement provides. On
the other hand, even adherents to this view concede that the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947
refrains from forthrightly endorsing collective bargaining and instead refrained the
NLRA "as favoring employee 'free choice' with respect to unionization and collective
bargaining. '436 Nevertheless, empathy for the collectivist impulse impels some observ-
ers to claim that attempts to protect union dues objectors violate "the First Amendment
rights of unions and union members... [by] threaten[ing] a union's right to expressive
association. 437
Despite the romance of this claim that overlooks union dissidents' rights to ex-
pressive association, a third understanding of unionism maintains that unions are
private organizations that have received an unconstitutionally coercive grant of power
in the form of the right to exclusive representation of workers through majority-rule
democracy. 438 This point of view concludes that union dues objectors are motivated
either by "genuine philosophical reservations" or fears that they will "suffer economi-
cally as a result of union action[s].,,439 Because "[o]nly the individual can assess the
subjective benefits of union membership," compulsory unionism is unlikely to gen-
erate free riding among those who decline to support the union."' This skeptical per-
spective discovers that state action exists and determines that compulsory union dues
passage of NLRA and the nonwhite-white unemployment differential widened. See VEDDER
& GALLAWAY, supra note 51, at 272-80. Such empirical evidence may be consistent with
less, not more, racial diversity.
"5 Estlund, supra note 216, at 1530.
436 Id. at 1534.
411 Sean T. McLaughlin, A Devil in Disguise: How Paycheck Protection Legislation
Violates the First Amendment, 27 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 113, 137 (2002).
438 See Baird, supra note 92; see also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S.
192, 208 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
The constitutional problem inherent in [exclusive representation]
is clear. Congress... has conferred upon the union selected by a major-
ity.., the power to represent [all members of a bargaining unit] ... in
all collective bargaining matters. While such a union is essentially a
private organization, its power to represent and bind all members of a
[bargaining unit] ... is derived solely from Congress.
Id. Apparently, "[iun the same case the Court noted that, as an exclusive bargaining agent,
a union 'is clothed with power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitu-
tional limitations on its power. .. ."' Baird, supra (quoting Steele, 323 U.S. at 198). Baird
states that it is doubtful that the United States Constitution granted Congress that "power to
intervene in theformation [sic] and execution of private, voluntary exchange contracts. Congress
has usurped that power, with the blessing of the U.S. Supreme Court, mainly on the basis of
an illegitimate reading of the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution." Id.
41' LEEF, supra note 87, at 34.
440 Id.
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payments implicate unjustified forced riding even when the dues are purportedly or
actually collected to further a collective bargaining purpose or any other purpose."'
Skepticism about collective bargaining imposed by statute appears to be consistent
with the notion that legislation tends to favor a centralized decision-making process
"with interest groups [and/or interest group leaders] trying to impose their will at the
expense of more diffuse [and more diverse] groups" or subgroups. 4 2 Uncertainty,
unease, and conflict may attach to hosts of putative collective bargaining related pur-
poses. Some workers might favor high wages, others better benefits, and still others
improved workplace safety. Even if one accepts the contention that unions operate
as a "mini-legislatures," '4 it remains highly doubtful that collective bargaining-oriented
decisions by this putative legislature will produce collectively rational decisions
representing the views of the majority. Hence, a judgment by a union's leader that
a particular union objective and associated expenditures benefits the entire union
membership does not by itself demonstrate that all or even a majority of unionists
favor either the objective or the expenditure. 4"
a. Expanding boundaries: finding communicative content in union organizing
It is far from clear that the Ninth Circuit was disposed to consider impartially
the constitutional claims of the dues objectors (nonmembers) because it held without
analysis that "the claim made by nonmembers does not involve unions' use of dues
44 See id. at 32-34.
442 A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis
of Tradition's Role in Constitutional Interpretation, 77 N.C. L. REv. 409, 414 (1999). It is
highly doubtful that "democracy [has the] ability to consistently produce collectively rational
decisions representing the views of the majority .... [Hence,] a legislative judgment that
certain individuals should enjoy entitlements at others' expense may benefit society ... does
not by itself demonstrate that citizens favor the transfer or that the transfer benefits society."
Id. at 477 (emphases in original). Evidently, a number of "factors support this skepticism
about majoritarian decisionmaking processes." Id. at 478. According to Pritchard and
Zywicki, these include: "(1) the influence of special interests on the political process; (2) the
'lumpiness' of political decisions," meaning, among other things, that when the number of
issues in any election vastly exceeds the number of candidates, it is unlikely that any candi-
date shares with even a single voter the same position on all issues; "(3) the 'rational ignorance'
of voters" given that knowledge is scarce and hence costly; "(4) the 'rational irrationality'
of voters caused by their individually trivial influence over election outcomes; (5) Arrow's
Theorem (the problem of aggregating individual preferences into coherent collective prefer-
ences); and (6) the problem of 'stakeless voting,"' or in other words, the problem of majori-
tarian decision-making giving decision authority to many people with little or no personal
stake in the matter. Id. at 478.
4" McUsic & Selmi, supra note 14, at 1343-44. (Noting that "unions... operate as mini-
legislatures" with collective bargaining being viewed "as a form of democratic self-government...
complete with.., legislative principles, including the principle of majority rule" (footnote
omitted)).
'4 See Pritchard & Zywicki, supra note 442, at 477-83.
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for political purposes."445 In order to determine whether the United Food decision
implicates First Amendment values, it is useful to analyze first the evidence upon
which the court relied to justify its failure to consider fairly the charging parties' First
Amendment claims.
The court relied largely on economic claims. It suggested that if evidence could
be found that demonstrated a positive relationship between extra unit organizing and
wages, organizing-related expenditures could be seen as germane. Conversely, if such
evidence was missing, that lacunae fortified the objections of union dissenters while
exposing the political, social, or ideological purposes which lie beneath organizing
expenditures. What counts as evidence is an obvious question.
On one account, a positive relationship between extra unit organizing and wages
exists. 446 Professor Voos, a union advocate who has asserted previously that "unions
bring both protections for workers and an organized collective voice to the work-
place," '7 was employed by the UFCW to provide evidence. Instead of evidence, she
submitted a "Report" that seems to be unworthy of submission to "any professional
'refereed' journal.""8 Her survey of existing research "found [allegedly] that, out
of some 20 studies by economists on the issue, all but two had found a significant
positive relationship between the percent of employees organized and the level of
union wages.'449 For Professor Voss, this leads to the conclusion "that there is over-
whelming evidence of a positive relationship between union coverage and union
wages. ' 50 Critically considered, her statement fails to demonstrate a provable con-
nection between organizing and wages. While there may be a connection between
union organizing and union coverage, it is equally clear that coverage as the inde-
pendent variable that may operate to produce a positive wage benefit is not the same
thing as an organizing effort that fails to result in coverage. Moreover, a "positive"
relationship between union coverage and the dependent variable, the wages of already
organized workers, fails to prove that there is a "significant" relationship. For
instance "25% of the economics studies cited in her Report ... indicate that the
relationship between wages and union coverage is 'insignificant' (and in a few cases
actually 'negative' ).,,45I Additionally, her report concentrated on the seventy-three
44 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,768
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
16 Two putative experts testified on behalf of the UFCW, Professor Voos and Professor
Craypo. Since Professor Voos's report is primarily in issue, I focus on her work. See, e.g.,
United Food & Commercial Workers Locals 951,7 and 1036,329 N.L.R.B. 730,732 (1999)
(discussing the contentions surrounding Professor Voos's report).
"7 Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary Innovations in Work
Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COM-
PETmVENEsS 173, 174 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992).
448 Exceptions of Charging Parties, supra note 382, at 16-17 & n.17.
449 United Food, 329 N.L.R.B. at 734.
450 Exceptions of Charging Parties, supra note 382, at 17 (emphasis added).
411 Id. at 17-18 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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largest cities in the United States despite evidence that a number of the charging
parties worked in largely rural areas.452
Although the United Food court was convinced that "[c]ase studies of specific
retail food geographic markets also confirmed the [positive] results of the statistical
studies, '453 there seems to be no analysis that distinguishes between spillover effects
and threat effects. It is possible, therefore, that successful union organizing shifts
union members in lower-wage jobs into the nonunion sector, and, accordingly, the
wage rate paid in the nonunion sector falls. This development would, of course, cor-
relate with an observed union relative wage advantage that tends to be greater than
the true absolute effect of the union on its members' real wage. 54 Professor Voos' s
report seems rife with omissions and verifiability issues. While the United Food
court relies on her "Report," the reliability of the report remains in doubt.455
Contrary evidence is available. In a study published in 2004, John DiNardo and
David Lee, using multiple establishment-level data sets that represent establishments
that faced organizing drives in the United States from 1984 to 1999, found that "union
wage impacts are [very] small - centered around zero." 45 6 Given this data, and (1)
the apparent absence of proof that Professor Voos separates threat effects and spill-
over effects, (2) her admission that "a union could spend virtually unlimited funds
on organizing a new unit and still not actually recruit a single new member or sign a
single new collective bargaining agreement, '457 (3) her concession that unions are
unlikely to successfully negotiate contracts in more than 30 percent of successful or-
ganizing campaigns that result in an actual certification election,458 and (4) Professor
Morgan Reynolds's opinion that Professor Voos's evidence consisted of "wishful
thinking" and ignored the law of supply and demand for labor,459 it was predictable
that the Board would formulate its conclusion in hypothetical terms. Missing is the
language of causation. The hypothetical states: "[O]rganizing ... can benefit all
employees in a unit already represented by a union."'  Even that hypothetical tends
452 United Food, 329 N.L.R.B. at 732.
113 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,769
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
41 Some evidence adduced before the administrative lawjudge shows "rising union wages"
can operate consistently with "falling levels of unionization." Exceptions of Charging Parties,
supra note 382, at 18 n. 12. (reporting on a study by labor economists Michael Wachter and
Peter Linneman) (emphasis in original).
455 Among the issues are Professor Voos's willingness to engage in unsupportable specu-
lation about large increases in unionization (10 percent or more), and her failure to consider
the positive effect of education on wages or the effect of race. See id. at 18-20.
456 DiNardo & Lee, supra note 257, at 3.
4"7 Exceptions of Charging Parties, supra note 382, at 20.
458 Id. at 21 ("[U]nions only win about 45% of certification elections, and then success-
fully negotiate contracts in only two-thirds of those units.").
419 Id. at 28-29.
4w United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Locals 951, 7 and 1036, 329 N.L.R.B.
730, 736 (1999) (emphasis added).
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to overstate benefits since an increase in wages in an already organized unit is un-
likely to benefit workers who lose their jobs because of a wage increase.
Member Brame's critique underscores these various points by demonstrating
that the NLRB fails to demonstrate a causal, as opposed to a coincidental, relation-
ship between union wages gains and union extra-bargaining unit organizing. Indeed
both the NLRB and Professor Voos fail to demonstrate that any wage gains are
likely to be obtained from union organizing efforts. Further, if DiNardo and Lee's
empirical investigation is correct, the contention that organizing yields more than
attenuated benefits becomes untenable. Although further study may be warranted,
Voos's claim that extra-bargaining unit organizing supplies economic benefits to
already organized workers by forcing up wages at competitor facilities is pungent with
salient implications that are adverse to union claims and contentions. Her claim can-
not operate as actual proof that organizing supplies causally related economic benefits
to newly organized workers to which the union has no representational obligation.
Hence, her free-rider analysis may function as a perversity.46" '
Taken as a whole, the Ninth Circuit opinion does not suffer from surplus empir-
ical evidence in support of its holding. Suspicion is indispensable for a number of
reasons. Recall the administrative law judge's refusal to make a ruling on the expert
testimony presented. 62 Instead of relying on such evidence, he gave weight to a
rather slender contention: Congress "believed" there was a positive correlation
between organizing and wages."63 Even accepting the correctness of this narrative,
we do not yet have proof that the individual closest to the evidence actually con-
sidered it. Still, given the unpersuasive evidence available, the focus on putative
benefits accruing to already-organized workers may, in the end, be misplaced. For
current purposes, it is time to accept an earlier suggestion: concede, for purposes
of argument, the unreliable claim that organizing provides some collective bargaining
benefits, but nonetheless challenge union dues expenditures on constitutional grounds.
In order to provide an analytical framework, it is helpful to focus on two things: the
purpose and the primary effect.
Following Professor Budziszewski, it is possible to state that "[a]n acorn is not
essentially something small with a point at one end and a cap at the other; it is some-
thing aimed at being an oak."46 Likewise, extra-bargaining union organizing may
not be essentially something that provides unions with an additional opportunity to
expand economic "benefits" for already organized workers; it is something aimed
at something greater - societal transformation. This probability assumes prominence
"6 See Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,452 n. 13 (1984) (conclud-
ing that "it would be perverse to read it [the RLA] as allowing the union to charge to object-
ing nonmembers part of the costs of attempting to convince them [unorganized workers] to
become members.").
462 See United Food, 329 N.L.R.B. at 731.
463 Id.
464 BuDzIszEwsK, supra note 21, at 23.
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given the evidence indicating that unions tend to consume up to 80 percent of union
dues on what can be seen as indirect political, ideological, and other challengeable
expenditures that are unlikely to have a representational purpose. 65 Plainly, union
dues payers may disagree with the union special interest message.4" Modem conflicts
persist between different workers who are represented by a single bargaining agency.
67
Predictably, different workers and different subgroups of workers find that their in-
terests are at variance with others.468 "With standardized agreements, these individual
variations in tastes and demands among workers are difficult to respect simulta-
neously. '469 It is questionable, therefore, that any worker who finds herself in dis-
agreement within the union should be called upon to subsidize the contrary views,
interests, or political preferences of the majority or entrenched union leaders, even
if the purpose is masked by collective bargaining goals. This analysis appears
particularly precise where "the state selects the 'bargaining unit' under the usual set
of complex and indeterminate criteria, which always work against the interests of
a political minority.
' 4 70
Since labor union "oligarchy... [may be] inevitable" and "'elitist bargaining'
[may] now [be] the norm, '47 1 concentration on economic benefits that are secured
on behalf of unit dues payers tends to obscure the fact that the AFL-CIO, the formerly
affiliated472 United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW), and UFCW's
various locals are structured to obtain far more than pure collective bargaining objec-
tives. Evidently, the law has failed "to require, let alone enforce, democratic collective
bargaining [and] has left union members subject to the manipulation of union leaders
and negotiators with interests sharply different from theirs. 47 3 Fortifying this assertion,
courts, commentators, and the NLRB refuse to focus on likely benefits (private or
465 See Edith Hakola & Rex Reed, Labor Plays Politics With Its Members' Dues, WASH.
POST, Sept. 1, 1996, at C4; see also Compelled Political Speech: Hearings Before the S. Comm.
On Rules & Admin., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Leo Troy, Professor of Economics,
Rutgers University), available at http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2000/041200 troy.htm.
466 Unions extract funds from their members to attain special interests benefits for the
causes they favor within the context of American democracy, which, oddly enough, "favors
concentrated interest groups at the expense of dispersed groups." Pritchard & Zywicki, supra
note 442, at 478-79. If true, this may favor entrenched union leadership at the expense of
dispersed and diverse union members.
467 Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 25, at 166 ("Since labor unions cannot function if they are
required to have the unanimous consent of all workers within a unit, the legal system in the
United States allows a bargaining representative chosen by a majority of workers within a
firm to select the single representative for all workers within the business.").
468 See id.
469 Id.
470 Id. at 167.
471 Schwab, supra note 40, at 371.
472 See United Food and Commercial Workers Leave AFL-CIO, USAToday.com, July 29,
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-07-29-ufcwx.htm.
41' Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 843 (1984).
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public externalities) received by outsiders or disproportionately received by union
leaders. Hence, the "fair share" language deployed to justify the chargeability of
challenged activities to dues objectors remains suspect. It is likely that objection-
able communicative content and spending are enshrouded by putatively economic
crusades.
An inspection of recent AFL-CIO declarations substantiates the labor federation's
commitment, for example, to a "major global campaign to expose Wal-Mart., 474 Their
goals include:
mobiliz[ing] federation-wide support for the UFCW's drive to
protect against the "Wal-Martization" of goodjobs[,] develop[ing
and] implement[ing] global industry strategies to support organiz-
ing [and] bargaining[,] ... building... community support [for]
changing laws[,]... [ensuring that] organizing/growth and politics
are linked[,] ... [providing funds to] plac[e] full-time campaign
directors in key states[,] . . . [and] developing new political
relationships.475
Furthermore, an examination of publicly available documents reveals that the
UFCW and its local affiliates have taken positions on a number of controversial
issues including health care,4 76 defending the filibuster of judicial nominees,477 social
security,478 minimum wages,479 and paid family medical leave.4"'
When labor union funds are spent to achieve interest group or special interest
goods, it is doubtful that the union can credibly contend that only represented workers
receive self-interested benefits. Instead, collective goods, such as enhanced child-
support payments, 481 yield self-interested benefits largely to a select group of workers,
leaders, or outsiders who happen to share this opinion. This activity, duly understood
47' AFL-CIO, A Comparison of "Winning for Working Families," A Proposal by the AFL-
CIO Officers with "Restoring the American Dream," http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/ourfuture
upload/comparison2.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
475 id.
476 See UFCW, Worker Political Agenda, Health Care, http://www.ufcw.org/worker-
political- agenda/health care/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
477 See UFCW, Worker Political Agenda, Legislative & Political Action, http://www.ufcw.
org/worker-political-agenda/2005-leg-and~poaction~mtg/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 30,
2006).
478 See UFCW, Worker Political Agenda, Social Security, http://www.ufcw.org/worker-
political_agenda/social-security/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
471 See UFCW, Worker Political Agenda, Minimum Wage, http://www.ufcw.org/worker-
political-agenda/minimumwage/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
480 UCFW Local 1036, Political Affairs, California First State With Paid Family Medical
Leave, http://www.ufcw1036.com/political.htm (follow"California First State with Paid Medical
Leave" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 30, 2006).
481 See id.
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as part of "Michel's 'Iron Law of Oligarchy,"' 482 operates simply as another version
of group-specific "rent-seeking behavior." '483 Group resources are captured and trans-
ferred to favor goals and purposes idealized by group leaders and outsiders while the
disfavored goals of the workers are left unattended.
Imagine the following possibilities connected to postmodern identity construal.
Hispanic workers within the United States, driven by ascriptive concerns, may take
an interest in ensuring an increase in immigration, legal or illegal, from Central and
South America. They believe immigration improves the well-being of individuals
who share their ethnicity. Union leaders may support the opposing view by allocating
union funds to lobby either against liberalizing immigration or for tightening the
rules. As this process proceeds, Hispanic workers may object to being associated
with a policy that has the effect of diminishing the well-being of fellow Hispanics.
They direct their opposition at the communicative element associated with compulsory
funding of the union's policy position.
Similarly, African American workers, knowledgeable about the historic role played
by unions in sustaining subordinating strategies that limit opportunities for African
American workers, may recognize minimum wage laws as an exclusionary device
that has diminished economic opportunity for black workers in the United States and
pre-Mandela South Africa.4" The future self-worth of African American workers is
likely to be diminished by the enactment of minimum wage increases that have a
disproportionately adverse effect on African American employment." 5 African
American workers may resist the communicative element connected to spending in
support of this activity because wage floors operate to diminish the economic well-
being and self-worth of individuals who share what has become, for them, a defining
characteristic.
Figuratively, if the purpose of an acorn is to produce an oak,48 6 it is likely that
union organizing operates purposely to produce collective goods that can be seen
as hostile to the interests of Hispanic, African American, and other workers who fail
to share a "community of interests" 487 with the local union, national union, or union
federation. The focus on presumed economic benefits received by already repre-
sented workers via extra-bargaining-unit organizing tends to operate as a sanctuary
that shelters the primary purposes and resultant beneficiaries from view. Overall,
482 Schwab, supra note 40, at 370.
483 Rent-seeking behavior has been crisply defined as conduct aimed at the transfer of wealth
rather than its creation. See, e.g., SPURR, supra note 237, at 26.
4' See Harry Hutchison, Toward a Critical Race Reformist Conception ofMinimum Wage
Regimes: Exploding the Power of Myth, Fantasy, and Hierarchy, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 93,
119-26 (1997) (reviewing unions' historical motive for backing minimum wage laws).
485 See generally id.
486 See supra note 464 and accompanying text.
487 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,769
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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this analysis serves to expand the boundaries of our understanding of expenditures
that can neither be described accurately as germane nor be portrayed correctly as shorn
of communicative content. Determining the legal sufficiency of a First Amendment
claim requires courts to traverse an often fictional chasm between government con-
duct that counts as state action and government conduct that does not count as state
action for purposes of constitutional law.488 As considered more fully below, the
state action issue should not prove to be an insurmountable barrier. In addition, both
the Lehnert and Seay cases provide examples pertaining to when union dues expen-
ditures burden the freedom of expression of union dues objectors.
b. Burdening freedom of expression
When represented workers are given an actual choice to support the union's
political and ideological mission, up to 85 percent of such workers refuse to allow
their dues go to politics.489 While most private employees lack a similar choice, it
is clear that "[t]he burden upon freedom of expression is particularly great [when] ...
compelled speech is in a public context. ' '490 Consequently, the Lehnert Court's
"hold[ing] that the State constitutionally may not compel its employees to subsidize
legislative lobbying or other political union activities outside the limited context of
contract ratification or implementation""49 was a foreseeable boundary.
Before inspecting challenged expenses in considerable detail, the Supreme Court
provided general principles to shape its deliberation. For instance, in Lehnert, "the
challenged lobbying activities [did not] relate to the ratification or implementation
of... [the] collective-bargaining agreement, '"492 and hence were nonchargeable.
Analytically, this example indicates that challenged expenditures must have a con-
nection with the presumed economic interest of the represented workers. Adverting
to "the government's interest in promoting labor peace and avoiding the 'free-rider'
problem that would otherwise accompany company union recognition, 4 93 he Lehnert
Court found that "[n]either goal is served by charging objecting employees for lob-
bying, electoral, and other political activities that do not relate to their collective-
bargaining agreement."' 94 Free-rider concerns are therefore inapt when "lobbying
extends beyond the effectuation of a collective-bargaining agreement. ' 495
Continuing to set forth general principles, the Lehnert Court declined to hold
that dues objectors can "be charged only for those collective-bargaining activities
488 Fee, supra note 57, at 578-79.
489 See CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 30, at 46.
490 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 522 (1991).
491 Id.
492 Id. at 520.
493 Id. at 520-21.
494 Id. at 521.
495 id.
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undertaken directly on behalf of their unit.1 96 This apparently allows both the courts
and the NLRB to conclude that a union does not act unlawfully by charging expenses
that are "for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the
local union by virtue of their membership in the parent organization.""'97 The
Court's failure to accept the complainants' view may be mistaken because virtually
any activity may ultimately inure to the benefit of members. The Court clarified.
Since a local union's affiliation relationship with the national unit may provide "con-
siderable economic, political, and informational resources when the local is in need
of them," such expenditures are chargeable to dues objectors.4 98 But, invoking Ellis,
the Court held that such expenses must be related to the union's "statutory functions"
and its "overall bargaining goals."'  The Court stated that the chargeability of such
expenses "does not... grant ... [the] union carte blanche" to spend nonmembers'
dues however they wish. 500 The Lehnert Court supplied familiar language, stating
that the union does not have the right "to expend dissenters' dollars for bargaining
activities wholly unrelated to the employees in their unit."501 Expressly precluded,
for instance, are "direct donation[s] or interest-free loan[s] to an unrelated bargaining
unit for the purpose of promoting employee rights or unionism generally.... And,
as always, the union bears the burden of proving the proportion of chargeable expense
to total expenses."5 °2 Placing the burden on the entity with the greatest access to
information makes logical sense and is likely to be consistent with an accurate un-
derstanding of whom, as between the union and the dissenter, is the lowest cost
information provider.
Justice Scalia would take this notion further. In the context of a public-sector
union, he would hold "that any charge that does not relate to an activity expressly
authorized by statute is constitutionally invalid, irrespective of its impact or lack
thereof, on free expression."5 °3 The majority opinion criticizes "Justice Scalia's rigid
approach... [for] fail[ing] to acknowledge the practicalities of the complex inter-
relationship between public employers, employees, unions, and the public.' ' ° Con-
versely, if union expenditures conceal spending objectives and purposes, then Justice
Scalia' s approach may not only be allowable - it may be necessary to vindicate the
First Amendment rights of union dissenters.
496 Id. at 522 (emphasis added).
'9' Id. at 524 (emphasis added). See also Teamsters Local 75 (Schreiber Foods), 329 N.L.R.B.
28, 31 (1999) (citing Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524).
498 Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 523.
499 Id.
'0' Id. at 524.
501 Id.
502 id.
503 Id. at 526 (emphasis in original) (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
504 Id.
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The majority's premises and conclusions suggest that union organizing expen-
ditures that exceed the level that is related provably to actual collective-bargaining
purposes ought not to be chargeable to dues objectors. This conclusion should apply
to all cases, whether arising within the public or private sector. Determining what
must be proven for purposes of analyzing United Food, however, will require reliance
on inferences drawn from specific examples.
For instance, the Lehnert Court disallowed the union's "Preserve Public Education
(PPE) program designed to secure funds for public education," without considering
the actual parameters of the program, because "none of the[] activities was shown
to be oriented toward the ratification or implementation of ... [the] collective-
bargaining agreement." 5 Here the Court adverts to the purpose of the challenged
activity and implies that purpose can and should be dispositive.5" While dissenters
are required to pay their share of general collective-bargaining costs of the state or
national parent union, if and when such costs are germane to collective bargaining,
extra-bargaining unit litigation expenses that provide hypothetical bargaining unit
benefits are not chargeable to dissenters.' 7
Similarly, "[p]ublic relations expenditures designed to enhance the reputation
of the teaching profession" might provide benefits by increasing the odds that the
public might consent to pay higher taxes and increase the fund from which teachers
are paid.508 Despite the collective-bargaining benefits of such activity, public relations
remains an impermissible expenditure.' 9 Furthermore, the Court distinguished the
permissibility of union social expenditures in Ellis from the public relations expen-
ditures in Lehnert - disallowing "informational picketing, media exposure, signs,
posters and buttons."5 0 Public relations expenditures implicate a communicative
content that is distinguishable from union social activities. When an activity becomes
largely communicative in nature, it becomes suspect under Lehnert.
Before applying specific Lehnert examples to the United Food case, one should
consider whether the state action rule precludes the application of the Lehnert rule
to private sector cases. One commentator asserts that Supreme Court precedents in
the affirmative action arena may serve "to defeat any arguments that a union's actions
in negotiating and observing a union security agreement are state actions by virtue
of the union's designation as the exclusive bargaining representative under section
9(a) of the NLRA."' Oddly enough, the Ninth Circuit, in Seay, disagreed. The court
considered a complaint brought by union dissenters covered by an agency shop agree-
ment within the meaning of the NLRA.1 2 The complaint stated that compulsory fees
5o5 Id. at 527.
506 id.
507 Id. at 528.
508 id.
509 Id.
50 Id. at 529 (citation omitted).
51 Dau-Schmidt, supra note 57, at 70-71.
512 Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 427 F.2d 996, 997 (9th Cir. 1970).
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paid by union dissidents "were being used in 'substantial amounts' by the union to
support the political campaigns of candidates for public office and were being em-
ployed 'to propagate political and economic doctrines, concepts, ideologies, and legis-
lative programs"' that they opposed."1 3 The court held that such allegations were not
"within the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the [NLRB]. 51 4 The Ninth Circuit's
Seay opinion states that "the pre-emption doctrine is not served by deferring to the
Board where a constitutional question is validly presented."5 5 Although the Ninth
Circuit now contends that most First Amendment claims "arise in the public sector
context or under the RLA,"5 6 the court concedes the obvious - its own precedents
confirm that under the NLRA, First Amendment claims can be validly brought to
the attention of the court without deferring to the NLRB." 7
In addition, the court found that the dissidents' amended complaint states a duty
of fair representation claim because it alleges that the union misused union funds.' 8
Since the "[p]re-emption doctrine depends upon 'the nature of the particular interest[]"'
at issue, the Seay court found this misuse allegation to be outside the parameters of
the NLRB because the duty of fair representation is not covered by statutory unfair
labor practices.5 9 Seay provides persuasive authority for the proposition that suffi-
cient state action exists to ground union dues objectors' First Amendment claims.
It is also authority for the proposition that union dues cases arising under the NLRA
support a separate claim for breach of a duty of fair representation. Hence, on the
Ninth Circuit's prior reading of the case law, the argument that state action rules bar
First Amendment challenges is unlikely to bar union dues disputes brought before
an impartial court.
Supplemental authority exists in support of these observations. It can be recalled
usefully that the Beck dues objectors "sought relief on three separate federal claims:
that the exaction of fees beyond those necessary to finance collective-bargaining activ-
ities violates Section 8(a)(3) [union security agreement rules]; that such exactions
violate the judicially created duty of fair representation; and that such exactions violate
the... [dues objectors'] First Amendment rights." 2° Emphasizing the discreteness
of these claims, the Beck Court held that the NLRB "had primary jurisdiction over"
issues related to the section 8(a)(3) claim521 while stating that the court "need not
"' Id. at 998.
514 Id.
... Id. at 1002.
516 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,767
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
517 id.
518 See Seay, 427 F.2d at 1002.
|9 Id. The NLRB may have concurrent jurisdiction to decide duty of fair representation
claims. See, e.g., HENDERSON, supra note 395, at 152-62.
520 Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 742 (1988).
521 Id.
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decide whether the exercise of rights permitted, though not compelled, by [section]
8(a)(3) involves state action." '22 Therefore, First Amendment challenges reinforced
by duty of fair representation claims attached to First Amendment norms are still
very much alive despite the unwillingness of the Court to ground its opinion in the
First Amendment and to decide that sufficient state action exist. Moreover, sufficient
state action has already been found in private sector cases within the meaning of the
RLA.523
Returning to the application of specific Lehnert examples to United Food, I con-
centrate on three illustrations: (1) public education (PPE) expenditures, (2) extra-
bargaining unit litigation expenses, and (3) public relations activities. First, securing
additional public education funding via PPE spending may supply possible collective-
bargaining related benefits for teachers. Still, the Supreme Court found that these
types of expenditures were not sufficiently related to either the ratification or the im-
plementation of a collective-bargaining agreement to be chargeable against dissenters.5 24
Fragrant with implications, however, PPE expenditures might be useful for purposes
of negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement; because the availability of additional
public revenues may be helpful in extracting larger wage increases from the employer.
Economic benefits related to the PPE are dissimilar to the highly contestable and
doubtfully reliable claims made in defense of extra-bargaining unit organizing in
United Food. It is highly implausible that benefits associated with securing additional
funds for public education can be seen as more attenuated than the economic benefits
associated with extra-bargaining unit organizing. Reinforcing this conclusion is the
determination that no benefits associated with extra-bargaining unit organizing are
obtainable unless several predicate steps are accomplished. Moreover, since the
Lehnert opinion implies that purpose can be dispositive, extra-bargaining organizing
may be disallowable if a political purpose can be linked substantially to the organiz-
ing effort.
Secondly, Lehnert indicates that extra-bargaining unit litigation expenses, while
potentially helpful to members of the unit, are unlikely to be helpful if the litigation
does not concern or adversely concerns dissenting employees. 25 Sending reports to
the membership about such litigation is subject to the same conclusion. Here, the
Court concentrates wisely on the improbability that union dissidents share in or are
part of the same community of interests associated with the union's overall litigation
strategy. 26 The rejection of such expenditures vindicates the diversity of individual
522 Id. at 761. See also id. at 763 (Blackmun, I., dissenting) ("I agree that the District Court
and the Court of Appeals properly exercised jurisdiction over... [dues objectors'] duty-of-
fair-representation and First Amendment claims .... ").
523 See generally Topol, supra note 57, at 1135 (discussing this development).
524 See supra notes 507-10 and accompanying text.
525 Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 528 (1991).
526 See id.
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and group interests that may comprise a union against the contrary claim that seems
attached to the notion of solidarity. The Court states that "union litigation may cover
a diverse range of areas... [which may be] unrelated to an objecting employee's
unit. 5 27 Accordingly, "[jlust as the Court in Ellis determined that the RLA, as
informed by the First Amendment, prohibits the use of dissenters' fees for extraunit
litigation, we hold that the Amendment proscribes such assessments in the public
sector.
5 28
The Lehnert Court supplies several additional points. First, its understanding
of the First Amendment proscribes extraunit litigation expenditures in both the private
and public sector. Second, extraunit activity is unlikely to benefit workers within
the unit. Third, because the Ellis Court's free-rider and First Amendment analyses
apply directly to private sector employment, the contention that such analyses cannot
apply to private sector cases arising under the NLRA becomes fragile. Applying
this analysis to United Food leads to several conclusions. The litigation expenses
in Lehnert are potentially helpful when such expenses directly concern dissenters.
It is equally likely that the organizing expenses in United Food, while potentially
helpful if unions provide primary benefits to dissenters, are unlikely to be helpful
when those expenses provide primary benefits to those outside the local union.
The third illustration drawn from Lehnert involves public relations expenditures.
Unlike social activities, public relations expenditures - "informational picketing,
media exposure, signs, posters and buttons" - have a plainly communicative element,
which is likely to "increase the infringement of ... [dissidents'] First Amendment
rights. 529 In United Food, by contrast, it is not impossible but it is more difficult
to prove that there is a communicative element associated with extra-unit organizing
activities. Nevertheless, since any compelled contribution to a union may constitute
a recognizable "infringement of his First Amendment rights," 3° a dues objector is
likely to find compelled contributions for the purposes of organizing additional workers
even more objectionable because of the message it sends to extra-unit workers and
to the larger community. Such payments operate contrary to the union dissenter's
appreciation of the larger public interest. More particularly, if union organizing has
a disguised purpose - additional funds directed toward the pursuit of political and
ideological activities that have no real collective-bargaining purpose - the dues
dispute becomes inextricably intertwined with First Amendment concerns. It may
be possible that the United Food and Commercial Workers Union's political and
social objectives operate and are financed completely independently of the union's
collective bargaining initiatives. All that is necessary to disprove that possibility is
complete access to union documents and accounts. Taken together, the United Food
527 Id.
528 Id. (citation omitted).
529 Id. at 529 (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,456 (1984)).
530 Id.
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court's contention that all workers must pay for organizing because all represented
workers receive uniformly robust benefits appears to be unsustainable. Compatible
with that contention, the Fourth Circuit opinion in Beck v. Communications Workers
ofAmerica following Ellis, unequivocally disallowed organizing expenses53" ' and the
subsequent Beck litigation failed to disavow this holding.
5 32
In the analysis that follows, I contend that the United Food decision is in error.
I concentrate largely on the possibility that self-interested benefits are likely to be
obtained by a large number of individuals outside the United Food court's compass.
The United Food court's explication suffers from two related strands of errors. The
first strand is a function of the court's failure to appreciate that economic, as well
as all other forms of self-interest, including ideological self-interest, brood whenever
trade unions engage in virtually any activity. The possibility that organized workers
will receive an economic advantage associated with extra bargaining unit organizing
implicates free-riders concerns. If wages at Grocery Store A rise because a union's
successful organizing effort leads to a collective-bargaining agreement that raises
wages at competitor Store B, one might argue that workers in Store A have obtained
economic benefits justifying compulsory dues as a device to preclude free riding unless
the primary purpose and principal effect of the organizing campaign at Store B is to
harvest self-interested benefits for those outside the local union. By overly concen-
trating on conjectural economic benefits that might be obtained hypothetically by
represented workers at, for example, Grocery Store A, the court may abandon a more
likely possibility: individuals (such as the union hierarchs or other outsiders) who
neither work in Store A nor have a connection to the grocery store industry can obtain
self-interested benefits from Store A's union members. Additionally, as previously
noted, members of the newly organized workforce will obtain self-interested benefits
if the union organizing campaign results in representation that ultimately leads to a
collective-bargaining contract that results in higher wages for newly organized workers.
Those benefits remain outside the court's eyesight.
A few illustrations may be helpful. The current leadership of the AFL-CIO op-
poses social security reform initiatives that include personal accounts.53 3 One need
not take a position on the wisdom of President Bush's initiative to understand that
if union dues are redeployed as part of a successful political campaign to block this
proposal, the benefits of union involvement cannot be limited to workers at Store
A. The benefits of the union's successful attempt to save social security are, in eco-
nomic terms, nonexcludable. Equally probable, individuals who are neither members
of the union nor members of the workforce may obtain possible economic benefits.
"' Beck v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1199 (4th Cir. 1985).
532 See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (apparently leaving to
the appellate court to determine which particular expenditures are allowed); Beck v. Commc'ns
Workers of Am., 800 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming federal jurisdiction).
133 Almeida, supra note 43.
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Union and nonunion retirees are examples. Moreover, separating economic from
all other forms of self-interested benefits is impossible. Saving social security may
increase an individual's sense of security without necessarily providing some
quantifiable pecuniary benefit. Similarly, monies spent on even incontestably direct
political activities may provide some tangible economic benefits or other self-interested
benefit to some, but not all, workers within a collective-bargaining unit consistent
with the known proclivities of cartels to attempt to expand their monopoly power.
Additionally, outsiders may become recipients of nonexcludable benefits derived from
the union sponsored activity.
Similarly, when the union pursues collective goods such as abortion rights or
marijuana decriminalization,5' these goods provide self-interested benefits consis-
tent with the knowledge that the pursuit of special-interest goods supplies concen-
trated (largely private) benefits to the few. 3 Framing this pursuit exclusively as a
limited search for economic benefits obtainable by union dissenters may provide
cover for the true beneficiaries' self-interest. Here, cover may take the form of an
unpersuasive conception of free riding. Operationally, judicial cover is supplied by
an inadequate search for all self-interested benefits attached to the challenged union
activity. According to Professor Budziszewski, the following paradigm applies:
"benefit incurs obligation, supreme benefit incurs supreme obligation."53 6 The ex-
clusion of certain benefits results in a corresponding exclusion of certain obligations
and certain obligors. Since the Ninth Circuit appears to exclude supreme beneficia-
ries, it must exclude, a fortiori, those who have incurred the supreme obligation.
Conversely, the court's asymmetry allows it to place the primary burden on its pre-
supposed, but not necessarily, supreme beneficiary - dues objectors.
The second strand of errors reinforces the errors associated with the first and is
directly connected to First Amendment concerns. Subject to the usual caveat about
causation, it is possible that union organizing efforts directed to workers at a compe-
titor, Store B, yield economic benefits (higher wages) for already organized workers
at Store A. Those benefits, however, may mask the true purpose and the primary
effect of such organizing - increasing the number of workers represented by the
local union which operates to expand total union dues revenue. Correlatively, addi-
tional dues revenues are then deployed principally to fuel the ideological and political
mission of union leaders or union majorities that are, for example, aimed at transform-
ing society via social disruption.5 37 This may require the election of a desired person
to government office. For union hierarchs, this necessitates, among other things,
'34 See, e.g., CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 30, at 18.
131 See Shaw, supra note 152, at 151.
536 BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 21, at 31.
... See, e.g.,CHAVEZ& GRAY, supra note 30, at 52 (discussing the radical agenda of labor
leader Dennis Rivera).
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"spending a larger percentage of... dues on the political education of... members." 3'
Given that the First Amendment can be seen as a key normative principle, 539 and given
that union members are likely to have diverse views concerning the benefits of
social disruption, the court's under-inclusive understanding of the political dimension
of union dues conflict threatens the freedom not to associate and freedom of speech
rights of union dissenters.
Risking repetition, I offer this summary. First, the court overestimates the self-
interested benefits obtained by already organized workers at Store A, derived from
the success of an organizing effort at Store B, by: (1) failing to require a causal con-
nection between economic benefits and union organizing expenditures purportedly
undertaken on their behalf, and (2) ignoring the self-interested benefits (private exter-
nalities) that actually flow from successful organizing, which accrue (perhaps dis-
proportionately) to the hierarchy, union majorities, or outsiders.40 Second, the Ninth
Circuit under-inclusively defines political expenditures by excluding from judicial
scrutiny union spending on organizing efforts that have the primary purpose and
effect of supporting political and ideological speech by expanding union strength in
the form of greater union coverage of an industry. The union's ideological and social
missions are strengthened when a large percentage of additional union dues revenue,
generated by compulsory dues paid by newly organized workers, migrates ultimately
to support non-representational activity that takes the shape of politics. The court's
current approach fails to provide a principled basis to explain any Board decision
concluding that a wide range of activities (political or otherwise) "may ultimately
inure"54' to the benefit of dues objectors. The NLRB has power, therefore, to authorize
labor unions to charge dues to all members even where the collective-bargaining
benefits, if any, remain attenuated.
Organizing can have at least two purposes: political and social transformation,
on the one hand, and pecuniary gains, on the other. Establishing the former elevates
First Amendment concerns. Diminishing the latter fortifies the former as well. Taken
together, the court's under-inclusiveness and overestimation may amount to a re-
gressive form of wealth redistribution that is unlikely to favor all workers in an
increasingly fragmented workplace while raising the probability that union dues
objectors will becomeforced riders.
538 Id. (quoting Dennis Rivera, Labor's Role in the PoliticalArena, in ANEW LABOR MOVE-
MENT FOR THE NEW CENTURY 241 (Gregory Mantsios ed., 1988)).
"9 For a discussion that concentrates on freedom and expressly adopts the First Amend-
ment as its guiding normative principle, see Benkler, supra note 69, at 26-28.
" It is unlikely that even a modest understanding of free riding compels financial support
of benefits that are provided to outsiders.
"4 This mistake can be linked to the Supreme Court's language in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991).
1392 [Vol. 14:1309
A CLEARING IN THE FOREST
Conceivably, of course, "a benevolent guardian that bargains against manage-
ment in the workers' best interest" might be found to lead a union.2 If this can
possibly be true, and assuming that all "workers' best interest" is uniformly the same,
then free riding may resurface as a possibility. I remain skeptical however, that such
a guardian can be found.543 Doubts are elevated both by virtue of the existence of dues
objectors and by a comprehensive understanding of the human diversity embedded
within the present-day workforce. It is neither likely that dues objectors have a dis-
guised preference for the political goals, nor is it likely that the objectors in United
Food obtained their fair share of the presumed economic benefits available. It is
probable, therefore, that the United Food court has not accommodated adequately
"first amendment-based doubts about compelling such financial subsidies." 544 On
the contrary, the United Food holding reifies the probability that national and local
unions will freeze out members with diverse preferences that operate within the
parameters of a contemporary conception of human autonomy, grounded in the thin,
Lehnert-derived argument that such activities will "ultimately inure to the benefit
of" dues objectors. 545
Since union dues objectors can be seen accurately as members of a distinct minor-
ity, judicial validation of challengeable union programs (such as organizing) that
constitute (indirectly or directly) an encroachment of their First Amendment interests
forecasts that courts may be better understood as serving the "veiled majoritarian
function of promoting popular preferences at the expense of minority interests. '546
Contemporaneously, union leaders insist that "the only way to start winning [political]
elections... [is] to organize. 5 47 Union leaders promote this symbiosis because they
believe it supplies self-interested benefits to someone. The calculations of union
hierarchs are unlikely to place minority interests (political or economic) at the top
of the union's agenda. On the contrary, union leaders will tend to fund political
candidates who share their own preferences. Notably, labor unions occupy seven
of the top ten spots on the latest lists of America's leading contributors to political
parties.54s Such evidence underscores the insight that
[t]he relevant difference between markets and politics does not
lie in the kinds of values/interests that persons pursue, but in the
conditions under which they pursue their various interests. Politics
542 Schwab, supra note 40, at 373.
54 See id. (discussing the unlikelihood of this guardian's existence).
5" Friesen, supra note 50, at 613 (describing "[the Supreme] Court's opinions, [which] taken
as a whole, .. . accommodate first amendment-based doubts.").
5"4 Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524.
546 Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 1971, 1974 (1990) (focusing on
racial minorities and judicial review).
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is a structure of complex exchange among individuals, a structure
within which persons seek to secure collectively their own pri-
vately defined objectives that cannot be efficiently secured though
simple market exchanges. 49
Although "[u]nion autocrats [may] hunger for the 'solidarity' that comes from
being able to compel all to join and pay .... if their services are as beneficial as they
claim, they should be able to succeed without the use of compulsion. 5 5 0 A labor
movement led by hierarchs that subordinates the interest of the rank-and-file to the
privately defined political and social preferences of the union hierarchy has no serious
claim on workers' allegiance.
Allegorically, just as a chalkboard has predisposed itself to be receptive to certain
kinds of writing instruments, so the United Food court believes that workers have
predisposed themselves to be vehicles for societal transformation.5 If societal trans-
formation is the object, compulsory enlistment implies that workers are the means
to achieve this end. Thus, one does not need to have a mind that is illuminated by
special revelation or intoxicated by the Supreme Court's postmodern formulation
of human autonomy 52 to recognize that objections to union dues are predictable and
that a world without them would be odd. Still, the United Food case, appreciated
dispassionately, provides a broad platform for expanding union efforts that constrain
intentionally or coincidentally the First Amendment rights of dues objectors. Prevent-
ing similar efforts in the future will likely require reform of the NLRA.
IV. A CLEARING IN THE FOREST
The United Food opinion signifies that imaginative statutory interpretation con-
duces to extend the NLRA beyond its self-imposed limits. There is no reason why
the Board, now liberated from Beck and, by extension, Ellis could not simply find
a basis somewhere within the statute or within a flawed conception of free riding to
extend United Food's teaching to organizing cases involving some general desire
to strengthen labor unions and the labor movement. The Ninth Circuit's opinion pro-
vides an opening for renewed efforts by union hierarchs to charge all represented
workers, dues objectors and non-objectors alike, with higher dues in pursuit of both
a stronger labor movement and greater political success. Activities seen previously
and uncontroversially as unrelated to representational duties and therefore as non-
chargeable expenses for dues objectors are likely to glide, deliberately or inadver-
tently, to the table.553 Nor is this claim simply idle speculation. In at least one case
549 Buchanan, supra note 181, at 107-08.
550 LEEF, supra note 87, at 34.
151 I am indebted to J. Budziszewski for this observation.
552 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
153 Examples might include extra bargaining unit activities to preclude the "Wal-Martization"
of the world, efforts aimed at raising the minimum wage, or sending extra bargaining unit
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pending before the NLRB, a union has asserted its right to charge private sector
employees for organizing efforts conducted within the public sector."5 4 It is possible
that if and when a union successfully organizes crossing guards employed by the
City of Green Bay, and if and when the crossing guards obtain a collective-bargain-
ing contract that provides higher wages, such activities will ultimately inure to the
benefit of Wisconsin area cheese and dairy industry workers. 5 Conversely, most
reasonable observers will decide that the contention that organizing crossings guards
constitutes a closely-related and therefore chargeable ingredient that supplies economic
benefits to dairy industry workers is unimaginably a bridge too far. Reforms that
preserve dues objectors' First Amendment values and their finances from majori-
tarian assaults associated with these kinds of non-representational activities that can
be seen to finance a union's political mission are overdue. The United Food opinion
supplies a pedestal from which to pursue union objectives that place union dissenters'
First Amendment interests at risk. I will, therefore, sketch a few proposals that may
act to impede this probability.
A. Prevent Information Asymmetry
It seems clear that as between unions and dues objectors, unions tend to have
access to the greatest amount of information. Equally probable, they have the greatest
incentive to blur the ideological, social, and purely private purposes that may be
embedded in compulsory union dues regimes. Nonetheless, "unions, set up to em-
power workers, provide far less financial information to their members - whose
mandatory fees support them - than a publicly held corporation must.., provide
to its shareholders.5 56 Accordingly, "in spite of the expansive revenue and legal privi-
leges unions possess," '557 unions generally face nominal financial disclosure require-
ments. 8 Though unions are compelled to provide Beck objectors who resign from
union membership with an independent audit, the NLRB has been far from convinced
of this obligation. 559 Typically, information provided to the rank-and-file does not
representatives out to organize non-competitor facilities or bring workers in from Bangladesh
to speak to UAW about Southeast Asian labor conditions. See, e.g., Jennifer John, Black Lake
on 20-City Tour, Three Women Tell ofAtrocities in Bangladesh, UAW Frontlines, http://www.
uaw.org/solidarity/02/0102/front06.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
'5' See Teamsters Local 75 (Schreiber Foods), 329 N.L.R.B. 28 (1999). The case remanded
for the development of further record on whether "organizing expenses are chargeable to dues
objectors." Id. at 32 & n. 14. Schreiber Foods, the employer, produces "cheese and related food
products." Id. at 42 (Biblowitz, ALJ).
555 See id. at 48.
556 Ken Boehm, Foreword in HUNTER, KERSEY & MILLER, supra note 35, at 1.
I" HUNTER, KERSEY & MILLER, supra note 35, at 3.
558 Id.
"9 See, e.g., Penrod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41,45-46 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (overruling the NLRB's
refusal to require a complete and thorough independent audit that provided the complainants
with a breakdown of expenditures that were placed into nonrepresentational categories sufficient
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have to meet an audit standard or a full disclosure standard,56 0 at least from the per-
spective of the NLRB.
Against this backdrop, a number of Supreme Court statements assume greater
force. In Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks v. Allen, the Court held that
"[s]ince the unions possess the facts and records from which the proportion of polit-
ical to total union expenditures can reasonably be calculated, basic considerations of
fairness compel that they, not the individual employees, bear the burden."56' Simi-
larly in Hudson, the Court held that "[b]asic considerations of fairness, as well as con-
cem for the First Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that the potential objectors
be given sufficient information to gauge the propriety of the union's fee., 56 2 The
D.C. Circuit "expressly applie[d] Hudson's requirements to new employees and finan-
cial core payors' 63 covered by the NLRA. Burdening unions with the requirement to
to inform objectors of how much dues were to be reduced for new employees and financial
core payors who exercised their Beck rights); Ferriso v. NLRB, 125 F.3d 865,866 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (disagreeing with the NLRB and holding that if a union collects a compulsory agency
fee, it is "required to provide [nonmembers] ... with an independent audit.., and that such
audits must ... conform to ordinary norms for audits of comparable entities"). NLRB
resistance to the imposition of an independent audit requirement may be abetted by a recent
Ninth Circuit decision disavowing the presumed necessity of providing audited financial
statements in the context of a dues objector dispute within the public sector. See Harik v. Cal.
Teachers Ass'n, 298 F.3d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 2002).
When information has been provided, some cases suggest that the union has engaged in
a policy of defining core (germane) expenditures too broadly supplemented by its failure to
fully inform workers of their right to object. See Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525
U.S. 33, 44 (1998) (holding that "a union [does not] breach[] the duty of fair representation
merely by negotiating a union security clause that uses the statutory language" contained in
section 8(a)(3) but fails to inform workers of the Beck decision).
51 See Penrod, 203 F.3d at 43. ("The Board [has] held that unions have no obligation to
tell employees.., what percentage of dues are spent on nonrepresentational activities."). The
NLRB apparently holds "that the standard by which a union's conduct is measured when it
exacts funds from objecting nonmembers [dues objectors] under a union-security clause is
the duty of fair representation." Teamsters Local 75 (Schreiber Foods), 329 N.L.R.B. 28, 30
(1999) (citing California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 228-30 (1995)).
When nonmembers object to a union's use of agency fees, the union
must reduce the fee so that it reflects representational expenditures only.
The union also must apprise the objector of the percentage of fees being
reduced, the basis for the calculation and the objectors' right to chal-
lenge the figures.
Id.
561 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963).
562 Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292,306 (1986). See also Abrams v. Commc'ns
Workers of Am., 59 F.3d 1373, 1379 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (applying Hudson to nonpublic
unions).
563 Penrod, 203 F.3d at 47 (citing Abrams, 59 F.3d at 1379). Currently the NLRB concurs
in the requirement that new workers be notified of their General Motors rights to refrain from
joining a union while retaining the obligation to pay germane union dues and fees. See, e.g.,
Teamsters Local 75 (Schreiber Foods), 329 N.L.R.B. at 29.
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provide complete and thorough information regarding all union financial allocations
(political or not) should be the right of all workers who are represented.
564
Understanding the difficulties that union dissenters confront enhances the attrac-
tiveness of this approach. Difficulties include persistent union opposition to efforts
by dues objectors to invoke their First Amendment rights,565 coupled with the require-
ment that dissenters must resign and lose their already limited union governance
rights. 566 This paradigm of limited financial disclosure may have been and may con-
tinue to be reinforced by the exploitation of campaign finance loopholes.567 Taken
together, this comprehensive pattern seems to allow unions "to pretend they spend
relatively little on politics, even while building tremendous political influence.""
The provision of full, complete, and accurate financial information to all union
members, including dues objectors, may be a step towards achieving actual, as opposed
to aspirational, democracy. 6 9 Without information, workers may have little incentive
6 It is clear that under California Saw, the NLRB requires the following:
[W]hen or before a union seeks to obligate an employee to pay fees and
dues under a union-security clause, the union should inform the em-
ployee that he has the right to be or remain a nonmember and that non-
members have the right (1) to object to paying for union activities not
germane to the union's duties as bargaining agent and to obtain a re-
duction in fees for such activities; (2) to be given sufficient information
to enable the employee to intelligently decide whether to object; and
(3) to be apprised of any internal union procedures for filing objections.
California Saw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 233. First, I have not found authority that confirms that
workers who elect to join the union have a right to receive the information specified in
California Saw on a continuing basis. Second, the NLRB affords unions with "wide range
of reasonableness ... in satisfying its duty of fair representation." Id. at 235.
565 See Knollenberg, supra note 34, at 364 (explaining that workers who "take on the union
establishment [will] find the process.., marked by threats of life and family, intimidation,
insults, and coercion"); see also Penrod, 203 F.3d at 46 (noting that "Beck objectors.., were
given only general categories of expenditures.").
566 Hutchison, supra note 86, at 486 (arguing that if a dues objectors is compelled to resign
and if her governance rights have value to her, her "resignation should serve to increase the
amount of forced riding she incurs").
567 See Hutchison, supra note 216, at 727.
568 Id. (footnote omitted).
569 Undeniably, any effort to reform the NLRA will encounter contrary arguments by com-
mentators who "favor legal changes that will make it easier to unionize because ... [they]
believe [the] continued decline in unionization is bad not only for unions and their members
but for the entire society." RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do?
250 (1984). In an effort to defend labor unions, some commentators advert to the possibility
that union democracy provides sufficient protection for union dissenters. Nonetheless, some
observers admit the obvious: "[any democracy - whether a labor organization or a national
government - inevitably calls for the subordination of some individual preferences." Friesen,
supra note 50, at 646. While corroboration of the link between unions and inescapable
subordination may be salutary news to union dissenters, democracy remains an unpromising
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(a) to resign from the union (a predicate to becoming a dues objector), or (b) to enforce
their Beck rights. A statutory enactment that requires unions to provide full and
complete information is warranted.
In order to give full effect to this proposal, Congress must ensure that the NLRB
and the courts demand proof that the challenged expenditures have more than a con-
jectural connection to a defensible collective bargaining purpose. Complemented
by statutorily confirmed burden shifting57° that ensures the burden of proof with respect
to the veracity of information is retained by the union, this rule would require unions
to prove affirmatively the causal connection between the challenged activity and the
stated collective bargaining benefit. This would give life to the ongoing incorpora-
tion of Hudson principles against private sector unions. 7' Furthermore, Congress
should require that the quality and quantum of the evidence supplied by the union
meet a high standard of evidentiary proof.
B. Ensure that Dues Objectors Have the Right, Coupled With Incentives, to Bring
Their Claims in Federal District Court
Since most union dues disputes are connected (whether formally or not) to the
duty of fair representation framework and First Amendment values, union dissenters
should be encouraged by statutory enactment to bring their claim in federal district
source to safeguard workers' dissent for two reasons. First, unions do not operate generally
as a democracy. See, e.g., Schwab, supra note 40, at 368-70. Consistent with that obser-
vation, Andrew Stem, President of the Service Employees International Union (SEIU), wants
to rebuild the union movement by "restor[ing] the labor bureaucracy's social and political
clout as a whole at the expense of small unions - and union democracy - to rebuild leverage
in particular industries." Lee Sustar, AFL-CIO: The Limits of Partnership, INT'L SOCIALIST
REv., July/Aug. 2005, available at http://www. isreview.org/issues/42/labordebate.shtml.
Second, democracy, if it exists, falls prey to John Stuart Mill's observation that democracy is
insufficient to protect disfavored subgroups and individuals from the coercive power that can
be exercised or authorized by a majority. See PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, THE RIGHT QUESTIONS:
TRUTH, MEANING & PUBLIC DEBATE 149 (2002) (discussing John Stuart Mill). Consequently,
democracy enhancement strategies are unlikely to preserve the diversity of preferences
situated within contemporary unions.
570 Some federal appellate opinions already exist that move toward the placement of the
burden on unions. See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507,524 (1991) ("[A]s
always, the union bears the burden of proving the proportion of chargeable expense to total
expense.").
' See, e.g., Penrod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Following Hudson, where "the
union paid more than half its income to affiliated organizations, but informed nonmembers
only that they were required to pay 95% of full dues," the D.C. Circuit Court acknowledged
that the Supreme Court ordered, "unless a union demonstrates that 'none of [the amount paid
to affiliates] was used to subsidize activities for which nonmembers may not be charged,' then
'an explanation of the share that was so used [is] surely required."' Id. at 47 (alterations in
original) (quoting Chi. Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 307 (1986)).
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court rather than simply asserting an unfair labor practice or duty of fair represen-
tation claim before the NLRB. The right to bring suit in federal court should be
toughened by sanctions that provide disincentives for unions to delay such pro-
ceedings and financial incentives to encourage dissenters to litigate the dispute in
court. A statutory right would constitute a normative statement that society takes
union dues objections seriously. In other words, society should see union dues ob-
jections in light of the Communications Workers of America v. Beck 572 case, which
took more than nine years to prosecute fully. 573 A statutory right to bring such lawsuits,
coupled with a full panoply of sanctions that are enforceable against unions that
flagrantly obstruct dues objectors' rights, should be given careful study. Sanctions,
including punitive damages if necessary, may lead to a more expeditious review of
dues objector cases. Overall, this approach is likely to provide an obstacle to elastic
statutory interpretation and often delayed NLRB decision-making. 4 Under this
approach, judicial deference will continue to be warranted only with respect to
NLRB unfair labor practice adjudication of complaints attached directly to statutory
language such as section 8(a)(3). Ifjudicial deference were to continue with respect
to complaints implicating the union's duty of fair representation or an infringement
of the workers' First Amendment rights, this would signify that society fails to take
seriously the First Amendment issues at stake. Congress should consider amending
the NLRA to give effect to this proposal.
C. Infuse the Union Dues Dispute With First Amendment Values
Lastly, when deciding First Amendment challenges, courts should adopt (or be
required to adopt) an extraordinarily broad conception of First Amendment norms
as an antidote to union attempts to camouflage the actual aim of union dues expen-
ditures. Indeed, the courts should infuse the union dues dispute with a robust under-
standing of First Amendment values. While there is every reason to believe that
unions, and more particularly union leaders, are unlikely to welcome proposals that
tend to diminish their power and their "right" to speak on behalf of the entire work-
force, it is, of course, the communicative content of such speech that prompts this
initiative. First Amendment values are unlikely to be worth much if and when the
free-rider presumption is maintained unjustifiably by either the courts, the NLRB,
or unions that shelter expenditures having a primary or substantial effect of promot-
ing offensive speech. Congress can breathe life into First Amendment values by
reviewing and reworking its free-rider analyses to ensure that free-rider fears cannot
572 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
5" The employees filed their suit in federal district court in June 1976, and the Supreme
Court issued its decision on June 29, 1988. See id. at 735, 739.
5" The first NLRB decision that took into account the Beck case was California Saw &
Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 239 (1995).
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trump First Amendment values. A minimal first step would be to disallow the legal
sufficiency of any union claim that a program or activity is chargeable because it
may "ultimately inure to the benefit" of workers. The enactment of this proposal
will provide helpful guidance to the courts.
Taken together, these proposals offer a clearing in a dense forest that has obscured
the necessity of establishing a causal connection between contested expenditures and
collective bargaining. Left unattended, the leaves, the overgrown flora, and the debris
cabined by this forest may conceal the true purpose associated with union orga-
nizing. This increasingly impenetrable forest has protected predictable free-rider
presumptions grounded in the illusion that unions provide an enduring community.
Failure to enact these proposals may allow the United Food decision to become a
sturdy platform from which to expand union political strength at the expense of the
growing diversity of interests present in America's contemporary workforce and in
derogation of First Amendment norms.
CONCLUSION
The union movement suffers from the belief in humanity's capacity to control
society in pursuit of an ideal - "collective self-determination" '575 - that is not only
desirable (for some) but also impossible. Both the NLRB and some courts have be-
come receptive to the possibilities associated with this belief. Ultimately, this con-
viction in its compulsory form, as well as the United Food opinion itself, may be
driven by the notion that conscious control or direction of social processes provides
an avenue to a new, improved, and progressive social welfare future that seems implicit
in some version of egalitarianism born of social disruption. Proponents of this form
of social progress are likely to be "indifferent as between achieving equality through
taking away from those who have and giving to those who have not. ,576 The various
goods that contemporary workers seek are irreducibly different and incommen-
surably complex. Vitiating individual autonomy and eviscerating individual prefer-
ences may be seen accordingly as acceptable casualties by labor unions that were
formed to deal initially with the inequality of bargaining presumption, but which
now have been transmuted into institutions that have another and larger purpose -
obtaining the Good.
When labor leaders link organizing efforts with their politics, their conception
of the Good, however self-interested, becomes more attainable. One of the Good's
indispensable fundamentals consists of imposed financial support. This process gives
rise, unhappily, to the hypothesis that union hierarchs have become "acolytes en-
thralled" and captured 577 by their attachment to talismanic rhetoric, who presume the
575 See KUKATHAS, supra note 175, at 18.
576 JOHN GRAY, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF MARKET INSTITUTIONS 35 (1992).
57 MARVA J. DAWN, POWERS, WEAKNESS, AND THE TABERNACLING OF GOD 6 (2001).
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coherence of a particular way of life... and who seek to impose the benefits of this
life on others579 who remain unwilling to capitulate to unions' centralizing impulse.
It is doubtful that even a majority of workers desire to share in this way of life
that may yield, at best, attenuated benefits. Since unions spend or are likely to spend
most of their dues revenues on nonrepresentational activities, society should reject
the NLRA' s failure to preclude compulsory payments for "any particular union goal
including the goal of political influence.5 8 ' This contention should be required to
surmount two obstacles: the union's duty of fair representation obligation and a
principled, yet robust, understanding of First Amendment values. The conscription
of funds, largely to achieve one's own private purposes, is unlikely to withstand any
ethical examination grounded in a fair understanding of human autonomy and liberty.
This examination of the union dues dispute implies that labor unions can no
longer be conceived of as true member-based organizations; nor can they be conceived
of as part of what was once seen as "a proud mass movement that... [endeavored
to] improve[]... the lives of its members in vital segments of the [then] manufacturing-
based economy. 5 81 Instead, labor unions have become "special-interest adjunct[s]"
to political allies while often failing to serve the actual interests of their members.582
Urgent legislative action and principled judicial decision-making should be seen as
important elements of any effort that aims to decouple politics from collective bar-
gaining. Ultimately, such efforts may breathe life into Senator Dirksen's observa-
tion that "the Constitution [should serve] as a shield between the working man and
the union officials who seek to force him to join a union or pay tribute ... as the
price of keeping his job, 5 83 and revitalize the Supreme Court's claim that "the right
to work for a living in the common occupations of the community is... the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure. 584
578 Yack, supra note 161, at 3.
179 Id. at 8-9.
580 Friesen, supra note 50, at 647 (emphasis in original).
581 Michael McMenamin, Labor Lost: Why the AFL-CIO's Cynical Survival Strategy Is
Doomed, REASON, Nov. 2000, at 47, 48.
582 Id. at 48.
583 Everett McKinley Dirksen, Individual Freedom Versus Compulsory Unionism: A
Constitutional Problem, 15 DEPAUL L. REv. 259, 275 (1966).
'84 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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